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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges 
SCIRICA, AMBRO, FUENTES, FISHER, CHAGARES  
and VANASKIE, join. 
 
At issue on appeal in this class action litigation is the 
propriety of the District Court‘s certification of two 
nationwide settlement classes comprising purchasers of 
diamonds from De Beers S.A. and related entities (―De 
Beers‖).1  The settlement provided for a fund of $295 million 
to be distributed to both the direct and indirect purchasers:  
the direct purchasers were to receive $22.5 million of the 
fund, while the indirect purchasers would receive $272.5 
                                                 
1
 The Settlement involved five individual class actions 
pending in federal court and two other class suits pending in 
state court.  The individual federal suits presently before us 
are:  Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., Index No. 04-cv-02819 
(D.N.J.); Null v. DB Investments, Inc., Madison Co. No. 05-
L-209 (Madison County, Ill. Cir. Ct., removed to S.D. Ill.); 
Leider v. Ralfe, No. 01-CV-3137 (S.D.N.Y.); Anco Industrial 
Diamond Corp. v. DB Investments, Inc., No. 01-cv-04463 
(D.N.J.); and British Diamond Import Co. v. Central 
Holdings Ltd., No. 04-cv-04098 (D.N.J.).  The two other class 
actions pending in state court pertinent to the Settlement and 
this set of appeals are: Hopkins v. De Beers Centenary A.G., 
San Francisco County No. CGC-04-432954 (Cal. Super. Ct.), 
and Cornwell v. DB Investments, Inc., Maricopa Co. No. 
CV2005-2968 (Ariz. Super. Ct.). 
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million.  A panel of our Court held that the District Court‘s 
ruling was inconsistent with the predominance inquiry 
mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), and 
remanded the matter for further proceedings.  See Sullivan v. 
DB Investments, Inc., 613 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en 
banc granted and vacated by Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 
619 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2010).  We then granted the plaintiffs‘ 
petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the prior order.  
Accordingly, we address anew the propriety of the District 
Court‘s certification of the direct and indirect purchaser 
classes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) 
and 23(b)(3), and also consider for the first time the 
objections raised to the fairness of the class settlement.
2
 
We believe that the predominance inquiry should be 
easily resolved here based on De Beers‘s conduct and the 
injury it caused to each and every class member, and that the 
straightforward application of Rule 23 and our precedent 
should result in affirming the District Court‘s order certifying 
the class.  But the objectors to the class certification and our 
dissenting colleagues insist that, when deciding whether to 
certify a class, a district court must ensure that each class 
member possesses a viable claim or ―some colorable legal 
claim,‖ (Dissenting Op. at 10).  We disagree, and 
accordingly, we will reason through our analysis in a more 
                                                 
2
 Because the Panel found the certification of the class to be 
flawed, it did not reach the Rule 23 fairness objections to the 
settlement, distribution plan, and fee award, or the District 
Court‘s resolution of these objections.  See Sullivan, 613 F.3d 
at 142 n.6.  Because we now conclude that the District 
Court‘s certification of the proposed settlement was 
appropriate, we will also address these issues. 
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deliberate manner in order to explain why the addition of this 
new requirement into the Rule 23 certification process is 
unwarranted.  
 
 
I.  Factual & Procedural Background 
A.  Present Litigation & Settlement Proceedings 
The allegations in the present case arose from De 
Beers‘s undisputed position as the dominant participant in the 
wholesale market for gem-quality diamonds throughout much 
of the twentieth century.
3
  It is alleged that, beginning in 1890 
and continuing through the filing of the Complaints at issue in 
this appeal, De Beers coordinated the worldwide sales of 
diamonds by, inter alia, executing output-purchase 
agreements with competitors, synchronizing and setting 
production limits, restricting the resale of diamonds within 
certain geographic regions, and directing marketing and 
advertising.  Through its coordinated network of diamond 
producers, De Beers was able to value diamonds according to 
certain physical characteristics and to then control the 
quantity and prices of diamonds in the marketplace by strictly 
regimenting sales to preferred wholesalers, known as 
                                                 
3
 The vacated Panel Opinion describes the history, 
progression to power, and eventual market dominance of De 
Beers and its related entities in greater detail.  See Sullivan, 
613 F.3d at 138-39.  For the sake of brevity, we provide a 
summary. 
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―sightholders.‖4  Sightholders resold these diamonds to 
jewelry manufacturers and retailers – either as rough 
diamonds or as cut, polished, and finished stones – and 
constituted De Beers‘s primary channel for distribution of its 
diamonds.
5
   
Between 2001 and 2002, plaintiffs brought suit 
complaining that De Beers‘s aforementioned business 
                                                 
4
 Sightholders are selected by De Beers‘s subsidiary 
Diamond Trading Company (―DTC‖) based upon specific 
criteria, ―including their financial standing and reliability, 
their market position, their distribution ability, their 
marketing ability, and their compliance with Diamond 
Trading Company Diamond Best Practice Principles.‖  
(App‘x 1438.)  In 2006, DTC had ninety-three sightholders, 
nine of which had head offices in the United States and 
seventy-six of which had sales offices in the country.  (Id.)  
Sightholders sell both rough and polished diamonds, as well 
as diamond jewelry.  (Id.)  By way of example, the retailer 
Tiffany & Co. is a majority-owner of the South African 
sightholder Rand Precision Cut Diamonds, which sells 
polished diamonds and manufactures jewelry for sale in 
Tiffany stores.  (Id. 1438-39.) 
5
 The process by which De Beers sold its rough diamonds 
entailed a ―diamond pipeline,‖ which began with the sale of 
rough diamonds and ended with the purchase of retail 
diamond jewelry by consumers.  The participants in the 
diamond pipeline included rough stone wholesalers, cutters 
and polishers of rough diamonds, finished stone wholesalers, 
diamond jewelry manufacturers and wholesalers, and 
retailers. 
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practices contravened state and federal antitrust, consumer 
protection, and unjust enrichment laws, and constituted unfair 
business practices and false advertising under common law 
and relevant state statutes.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged 
that De Beers exploited its market dominance to artificially 
inflate the prices of rough diamonds; this, in turn, caused 
reseller and consumer purchasers of diamonds and diamond-
infused products to pay an unwarranted premium for such 
products.  The initial two price-fixing lawsuits were filed in 
the United States District Courts for the District of New 
Jersey and the Southern District of New York in 2001, and 
five subsequent lawsuits were initiated in federal and state 
courts in other parts of the country.
6
  Three of the lawsuits 
                                                 
6
 The theories of recovery in the individual cases are as 
follows:  Anco Industrial was filed on behalf of all direct 
purchasers of rough diamonds pursuant to Clayton Act §§ 4 
and 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26, to prevent and restrain 
violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
2.  British Diamond was filed on behalf of direct purchasers 
of polished diamonds pursuant to Clayton Act §§ 4 and 16, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26, to prevent and restrain violations of §§ 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.  Cornwell was 
filed on behalf of all purchasers of diamonds in Arizona 
pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1402 for 
monopolization of the market for diamonds, and under § 44-
1403 for establishment, maintenance or use of monopoly.  
Hopkins was filed on behalf of California residents who 
purchased diamonds in California pursuant to Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 16720, et seq., alleging engagement in a 
continuing unlawful restraint of trade; pursuant to § 17200, et 
seq., for violation of the unfair competition law; and under 
California common law for monopolization and attempted 
15 
 
were filed in state court in Arizona, California, and Illinois, 
respectively; the last was then removed to the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.  The five 
suits in federal court were subsequently all transferred to and 
consolidated in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, and are presently before us. 
The plaintiffs in the seven cases are best characterized 
as falling within one of two types of purchaser classes.  The 
first category includes direct purchasers of gem diamonds, 
who purchased directly from De Beers or one of its 
                                                                                                             
monopolization.  Leider was filed on behalf of consumers 
who purchased diamonds or diamond jewelry pursuant to the 
Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11; under § 16 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, for injunctive relief in 
connection with §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and for 
damages for violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act; pursuant to 
federal and New York state common law for damages and 
injunctive relief; under N.Y. Gen. Bus. §§ 349-350; and under 
New York‘s Donnelly Act and the antitrust laws of fifteen 
other states and the District of Columbia.  Null was filed on 
behalf of all purchasers of De Beers diamonds pursuant to 
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505/1, et seq., and § 510/2, alleging 
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices, and, in the alternative, pursuant to the consumer 
fraud and deceptive practice laws of the various states where 
purchases of diamonds were made.  Sullivan was filed on 
behalf of a class of all persons and businesses in the United 
States who purchased polished diamonds indirectly from De 
Beers pursuant to §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act for 
injunctive relief, and pursuant to state antitrust and deceptive 
practices acts for monetary relief. 
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competitors (―Direct Purchaser Class‖ or ―Direct 
Purchasers‖).  These plaintiffs advanced claims of price-
fixing and monopolization pursuant to §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, and sought monetary and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.  The second category 
of plaintiffs consists of indirect purchasers of rough or cut-
and-polished diamonds; this category of consumers, jewelry 
retailers and other middlemen acquired diamonds from 
sightholders or other direct purchasers, rather than directly 
from De Beers or its competitors (―Indirect Purchaser Class‖ 
or ―Indirect Purchasers‖).  While both categories of 
purchasers alleged the same antitrust injury and sought 
injunctive relief pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act, the 
Indirect Purchasers sought damages pursuant only to state 
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment statutes 
and common law. 
As it had for well over a half-century, De Beers 
initially rejected the plaintiffs‘ assertion that courts in the 
United States possessed personal jurisdiction over it and its 
associated entities, arguing that it never transacted business 
directly in the United States.  De Beers refused to appear in 
the lawsuits, resulting in defaults or default judgments being 
entered against it in each of the filed cases with the exception 
of Cornwell.  While continuing to insist that these default 
judgments were unenforceable, counsel for De Beers 
approached plaintiffs‘ counsel in May 2005 to discuss 
settlement of the Indirect Purchasers‘ claims.  These 
discussions yielded an agreement to settle Sullivan, Hopkins, 
Null, and Cornwell (the ―Indirect Purchaser Settlement‖), 
with De Beers agreeing to establish a settlement fund of $250 
million to be distributed to class members, and further 
agreeing not to contest certification of a settlement class of 
17 
 
indirect purchasers.
7
  The settlement also provided for a 
stipulated injunction, enjoining De Beers from engaging in 
certain conduct violative of United States antitrust laws.  
Pursuant to the settlement, De Beers would consent to the 
District Court‘s jurisdiction for the limited purpose of 
fulfilling the terms of the settlement and enforcement of the 
injunction. 
The District Court entered an order on November 30, 
2005, preliminarily approving the Indirect Purchaser 
Settlement and conditionally certifying a settlement class of 
Indirect Purchasers pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(2) – for purposes of entering the stipulated 
injunction – and 23(b)(3) – in order to distribute the 
settlement fund to class members. 
De Beers then entered into settlement discussions with 
plaintiffs‘ counsel for the Direct Purchasers in Anco and 
British Diamond, ultimately reaching an agreement in March 
2006.  The latter agreement paralleled the Indirect Purchaser 
Settlement in that De Beers agreed to not contest certification 
of a Direct Purchaser settlement class, to abide by 
substantively identical injunctive relief as imposed under the 
Indirect Purchaser Settlement, and to establish a $22.5 million 
fund to satisfy the Direct Purchasers‘ claims.  As part of this 
settlement, De Beers also agreed to increase the Indirect 
Purchaser Settlement fund by $22.5 million to accommodate 
those putative class members characterized as Indirect 
Purchasers in the lawsuits filed by the Direct Purchasers who 
had not participated in the Indirect Purchaser Settlement.   
                                                 
7
 The Leider plaintiffs subsequently reached agreement with 
the parties to the Indirect Purchaser Settlement to resolve that 
matter in accordance with the terms of the Settlement. 
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On March 31, 2006, the District Court modified its 
November 30, 2005 Order to conditionally certify both the 
Direct and Indirect Purchaser settlement classes under Rules 
23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), and to preliminarily approve a 
combined settlement fund for both classes totaling $295 
million, of which $22.5 million was allotted to Direct 
Purchasers and $272.5 million was allocated to the Indirect 
Purchaser claims.  The combined settlement also provided for 
entry of a stipulated injunction, which required De Beers to, 
inter alia, comply with and abide by federal and state antitrust 
laws, to limit its purchases of diamonds from third-party 
producers, to abstain from setting or fixing the prices of 
diamonds sold by third-party producers, to desist from 
restricting the geographic regions within which sightholders 
could resell De Beers diamonds, and barred De Beers from 
purchasing diamonds in the United States for the principal 
purpose of restraining supply.  Notably, De Beers agreed to 
subject itself to personal jurisdiction in the United States for 
purposes of enforcing the combined settlement agreement. 
B.  Special Master & Objections 
 After granting preliminary approval to the combined 
settlement agreement, the District Court referred the case to a 
Special Master pursuant to Rules 23, 53, and 54 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to consider and recommend 
a plan for dissemination of the Notice of Settlement, a 
distribution plan for members of the Indirect and Direct 
Purchaser settlement classes, division of the fund between the 
Indirect Purchaser reseller and consumer subclasses, the 
amount of incentive awards for named plaintiffs, and the fee 
requests filed by plaintiffs‘ counsel.  After two years of 
proceedings, the Special Master authored several lengthy 
Report and Recommendations finding the settlement fair, 
19 
 
reasonable, and adequate based upon the parties‘ agreement 
to seek the certification of the following two nationwide 
Settlement Classes: 
(i) The ―Direct Purchaser Class.‖  All 
natural persons and legal entities located in the 
United States who purchased any Gem 
Diamond directly from a Defendant or 
Defendants‘ Competitors (including any entity 
controlled by or affiliated with any such party) 
from September 20, 1997 to the date of 
settlement class certification.  The class shall 
exclude Defendants, the officers, directors or 
employees of any Defendant, any entity in 
which any Defendant has a controlling interest, 
any affiliate of any Defendant, Defendants‘ 
Competitors, any person or entity which is or 
was a Sightholder for the time period(s) during 
which such person or entity had Sightholder 
status, any federal, state or local governmental 
entity, and any judicial officer presiding over 
this Settlement, and any member of the judicial 
officer‘s family and court staff; and 
(ii) The ―Indirect Purchaser Class.‖  All 
natural persons and legal entities located in the 
United States who purchased any Diamond 
Product from January 1, 1994 to the date of 
settlement class certification, provided that any 
purchases of any Gem Diamond made directly 
from a Defendant (including any entity in which 
any Defendant has a controlling interest and any 
affiliate of any Defendant) or Defendants‘ 
competitors (including any entity controlled by 
20 
 
or affiliated with any such party) shall be 
excluded.  The class shall also exclude 
Defendants, the officers, directors or employees 
of any Defendant, any entity in which any 
Defendant has a controlling interest, any 
affiliate of any Defendant, any federal, state or 
local governmental entity, and any judicial 
officer presiding over this Settlement, and any 
member of the judicial officer‘s family and 
court staff. 
(App‘x 270 (quoting September 4, 2007 Report and 
Recommendation of Special Master Alfred M. Wolin 
(―R&R‖) at 21, App‘x 1433-34).)  The Indirect Purchaser 
Class was further subdivided into two subclasses for purposes 
of effectuating the Settlement Agreement: 
(1) The ―Indirect Purchaser Reseller Subclass,‖ 
consisting of all members of the Indirect Purchaser 
Class who purchased any diamond product for resale; 
and 
(2) The ―Indirect Purchaser Consumer Subclass,‖ 
consisting of all members of the Indirect Purchaser 
Class who purchased any diamond product for use and 
not for resale. 
(Id. 270-71.)
8
 
                                                 
8
 The Indirect Purchaser Consumer Subclass is estimated to 
contain between 67 and 117 million members, while the 
Indirect Purchaser Reseller Subclass contains an estimated 
38,152 members.  The Direct Purchaser Class is estimated to 
contain approximately 130 members.  (App‘x 275 n.1.) 
21 
 
After reviewing the record, the competing econometric 
reports furnished by several experts, and other reliable data, 
the Special Master recommended that, apart from the $22.5 
million allocated to the Direct Purchaser Class,
9
 the Indirect 
Purchaser Settlement Fund of $272.5 million should be 
allocated 50.3%, approximately $137.1 million, to the 
Resellers Subclass, and 49.7%, approximately $135.4 million, 
to the Consumers Subclass.
10
  (App‘x 1508.)  Unlike Direct 
                                                 
9
 The Special Master advised that distribution of the Direct 
Purchaser Settlement Fund be conducted on a pro rata basis 
and that each Direct Class member receive the Net Settlement 
amount multiplied by the quotient of the Adjusted Purchases 
of the claimant divided by the aggregate Adjusted Purchases 
of all approved direct purchaser claims.  The Adjusted 
Purchases of a claimant would be calculated by multiplying 
the amount paid for Rough Diamonds by 1.22 (the average 
Rough to Polished Matrix factor), and adding the total 
amount paid for Polished Diamonds.   (App‘x 1533-34.) 
10
 The Special Master recommended that the Indirect 
Purchaser Consumer Subclass receive a pro rata share of the 
Indirect Purchaser Settlement Fund, calculated by multiplying 
the Net Consumer settlement fund amount by the quotient of 
a consumer‘s total recognized diamond claim divided by the 
total recognized diamond claims of all consumers.  (App‘x 
1547.)  In contrast, a Reseller Subclass member‘s claim 
would be calculated in a three step process:  (1) all of the 
claimant‘s diamond purchases are converted to the common 
metric of polished wholesale value and adjusted to reflect the 
number of years each Reseller operated during the class 
period; (2) claims are weighted by applying the absorption 
weighting factor derived from a fixed effects regression 
22 
 
Purchasers, who purchased diamonds only, Indirect 
Purchasers generally purchased jewelry and other products 
containing diamonds; given this, the Special Master 
attempted to ascertain the cost of the diamonds in the final 
purchased product separate and apart from the cost of other 
components.  The Special Master further recommended that 
claims that would result in de minimis recoveries from the 
settlement fund – equating to less than ten dollars11  – not be 
paid in light of high administrative costs.
12
   
With respect to plaintiffs‘ counsel‘s request for 
                                                                                                             
analysis for each type of diamond purchase; and (3) the 
claimant‘s pro rata share of the Reseller Subclass settlement 
fund is the ratio of the claimant‘s ―absorption adjusted 
purchases‖ to the sum of all claimants‘ ―absorption adjusted 
purchases.‖  (Id. 1575.) 
 
11
 The Special Master‘s report noted that Indirect Purchaser 
Consumer claims aggregating less than $165 for mixed stone 
jewelry or products, and less than $95 for diamond only 
jewelry or products, would be considered de minimis.  (App‘x 
1547-48.) 
12
 Additionally, the Special Master recommended a four-
part notification program – entailing direct notice, publication 
notice, ―earned media outreach‖ in the form of press releases 
and news reporting, and electronic notice – finding that it 
provided notice ―in a reasonable manner to all class members 
who would be bound by the proposed settlement.‖  (App‘x 
1518-27 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)).)  The District Court 
adopted this recommendation and method of notification in 
its October 1, 2007 Order. 
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attorneys‘ fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses, the 
Special Master recommended a percentage of recovery 
approach with a lodestar cross-check, and concluded that the 
request for 25% of the settlement fund in fees, and for under 
1% of the fund in expenses, was fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.
13
  The Special Master further decided that the 
$220,000 in incentive awards sought on behalf of class 
representatives was appropriate in light of the benefits 
conferred upon the class and the risks incurred in engaging in 
litigation. 
In response to the preliminary certification of the 
Settlement Agreement and the Special Master‘s 
recommendations, the District Court received twenty separate 
objections on behalf of thirty-seven objectors.  All of the 
objectors were members of the Indirect Purchaser Class; none 
of the Direct Purchasers objected to the Settlement.
14
  Fifteen 
of the twenty objections opposed class certification of the 
settlement, four objected to the stipulated provision for 
injunctive relief, six opposed the allocation and distribution of 
the Settlement Funds, and nine objected to the provisions for 
attorneys‘ fees.  As required by the Federal Rules, the District 
Court conducted a Fairness Hearing in the matter on April 14, 
2008.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 
The objectors challenging the propriety of certifying 
                                                 
13
 The District Court rejected the Special Master‘s 
recommendation of adding a percentage of the interest earned 
on the total settlement fund to the total attorneys‘ fees. 
14
 Four objectors were members of the Indirect Purchaser 
Reseller Subclass and thirty-three objectors belonged to the 
Indirect Purchaser Consumer Subclass.  (App‘x 272.) 
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the two settlement classes raised two primary arguments.  
First, the objectors contended that a nationwide class of 
Indirect Purchasers should not be certified under Rule 
23(b)(3) for purposes of administering a monetary settlement 
of state law claims because significant differences existed 
among the various antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust 
enrichment laws of the relevant state jurisdictions.  
Specifically, the objectors argued that the substantive law of 
many states prohibits indirect purchasers from recovering 
damages for antitrust injuries, exposing the class to 
particularized legal variations and precluding a finding that 
common questions of law or fact predominated over 
individual issues.
15
  Second, the objectors challenged the 
certification of both Direct and Indirect Purchaser classes for 
purposes of implementing injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(2).  The objectors asserted that the market for rough 
gem diamonds had become competitive during the course of 
the instant litigation, rendering an injunction to enforce 
compliance with antitrust laws superfluous, and divesting the 
Indirect Purchasers of antitrust standing to seek relief. 
Other objections challenged the fairness and adequacy 
of the Settlement and the plan of allocation for the Indirect 
Purchaser Settlement Fund as between the Reseller and 
Consumer Subclasses, averring that each class member would 
                                                 
15
 A related objection was filed on grounds that the equal 
allocation of the Indirect Purchaser Settlement Fund without 
consideration of a claimant‘s state of controlling law was 
improper since some states purportedly prohibited recovery 
by indirect purchasers.  These objectors asserted that class 
members from states permitting indirect purchaser recovery 
should be entitled to greater monetary compensation. 
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collect only $1-2 in exchange for their full release of claims 
against De Beers if every single putative class member 
requested compensation; also, they might receive nothing 
under the de minimis provision in the Settlement.  Objectors 
also urged that the award of attorneys‘ fees to plaintiffs‘ 
counsel was excessive and unreasonable in a default 
judgment case with minimal litigation. 
C.  Acceptance and Certification of Class Settlement 
In its May 22, 2008 Opinion, the District Court 
considered and rejected each of the objections.  Responding 
to the Rule 23(b)(3) objections, the Court concluded that 
differences in state antitrust and consumer protection statutes 
did not override class commonalities.  Observing that 
―‗predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging 
consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust 
laws,‘‖ (App‘x 276 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997))), the District Court noted that ―at 
the class certification stage, the Court need not concern itself 
with whether Plaintiffs can prove their allegations‖ so long as 
they ―‗make a threshold showing that the elements of impact 
will predominantly involve generalized issues of proof, rather 
than questions which are particular to each member of the 
plaintiff class,‘‖ (id. 277 (quoting In re Linerboard Antitrust 
Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 2002)).)  In this regard, the 
District Court presented the following operative factual and 
legal inquiries that, in its view, constituted common questions 
that predominated over individual issues in the litigation: 
(a) Whether Defendants combined or 
conspired with others to fix, raise, 
stabilize and maintain the prices of 
polished diamonds; 
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(b) Whether Defendants monopolized or 
combined or conspired with others to 
monopolize the supply of polished 
diamonds; 
(c) Whether Defendants‘ conduct caused the 
prices of polished diamonds to be 
maintained at higher levels than would 
exist in a competitive market; 
(d)  Whether Plaintiffs and the Classes are 
entitled to injunctive relief; and 
(e) Whether Defendants‘ conduct caused 
injury to the business or property of 
Plaintiffs and the other Class and 
Subclass Members and, if so, the 
appropriate class-wide measure of 
damages. 
(App‘x 276 (alterations omitted).)  The District Court also 
stressed that all class members shared a common 
jurisdictional question pertaining to De Beers‘s refusal to 
submit to the jurisdiction of United States courts and the 
potential burden of confirming domestic contacts for purposes 
of establishing personal jurisdiction.  (Id. 279.) 
Considering the nature of De Beers‘s central role in the 
alleged diamond conspiracy, the Court determined that each 
class member shared ―a similar legal question arising from 
whether De Beers engaged in a broad conspiracy‖ aimed at 
affecting diamond prices in the United States; concurrently, 
all class members shared common factual issues pertaining to 
the form, duration, and extent of the conspiracy.  (App‘x 278-
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79.)  The Court concluded that the totality of common issues 
predominated over individual questions, and, as a result, the 
objectors‘ assertion that disparities in state law precluded a 
nationwide class settlement was unavailing.  In its analysis, 
the Court emphasized the expense, complexity, and 
imprecision of weighing the relative strengths of different 
state law claims, the policy interest in securing an expedient 
resolution to the disparate claims of the Direct and Indirect 
Purchasers, and De Beers‘s insistence upon a release of all 
potential damage claims in all fifty states. 
 With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) analysis for 
injunctive relief, the District Court rejected the objectors‘ 
assertion that both of the purchaser classes faced no risk of 
future harm.  The Court observed that De Beers had stipulated 
to the injunction and ―waived the right to demand proof of 
substantive elements of the claims‖ advanced by plaintiffs, 
namely, that De Beers‘s ongoing conduct would continue to 
anti-competitively increase the price of all diamonds on the 
market.  (App‘x 285.)  Accordingly, the Court determined 
that injunctive relief was appropriate and would benefit all 
classes and subclasses. 
Having ruled that the Rule 23(b) elements were 
satisfied, the District Court then responded to the other 
objections relating to the fairness and adequacy of the 
Settlement and the plan of allocation and distribution, as well 
as to objections pertaining to attorneys‘ fees.  The District 
Court conducted a fairness evaluation of the final settlement 
by applying and weighing the fairness factors set forth in 
Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975), ―being mindful 
of the heightened standard of review in place for a settlement-
only class that has not yet been entirely certified.‖  (App‘x 
288-89.)  The Court concluded that the final settlement 
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agreement and the plan of allocation were fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.  The District Court also reviewed the attorneys‘ 
fees application pursuant to Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy 
Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000), similarly finding the 
Special Master‘s recommendation for 25% of the settlement 
fund in fees to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
 Accordingly, the District Court entered a final order on 
May 22, 2008, certifying the Direct and Indirect Purchaser 
Classes under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).  The Direct 
Purchaser Class consists of all sightholders who purchased 
rough gem diamonds directly from De Beers between 
September 20, 1997 and March 31, 2006.  The Indirect 
Purchaser Class includes all Indirect Purchasers who acquired 
gem diamonds between January 1, 1994 and March 31, 2006, 
regardless of whether De Beers or one of its competitors 
supplied the diamonds.
16
  The Court‘s order further included 
the previously agreed-upon injunction, which is to remain in 
effect for five years from the date of its issuance.  The 
objectors then filed the appeals presently before us. 
D.  Proceedings On Appeal 
 On appeal, a divided panel of this Court initially 
determined that the District Court abused its discretion in 
certifying the nationwide class of litigants.  We vacated this 
Opinion and granted rehearing en banc.  While we do not 
                                                 
16
 As the Panel Opinion noted, the parties did not explain, 
nor did the record reveal, any reason for the disparity in the 
time periods covered by the Settlement between the Indirect 
and Direct Purchaser classes.  See Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 143 
n.8.  We do not consider this difference pertinent to the 
appeals. 
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usually discuss the analysis contained in a vacated opinion, 
we do so here because the Panel‘s decision reflected, 
accepted, and elaborated upon one or more of the views 
advanced by the objectors, with which we take issue.  Our 
dissenting colleagues also embrace certain of these views. 
Addressing the objectors‘ challenge to the District 
Court‘s finding of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
Panel undertook a wide-ranging fact-finding review of state 
antitrust statutes, noting that the variance among states ―is 
mainly a function of whether a state has chosen to follow the 
Sherman Act principles regarding standing laid down by the 
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 
(1977).‖  Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 146.  There, the Supreme 
Court decided that only direct purchasers possessed standing 
under the federal Sherman Act to sue for monetary damages 
incurred from an antitrust injury.  The Panel observed that 
some states follow this framework and prohibit monetary 
recovery for indirect purchasers, while other states have 
enacted statutes known as ―Illinois Brick repealers,‖ which 
extend antitrust standing to indirect purchasers and 
consumers.
17
  Id.  As a result, the Panel found that ―only some 
of th[e] jurisdictions recognize the claims for which recovery 
is sought,‖ and that such distinctions reflected ―fundamental 
policy differences among the several states.‖  Id. at 147, 149.  
Based on its belief that many members of the Indirect 
Purchaser Class lacked a substantive right to recover 
damages, the Panel decided that ―no question of law or fact 
                                                 
17
 Based on its assessment, the Panel found that at least 
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia possess 
Illinois Brick repealer statutes or have judicially extended 
antitrust standing to indirect purchasers. 
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regarding their legal rights is uniform throughout the class,‖ 
thereby defeating a finding of predominance.  Id. at 149. 
 The Panel then considered the various state consumer 
protection and unjust enrichment claims implicated by the 
District Court‘s certification, again noting several variations 
among jurisdictions:  differences in whether indirect 
purchasers may invoke consumer protection and unjust 
enrichment statutes to gain antitrust relief; variations in the 
extent of elements of proof necessary to establish unjust 
enrichment or consumer fraud; and dissimilarities in whether 
a plaintiff must lack an adequate remedy at law to bring an 
equitable claim.  Id. at 150-51.  Based upon these 
discrepancies, the Panel decided that ―evidence of price-
fixing and monopolization does not give rise in every state to 
an unjust enrichment or consumer protection claim for 
indirect purchasers,‖ defeating predominance and rendering 
the District Court‘s certification of a nationwide class an 
abuse of discretion.  Id. at 151. 
The Panel further observed that the District Court‘s 
certification order contravened the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072(b), by extending antitrust remedies not rooted 
in state substantive law to putative class members.  Id.  The 
Panel expressly rejected the plaintiffs‘ argument that De 
Beers‘s willingness to stipulate to liability in all fifty states 
should suffice for the District Court‘s predominance inquiry, 
holding instead that such an approach would invite collusive 
settlements.  Id.  In the same vein, the Panel expressed 
concern that the District Court sacrificed principles of 
federalism in favor of obtaining an expedient settlement by 
certifying the nationwide class ―despite the fact that only 
some of those jurisdictions recognize the claims for which 
recovery is sought.‖  Id. at 152.  Finding that certain states 
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categorically deny to indirect purchasers a right to antitrust 
recovery as a matter of substantive law, the Panel concluded 
that the instant certification ―wrongly allowed the sovereignty 
of the states to be subordinated to De Beers‘s desire to resolve 
all indirect purchaser claims simultaneously.‖  Id. 
Finally, the Panel rejected the District Court‘s 
certification of the Indirect Purchaser Class under Rule 
23(b)(2) for the purpose of awarding injunctive relief under 
§ 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.  Relying upon expert 
reports written to identify a methodology for calculating 
damages, the Panel concluded that De Beers‘s market share 
fell from approximately 65% in 2000 to 45% in 2006, and 
determined that, as a result, plaintiffs face ―no significant 
threat of future antitrust harm in the absence of the injunction 
because . . . the market has become increasingly competitive 
from 2006 onward.‖  Id. at 157-58.  Accordingly, the Panel 
found that plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing under § 16 of 
the Clayton Act and vacated the District Court‘s order 
certifying the injunctive class. 
The Panel Opinion remanded the matter to the District 
Court to consider whether ―a more limited class of indirect 
purchasers is appropriate under Rule 23,‖ and instructed the 
District Court to more precisely identify ―a readily 
discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or 
defenses to be treated on a class basis.‖  Id. at 154 (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P 23(c)(2)).  The Panel noted that the Court 
failed to clearly delineate the precise state law claims subject 
to class treatment and did not explicitly state whether the 
claims advanced apply to the Indirect Purchasers‘ antitrust, 
consumer protection, or unjust enrichment claims, or to some 
combination of the three.  Accordingly, the Panel directed the 
District Court to ―identify with particularity both the 
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prerequisites for membership in the class and the issues or 
claims that will be resolved on a class-wide basis.‖  Id. at 155. 
In response, Appellees Shawn Sullivan, Arrigotti Fine 
Jewelry, and James Walnum petitioned for rehearing, urging 
that the Panel Opinion was inconsistent with our precedent 
governing class action settlements.  In support, they raised 
several arguments.  First, they contended that the Panel‘s 
demand that all class members assert at least one ―uniform‖ 
claim in order for disparate state claims to be settled at once 
contravened our clear holdings in Warfarin and Prudential.  
(See Pet. of Appellees for Reh‘g or Reh‘g En Banc 2.)  Next, 
they urged that the Panel‘s extensive inquiry into the legal 
viability of plaintiff‘s claims at the class certification stage 
improperly adjudicated the merits of the asserted claims and 
undermined the ―strong judicial policy in favor of class action 
settlement.‖  (Id. (citation omitted).)  Finally, the Appellees 
observed that the Panel‘s methodology supplanted the District 
Court as primary fact-finder and unilaterally reached factual 
conclusions based upon evidence unrelated to the subject at 
issue.  (Id. 3-4.)   
We granted the petition for the entire Court to address 
these issues. 
II.  Jurisdiction And Standard of Review 
 The District Court exercised federal question 
jurisdiction over the Direct Purchasers‘ Sherman Act antitrust 
claim for damages pursuant to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 15, and over both the Direct and Indirect Purchasers‘ 
claims for injunctive relief under § 16 of the same Act, 15 
U.S.C § 26.  Original jurisdiction over the federal claims also 
arose under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).  The District 
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Court possessed supplemental jurisdiction over the Indirect 
Purchasers‘ state-law antitrust, consumer protection, and 
unjust enrichment claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We 
review final orders of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
 ―Our role as an appellate court is to ascertain whether 
or not the trial judge clearly abused his or her discretion in 
approving or rejecting a settlement agreement.‖  Ehrheart v. 
Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010).  A 
district court abuses its discretion if its ―‗decision rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 
or an improper application of law to fact.‘‖  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995) (―GM 
Truck‖)).  ―If the court‘s analysis on these points is correct, 
[however,] then ‗it is fair to say that we will ordinarily defer 
to its exercise of discretion‘ embodied in the findings on 
predominance and superiority.‘‖  Linerboard, 305 F.3d at 
149-50 (quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 
448 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also United Steel, Paper & Forestry, 
Rubber, Mfg.  Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l 
Union v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 
2010) (―We review . . . the underlying determination whether 
the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) has been 
satisfied for abuse of discretion.‖) (citation omitted).  
―Whether an incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue 
of law to be reviewed de novo.‖  Id. (citation omitted). 
 The District Court‘s ―determination that the settlement 
was fair, reasonable, and adequate‖ is likewise reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 
231 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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III.  Discussion 
 At issue on appeal is the District Court‘s approval of 
the class settlement agreement and certification of the Indirect 
Purchaser Class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) and both the Direct 
and Indirect Purchaser Classes under Rule 23(b)(2).  We 
begin by discussing the standards for certifying a settlement 
class and will address the pertinent objections in light of the 
District Court‘s – and the vacated Panel‘s – Opinions.  We 
will then consider the objections pertaining to the fairness of 
the settlement, the plan of allocation, and the attorneys‘ fees 
award, which we have not previously addressed.
18
  
A.  Certification Pursuant to Rule 23 
As we have consistently observed, ―Rule 23 is 
designed to assure that courts will identify the common 
interests of class members and evaluate the named plaintiffs‘ 
and counsel‘s ability to fairly and adequately protect class 
interests.‖  In re Comm. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 
(3d Cir. 2010) (―Comm. Bank II‖) (quoting GM Truck, 55 
F.3d at 799) (alterations omitted).  In turn, before approving a 
class settlement agreement, ―a district court first must 
determine that the requirements for class certification under 
Rule 23(a) and (b) are met.‖  In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. 
                                                 
18
 As mentioned above, because the Panel concluded that 
certification was inappropriate, it did not reach the Special 
Master‘s recommendations or the objections to the 
distribution plan and fee award.  Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 142 
n.6.  In light of our finding that class certification is 
appropriate, we assess these objections for the first time. 
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Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2010).  Rule 23(a) contains 
four threshold requirements, which every putative class must 
satisfy: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable; (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of 
the class; and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613.  
Upon finding each of these prerequisites satisfied, a district 
court must then determine that the proposed class fits within 
one of the categories of class actions enumerated in Rule 
23(b).   
As mentioned, Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class actions 
seeking injunctive relief in instances where the defendant 
―has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to 
the class, so that final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); see 
In re Comm. Bank of N. Va. (Comm. Bank I), 418 F.3d 277, 
302 n.14 (2005).  Separately, certification pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(3) seeking monetary compensation is permitted where 
(1) ―questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members,‖ and (2) ―a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see Collins v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 34 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 1994).  
These twin requirements are commonly referred to as 
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predominance and superiority.  We address the certification 
of the damages class first before turning to the certification 
for injunctive relief.   
1.  Predominance of Common Legal or Factual Issues 
Under Rule 23(b)(3) 
The objectors challenge the District Court‘s Rule 
23(b)(3) analysis with regard to the state law claims asserted 
by the Indirect Purchasers against De Beers.  The District 
Court concluded that differences in state law did not override 
predominantly common factual and legal issues presented by 
De Beers‘s integral role in perpetuating the alleged 
conspiracy.  Rejecting this view, the objectors argue that the 
existence of substantive variations in the state antitrust laws 
underlying the Indirect Purchaser damages claims should 
preclude a court from finding that common issues affecting 
the class as a whole predominate.  They also urge that 
differences among state consumer protection and unjust 
enrichment laws would likewise preclude a finding of 
predominance.  Our dissenting colleagues focus on this issue 
as well, and adopt a specific requirement that every class 
member has ―some colorable legal claim‖ in order for a 
district court to certify a class.  (Dissenting Op. at 10.)  In our 
view, this requirement would result in a radical departure 
from what Rule 23 envisions and what our precedent 
demands, and it founders for many reasons.
19
   
a.  Legal Framework 
                                                 
19
 The objectors also challenge the District Court‘s 
purported failure to identify the state law claims that should 
receive class treatment under the existing certification order, 
as we discuss below. 
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The predominance inquiry ―‗tests whether proposed 
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 
representation,‘‖ In re Ins. Broker. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 
241, 266 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624), 
and assesses whether a class action ―would achieve 
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote 
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,‖ Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee‘s note to 1966 
amendment.  See also 2 William Rubenstein, Alba Conte & 
Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 4:25 (4th ed. 
2010) (―[T]he predominance test asks whether a class suit for 
the unitary adjudication of common issues is economical and 
efficient in the context of all the issues in the suit.‖).  Parallel 
with Rule 23(a)(2)‘s commonality element, which provides 
that a proposed class must share a common question of law or 
fact, Rule 23(b)(3)‘s predominance requirement imposes a 
more rigorous obligation upon a reviewing court to ensure 
that issues common to the class predominate over those 
affecting only individual class members.   Ins. Broker., 579 
F.3d at 266.  ―Hence, we consider the Rule 23(a) 
commonality requirement to be incorporated into the more 
stringent Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, and 
therefore deem it appropriate to ‗analyze the two factors 
together, with particular focus on the predominance 
requirement.‘‖  Id. (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust 
Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also Danvers 
Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 148 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (―[T]he commonality requirement is subsumed by 
the predominance requirement.‖). 
From our case law, we can distill at least three 
guideposts that direct the predominance inquiry:  first, that 
commonality is informed by the defendant‘s conduct as to all 
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class members and any resulting injuries common to all class 
members; second, that variations in state law do not 
necessarily defeat predominance; and third, that concerns 
regarding variations in state law largely dissipate when a 
court is considering the certification of a settlement class.  We 
address each of these guideposts in turn.  Then, we turn to 
case law demonstrating that Rule 23(b)(3) does not, as urged 
by the objectors and the dissent, require individual class 
members to individually state a valid claim for relief.  Next, 
we address the flaws inherent in the framework proposed by 
the dissent.  Finally, we discuss why an important by-product 
of the class action device – settlement of all potential claims – 
supports the decision we reach here. 
i)  Precedent Regarding Predominance: 
Defendant’s Conduct and Class 
Members’ Injuries   
Our precedent provides that the focus of the 
predominance inquiry is on whether the defendant‘s conduct 
was common as to all of the class members, and whether all 
of the class members were harmed by the defendant‘s 
conduct.  Our reasoning in Warfarin is instructive on this 
point.  The claims asserted there were remarkably similar to 
the specific claims at issue here.  There, we considered the 
propriety of the certification of a settlement class arising out 
of DuPont Pharmaceuticals‘ alleged dissemination of 
misleading information about a competitor‘s product.  391 
F.3d at 522.  The plaintiffs averred that DuPont engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct that allowed it to maintain a 67% 
market share and to charge supracompetitive prices, in 
violation of federal antitrust law, the antitrust statutes of 
39 
 
Illinois Brick repealer states,
20
 the consumer protection and 
deceptive practices statutes of all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia, and the common law prohibitions on unjust 
enrichment and tortious interference of every jurisdiction.  Id. 
at 523-25.  After reaching a class settlement with the 
defendant and receiving the district court‘s preliminary 
approval, objections were lodged contesting the certification 
of a single nationwide class of plaintiffs.  The objectors 
argued that such certification was inappropriate due to 
inconsistencies in state antitrust and consumer fraud statutes‘ 
provision of statutory standing to assert antitrust claims and 
eligibility for treble or punitive damages recovery, and the 
relative weakness of certain consumer claims.  Id. at 529-31. 
Guided by the Supreme Court‘s observation that 
―[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging 
consumer[ ] fraud or violations of the antitrust laws,‖ we 
stated: 
This case falls squarely into that category: 
plaintiffs have alleged that DuPont engaged in a 
broad-based campaign, in violation of federal 
and state consumer fraud and antitrust laws, to 
deceive consumers, TPPs, health care 
professionals, and regulatory bodies into 
believing that generic warfarin sodium was not 
an equivalent alternative to Coumadin. These 
allegations naturally raise several questions of 
law and fact common to the entire class and 
which predominate over any issues related to 
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 As mentioned, certain states have enacted statutes known 
as ―Illinois Brick repealers,‖ which extend antitrust standing 
to indirect purchasers and consumers.  See supra n.17. 
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individual class members, including the 
unlawfulness of DuPont‘s conduct under federal 
antitrust laws as well as state law, the causal 
linkage between DuPont‘s conduct and the 
injury suffered by the class members, and the 
nature of the relief to which class members are 
entitled. 
Id. at 528.  In light of DuPont‘s allegedly deceptive ―broad-
based, national campaign conducted by and directed from 
corporate headquarters,‖ we emphasized that proof of liability 
of DuPont‘s conduct ―depends on evidence which is common 
to the class members‖ because ―liability depends on the 
conduct of DuPont, and whether it conducted a nationwide 
campaign of misrepresentation and deception, [and] does not 
depend on the conduct of individual class members.‖  Id.  As 
a result, we affirmed the District Court‘s ruling that class 
members shared predominantly common issues as to the 
conduct of the defendants despite possessing claims arising 
under differing state laws.  Id. at 530.
21
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 Contrary to the objectors‘ and the Panel‘s view that 
Warfarin‘s analysis is inapplicable because the plaintiffs in 
that case purportedly shared a common claim under the 
Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, our holding in Warfarin did 
not address the Delaware statute in analyzing predominance.  
391 F.3d at 528-29.  Indeed, Warfarin did not consider 
whether every class member even possessed a claim under 
Delaware law, nor did it undertake a choice-of-law analysis to 
determine whether all members in the nationwide class could 
assert a claim under the Delaware statute.  Rather, we simply 
concluded that any claims arising under the varying state laws 
and the Delaware statute could be proved with common 
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 We applied a similar approach in Insurance 
Brokerage, where, in evaluating a challenge to certification of 
a settlement class on the basis of predominance, we 
determined that the elements of a Sherman Act violation for 
concerted anticompetitive activity focused upon ―the conduct 
of the defendants.‖  579 F.3d at 268.  Noting the presence of 
several shared questions of law and fact – including, among 
others, whether the defendants conspired to allocate a 
particular market, whether the conduct actually reduced 
competition in the market by consolidating the industry, and 
whether the conspiratorial conduct raised premiums for all 
members of the class – we concluded that ―common questions 
abound with respect to whether the defendants engaged in 
illegal, concerted action.‖  579 F.3d at 268.  As a result, we 
held that ―individual issues d[id] not overwhelm the common 
ones.‖22  Id.; see also Linerboard, 305 F.3d at 162 
(―[C]ommon issues [ ] predominate here because the inquiry 
                                                                                                             
evidence, thereby supporting a finding of predominance.  Id. 
22
 A comparable approach is evidenced in our decision in 
Prudential, where we affirmed the district court‘s finding of 
predominance based upon the central issue in the case – a 
common nationwide scheme of deceptive conduct by the 
defendant to defraud millions of customers.  148 F.3d at 315.  
Similarly, in Linerboard, we noted that the ―critical inquiry 
will be whether defendants successfully concealed the 
existence of the alleged conspiracy,‖ and ―the fact of 
concealment [ ] is the polestar in an analysis of fraudulent 
concealment.‖  305 F.3d at 163 (emphasis in original).  
Because it was the defendant‘s conduct that demanded 
attention, we found that ―allegations of proof are all common 
to the defendants, not the plaintiffs.‖  Id. 
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necessarily focuses on defendants‘ conduct, that is, what 
defendants did rather than what plaintiffs did.‖) (citation & 
quotations omitted); cf. In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 
136, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing certification of 
litigation class where plaintiffs‘ claims arose ―not out of one 
single event or misrepresentation,‖ but out of ―non-
standardized and individualized sales ‗pitches‘‖). 
In this regard, we note the dissent‘s misreading of the 
Supreme Court‘s recent opinion in Wal-mart Stores Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) as supporting its thesis that an 
inquiry into the existence or validity of each class member‘s 
claim is required at the class certification stage.  To the 
contrary, Dukes actually bolsters our position, making clear 
that the focus is on whether the defendant‘s conduct was 
common as to all of the class members, not on whether each 
plaintiff has a ―colorable‖ claim.  In Dukes, the Court held 
that commonality and predominance are defeated when it 
cannot be said that there was a common course of conduct in 
which the defendant engaged with respect to each individual.  
But commonality is satisfied where common questions 
generate common answers ―apt to drive the resolution of the 
litigation.‖  131 S. Ct. at 2551.  That is exactly what is 
presented here, for the answers to questions about De Beers‘s 
alleged misconduct and the harm it caused would be common 
as to all of the class members, and would thus inform the 
resolution of the litigation if it were not being settled. 
Specifically, here, plaintiffs allege that De Beers 
engaged in anticompetitive activity by exploiting its 65% 
share of the diamond market and control of the world‘s 
supply of rough diamonds to impose rigid constraints on the 
sale and resale of those diamonds.  This conduct resulted in a 
common injury as to all class members – inflated diamond 
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prices – in violation of federal antitrust law, and the antitrust, 
consumer protection, or unjust enrichment laws of every state 
and the District of Columbia.
23
  In this respect, as in Warfarin 
and Insurance Brokerage, De Beers‘s asserted price-fixing 
and monopolization conduct lies at the core of plaintiffs‘ 
claims, as do the common injuries which all class members 
suffered as a result.  Based upon our case law, we can distill 
that ―each class member shares a similar legal question 
arising from whether De Beers engaged in a broad conspiracy 
that was aimed to and did affect diamond prices in the United 
States.‖  (App‘x 278-79 (emphasis added).)  Evidence for this 
legal question would entail generalized common proof as to 
―the implementation of De Beers‘[s] conspiracy, the form of 
the conspiracy, and the duration and extent of the 
conspiracy.‖  (Id. 278.)   
The plaintiffs likewise share common factual 
questions as to whether De Beers ―acted in concert to 
artificially fix, maintain, and stabilize prices and to 
monopolize trade and commerce in the market for polished 
diamonds,‖ and whether said activity resulted ―in an inflation 
in the prices of diamonds sold to consumers.‖  (Id. 278-79.)  
These allegations are unaffected by the particularized conduct 
of individual class members, as proof of liability and liability 
itself would depend entirely upon De Beers‘s allegedly 
                                                 
23
 No one seriously disputes that De Beers‘s alleged 
conduct, if true, was anticompetitive and violated state 
antitrust laws.  Our disagreement with the dissent arises 
solely out of the question whether certain class members‘ 
potential inability to satisfy some states‘ statutory standing 
requirements should have precluded the District Court from 
certifying the settlement class in this case. 
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anticompetitive activities.  Indeed, the presence of these 
questions stemming solely from De Beers‘s asserted behavior 
and the fact that all class members purchased diamonds is an 
apt illustration of why the predominance test is ―readily met 
in certain cases alleging consumer [ ] fraud or violations of 
the antitrust laws.‘‖24  Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 266 (quoting 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3) advisory committee‘s notes to 1966 amendment 
(providing that ―a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by 
the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing 
situation for a class action‖).  Considering this presentation of 
common issues, a finding that common inquiries 
predominated over individual questions particular to any 
putative class member appears reasonably within the 
discretion of the District Court. 
The dissent urges that according to our view, the class 
is ―practically limitless.‖  (Dissenting Op. at 9.)  This is 
plainly incorrect:  the limits are found in the conduct of the 
defendant and the injuries sustained by class members as a 
result of the conduct.  These provide sufficient class contours.  
The instant class is not made up of ―everyone on earth,‖ 
―regardless of diamond purchases.‖  (Dissenting Op. at 8 n.5.)  
Instead, each member is a Direct or Indirect Purchaser, 
harmed by what De Beers did.  These class members, 
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 As we noted in Insurance Brokerage, we do not presume 
here ―that common issues necessarily predominate in every 
antitrust case.‖  579 F.3d at 267 n.26 (citing Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 321-22).  Here, we merely conclude 
that the District Court was free to determine that common 
issues of law or fact stemming from De Beers‘s conduct in 
this instance satisfied the predominance requirement. 
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moreover, possess a legally cognizable injury acknowledged 
in hornbook law, as their injuries are real, and stem not from 
simply feeling ―wronged,‖ as the dissent suggests (Dissenting 
Op. at 8), but from De Beers‘s alleged anti-competitive 
conduct, conduct which antitrust laws forbid. 
ii)  Precedent Regarding Variations in  
State Law 
Furthermore, our precedent provides that ―variations in 
the rights and remedies available to injured class members 
under the various laws of the fifty states [do] not defeat 
commonality and predominance.‖  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529 
(quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. 
Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998)).  This is so 
because ―‗a finding of commonality does not require that all 
class members share identical claims,‘‖ and predominance is 
not considered deficient merely ―because claims were subject 
to the [varying] laws of fifty states.‖  Id.  ―‗Predominance 
under Rule 23(b)(3) cannot be reduced to a mechanical, 
single-issue test‘‖; rather, ―‗[a]s long as a sufficient 
constellation of common issues binds class members together, 
variations in the sources and application‘‖ of applicable laws 
will not foreclose class certification.  Linerboard, 305 F.3d at 
162-63 (quoting with approval Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. 
Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
argument that variations in twenty states‘ laws concerning 
reliance, waiver, and statutes of limitations defeated 
predominance)); see also Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 
323 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2003) (―Rule 23(b)(3) requires 
merely that common issues predominate, not that all issues be 
common to the class.‖) (emphasis added).  Thus, it is not 
surprising that we can find no support in our Court‘s 
jurisprudence for the proposition that commonality and 
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predominance are defeated merely because available rights 
and remedies differ under the several laws that form the basis 
for the class claims.
25
   
We have never required the presentation of identical or 
uniform issues or claims as a prerequisite to certification of a 
class.  Rather, our jurisprudence evinces a pragmatic response 
to certifications of common claims arising under varying state 
laws.  In Prudential, we addressed the certification of a 
settlement class arising under federal securities law and 
varying state law formulations of common law fraud, breach 
of contract, bad faith, negligent misrepresentation, 
negligence, unjust enrichment, and breach of state consumer 
fraud statutes.  148 F.3d at 315.  We emphasized our 
willingness to certify nationwide classes where differences in 
state law fell ―into a limited number of predictable patterns,‖ 
and any deviations ―could be overcome at trial by grouping 
similar state laws together and applying them as a unit.‖  Id.  
As such, we affirmed the district court‘s decision to subsume 
the relatively minor differences in state law within a single 
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 Other courts have similarly declined to examine the 
controlling substantive law pertinent to asserted claims at the 
class certification stage.  See, e.g., Schumacher v. Tyson 
Fresh Meats, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 605, 612 (D.S.D. 2004) 
(―Where federal claims and common law claims are 
predicated on the same factual allegations and proof will be 
essentially the same, ‗even if the law of different states might 
ultimately govern the common law claims – an issue that 
need not and is not decided at this juncture – certification of 
the class for the whole action is appropriate.‘‖) (quoting 
Walsh v. Chittenden Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1043, 1055 (D. Vt. 
1992)) (alteration omitted). 
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class.  Id.; see also Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 271 (noting that 
―subclasses are appropriate ‗where a class is found to include 
subclasses divergent in interest‘‖) (citation & alteration 
omitted). 
Similarly, in GM Truck, we approved the certification 
of nationwide (b)(3) litigation classes where ―the laws of the 
50 states could be reduced to [several] general patterns, 
providing the framework for sub-classes if the nationwide 
action had proven unmanageable.‖  55 F.3d at 817-18 
(discussing In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 
(3d Cir. 1986)).  Observing that ―we [could not] conceive that 
each of the forty-nine states [ ] represented here has a truly 
unique statutory scheme,‖ we determined that a nationwide 
class ―could have been properly certified.‖  Id.  This 
alternative to outright rejection of certification of a 
nationwide class was deemed to be especially fitting because 
it could ―surmount[ ] some of the individual issues while 
retaining some of the substantive advantages of the class 
action.‖  Id. at 818. 
Echoing this approach, our fellow Courts of Appeals 
have agreed that, for purposes of litigation classes, ―if the 
applicable state laws can be sorted into a small number of 
groups, each containing materially identical legal standards,‖ 
then certification of subgroups ―embracing each of the 
dominant legal standards can be appropriate.‖  Klay v. 
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004); see also 
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.) (holding that class certification is 
appropriate where state law variations can be grouped by 
similar legal doctrines).  
Where ―a sufficient constellation of common issues 
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binds class members together,‖ Linerboard, 305 F.3d at 162-
63, differences in state law treatment of indirect purchaser 
claims likely fall into a handful of clearly discernible 
statutory schemes.  Nothing in our case law or the language 
of Rule 23 commands that everyone in a class must allege 
precisely identical or ―uniform‖ causes of action, see 
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 149, and statutory variations do not 
defeat predominance in the presence of other exceedingly 
common issues.
26
  Instead, as Prudential and GM Truck 
explain, where a defendant‘s singular conduct gives rise to 
one cause of action in one state, while providing for a 
different cause of action in another jurisdiction, the courts 
may group both claims in a single class action.  This tactic in 
litigation advances the laudatory purposes of the class action 
device, ―preserv[ing] the resources of both the courts and the 
parties by permitting issues affecting all class members to be 
litigated in an efficient, expedited, and manageable fashion.‖  
Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
iii)  Certification of Settlement Classes: 
Diminished Concern Regarding 
Variations in State Law 
But we need not rely merely on certifications 
involving actual litigation of the class issues for the 
proposition that differing state laws do not defeat 
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 We do not reach this conclusion so as to allow district 
courts to ―shirk‖ the requirements of Rule 23 when certifying 
the class, as the dissent suggests.  (Dissenting Op. at 21 n.13.)  
We do not ignore the differences in state law, but rather find, 
based on our precedent, that those differences do not defeat 
predominance. 
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commonality or predominance.  The correct outcome is even 
clearer for certification of a settlement class because the 
concern for manageability that is a central tenet in the 
certification of a litigation class is removed from the 
equation.  Indeed, the class settlement posture of this case 
largely marginalizes the objectors‘ concern that state law 
variations undermine a finding of predominance.   
In Warfarin, we rejected an objection essentially 
indistinguishable from the one advanced here, namely, that 
―variations in and inconsistencies between the state consumer 
fraud and antitrust laws of the fifty states defeat the 
commonality and predominance requirements of Rule 23.‖  
391 F.3d at 529.  In light of the Supreme Court‘s guidance 
that a district court ―[c]onfronted with a request for 
settlement-only class certification‖ need not inquire whether 
the case ―would present intractable management problems,‖ 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620, in Warfarin, we delineated a ―key‖ 
distinction between certification of a class for settlement 
versus certification for purposes of litigation, 391 F.3d at 529.  
Specifically, we observed that, in the settlement context, 
variations in state antitrust, consumer protection and unjust 
enrichment laws did not present ―the types of insuperable 
obstacles‖ that could render class litigation unmanageable.27  
Id. (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 315).  We emphasized, as a 
result, that ―variations [in state laws] are irrelevant to 
                                                 
27
 In conducting the analysis in Warfarin, we expressly 
distinguished the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002), in 
which certification of a nationwide class arising under the tort 
laws of all fifty states was sought for purposes of litigation, 
rather than settlement.  391 F.3d at 529. 
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certification of a settlement class‖ since a settlement would 
eliminate the principal burden of establishing the elements of 
liability under disparate laws.  Id.; see, e.g., Davis v. J.P 
Morgan Chase & Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 601, 609 (W.D.N.Y. 
2011) (―[S]tate-law distinctions impact trial manageability, 
which is relevant principally with respect to litigation at 
trial.‖) (citing Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529-30); In re Lupron 
Mktg & Sales Practices Litig., 228 F.R.D. 75, 92 (D. Mass. 
2005) (finding that ―differences in the state consumer 
protection laws‖ implicate manageability concerns and do not 
pose an obstacle to certification of a settlement class). 
Hence, our consideration of varying laws in the 
context of predominance has primarily focused on 
manageability of a litigation class.  This is a particularly 
important point, as the objectors seem to conflate the 
predicate predominance analysis for certification of a 
settlement class with that required for certification of a 
litigation class, relying exclusively upon cases implicating the 
manageability obstacles inherent in class litigation.  See, e.g., 
Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Mil. Healthcare 
Servs., Inc., 601 F.3d 1159, 1180 (11th Cir. 2010); Cole v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2007).  The 
Panel likewise referenced authority that focused on the 
manageability issues pertinent to certification of litigation 
classes in rejecting the settlement class certification.  See 
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 151 (quoting Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
188 F.R.D. 483, 501 (S.D. Ill. 1999) (discussing 
―unmanageable‖ nature of varying state unjust enrichment 
laws)). 
Because we are presented with a settlement class 
certification, ―we are not as concerned with formulating some 
prediction as to how [variances in state law] would play out at 
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trial, for the proposal is that there be no trial.‖  Ins. Broker., 
579 F.3d at 269 (internal citations & quotations omitted).  As 
such, we simply need not inquire whether the varying state 
treatments of indirect purchaser damage claims at issue would 
present the type of ―insuperable obstacles‖ or ―intractable 
management problems‖ pertinent to certification of a 
litigation class.
28
  Comm. Bank I, 418 F.3d at 299; Warfarin, 
391 F.3d at 529.  The proposed settlement here obviates the 
difficulties inherent in proving the elements of varied claims 
at trial or in instructing a jury on varied state laws, and ―the 
difference is key.‖29  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529.  
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 We are aware that there may still be circumstances, as we 
and other Courts of Appeals have noted, where ―‗[i]n a multi-
state class action, variations in state law may swamp any 
common issues and defeat predominance.‘‖  Klay v. Humana, 
Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Castano 
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996)).  But 
these decisions are inapplicable here, as the certification 
orders at issue pertained to litigation classes and were 
preoccupied with the attendant manageability aspects of 
certification.  More explicitly, the courts expressed unease 
that if ―more than a few of the laws of the fifty states differ, 
the district judge would face an impossible task of instructing 
a jury on the relevant law,‖ and noted ―the difficulties in 
trying the [ ] claims on a class basis.‖  Id. (citation & 
quotations omitted).  Unlike those situations ―where the 
certification inquiry [is] set against the backdrop of an 
impending trial,‖ Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 269, the settlement 
context here does not present equivalent concerns. 
29
 Unsurprisingly, we are not alone in recognizing the ―key‖ 
distinction between certification for settlement purposes 
52 
 
Accordingly, while we are cognizant of our responsibility to 
―protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad 
class definitions,‖ Comm. Bank II, 622 F.3d at 291, state law 
variations are largely ―irrelevant to certification of a 
settlement class,‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529.30 
                                                                                                             
versus litigation, and ―courts are more inclined to find the 
predominance test met [in the settlement context], even when 
there are differences in applicable state laws.‖  Ersler v. 
Toshiba Am., Inc., No. CV-07-2304, 2009 WL 454354, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009) (citing In re Grand Theft Auto 
Video Game Consumer Litig., 251 F.R.D. 139, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008)); see, e.g., In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 267 
F.3d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that while 
certification of litigation classes arising under varying 
consumer fraud statutes is often inappropriate, the same is not 
true for settlement classes where ―no one need draw fine lines 
among state-law theories of relief‖); In re Inter-Op Hip 
Prosthesis Liability Litig., 204 F.R.D 330, 347 (N.D. Ohio 
2001) (―[W]hen taking the proposed settlement [ ] into 
consideration for purposes of determining class certification, 
individual issues which are normally present in . . . litigation 
become irrelevant, allowing the common issues to 
predominate.‖) (citation & quotations omitted). 
30
 Although we will not here speculate as to the type of  
―situations where variations in state laws are so significant so 
as to defeat commonality and predominance even in a 
settlement class certification,‖ Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 530, we 
are confident that the several common questions of law or 
fact arising from a ―single central issue‖ – namely, De 
Beers‘s alleged anticompetitive conduct and the resulting 
injury caused to each class member – predominate over any 
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iv) Rule 23(b)(3) and our Precedent do 
not Require that Individual Class 
Members State a Valid Claim 
At bottom, we can find no persuasive authority for 
deeming the certification of a class for settlement purposes 
improper based on differences in state law.  The objectors and 
our dissenting colleagues nevertheless insist that, despite the 
prevalence of the shared issues of fact and law stemming 
from the defendant‘s conduct common as to all class 
members and each class member‘s resulting injury, states‘ 
inconsistent treatment of indirect purchaser damages claims 
overwhelms the commonalities.  They advocate this because 
approximately twenty-five states have not extended antitrust 
standing to indirect purchasers through Illinois Brick repealer 
statutes or judicial edict; likewise, some uncertain number of 
states do not permit an end-run around antitrust standing 
through claims based on consumer protection and/or unjust 
enrichment statutes.  (See Quinn Supp. Br. on Reh‘g En Banc 
21-22.)  It follows then, they argue, that a large proportion of 
the Indirect Purchaser Class lacks any valid claims under 
applicable state substantive law, and, therefore, cannot 
―predominantly‖ share common issues of law or fact with 
those Indirect Purchasers actually possessing valid claims.
31
  
                                                                                                             
issues concerning individual class members, Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 314 (citation & quotations omitted). 
31
 As noted, the Panel conducted an extensive review of 
relevant state statutes and reached the conclusion that 
―indirect purchasers do not have a right to recover in all 
states, and, therefore, no question of law or fact regarding 
their legal rights is uniform throughout the class.‖  Sullivan, 
613 F.3d at 149. 
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In turn, they insist that a district court must undertake a 
thorough review of applicable substantive law to assure itself 
that each class member has ―at least some colorable legal 
claim‖ (Dissenting Op. at 10) or ―has a valid claim‖ (Quinn 
Supp. Br. at 16) before certifying a settlement.   
But this focus is misdirected.  The question is not what 
valid claims can plaintiffs assert; rather, it is simply whether 
common issues of fact or law predominate.  See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(b)(3).  Contrary to what the dissent and objectors 
principally contend, there is no ―claims‖ or ―merits‖ litmus 
test incorporated into the predominance inquiry beyond what 
is necessary to determine preliminarily whether certain 
elements will necessitate individual or common proof.  Such 
a view misreads Rule 23 and our jurisprudence as to the 
inquiry a district court must conduct at the class certification 
stage.  An analysis into the legal viability of asserted claims is 
properly considered through a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b) or summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, not as part 
of a Rule 23 certification process.  See Comm. Bank II, 622 
F.3d at 303 (―[T]he Rule 23 requirements ‗differ in kind from 
legal rulings under Rule 12(b)(6).‘‖) (quoting Szabo v. 
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001)).   
To adopt the position of the dissent and the objectors is 
to introduce a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry as to every claim in the 
class before a class may be certified.  But Rule 23 makes 
clear that a district court has limited authority to examine the 
merits when conducting the certification inquiry:   
Although an evaluation of the probable outcome 
on the merits is not properly part of the 
certification decision, discovery in aid of the 
certification decision often includes information 
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required to identify the nature of the issues that 
actually will be presented at trial. In this sense it 
is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery 
into the ―merits,‖ limited to those aspects 
relevant to making the certification decision on 
an informed basis.   
2003 Amendments to Rule 23 (emphasis added); see also 
Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1988) (―The 
ability of a named plaintiff to succeed on his or her individual 
claims has never been a prerequisite to certification of the 
class.‖).  A court may inquire whether the elements of 
asserted claims are capable of proof through common 
evidence, but lacks authority to adjudge the legal validity or 
soundness of the substantive elements of asserted claims.  Put 
another way, a district court may inquire into the merits of the 
claims presented in order to determine whether the 
requirements of Rule 23 are met, but not in order to determine 
whether the individual elements of each claim are satisfied. 
Citing our holdings in Hydrogen Peroxide and Newton 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 
(3d Cir. 2001), the objectors argue that the District Court 
abused its discretion by failing to establish as part of the 
certification process that each class member possessed a valid 
claim under the applicable substantive laws.
32
  (See Quinn Br. 
at 17.)  But these cases do not stand for this proposition.  We 
explained in Hydrogen Peroxide that an examination of the 
                                                 
32
 The Panel echoed the objectors‘ position, concluding after 
examining the laws of fifty states that many jurisdictions 
―categorically foreclosed‖ a legal right to recover on the 
merits to indirect purchasers.  Sullivan, 613 F.d at 151 n.14. 
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elements of plaintiffs‘ claim is sometimes necessary, not in 
order to determine whether each class member states a valid 
claim, but instead to determine whether the requirements of 
Rule 23 – namely, that the elements of the claim can be 
proved ―through evidence common to the class rather than 
individual to its members‖ – are met.  552 F.3d at 311-12.  In 
Newton, we similarly stated that a court may ―delve beyond 
the pleadings to determine whether the requirements for class 
certification are satisfied,‖ and held that a court‘s rigorous 
certification analysis may include a ―preliminary inquiry into 
the merits.‖  259 F.3d at 167 (citations & quotations omitted).  
But we did not state that an inquiry into the merits was 
necessary in order to prove that each class member has state a 
valid claim as a prerequisite to class certification.  Rather, the 
Rules and our case law have consistently made clear that 
plaintiffs need not actually establish the validity of claims at 
the certification stage.
33
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 The marginal role played by the question of ―validity‖ of 
claims in class settlement certification situations is further 
evidenced by considering our subsequent Prudential decision.  
See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 
F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2001) (―Prudential II‖).  There, we 
released all state-law claims – including unnamed claims – 
―arising from the same nucleus of operative facts as the 
claims‖ actually considered by the Court without adjudicating 
the validity of those other allegations.  Id.  We observed that 
―a judgment pursuant to a class settlement can bar later 
claims based on the allegations underlying the claims in the 
settled class action‖ even where the ―precluded claim was not 
presented, and could not have been presented, in the class 
action itself.‖  Id. (citations omitted).  We reasoned that while 
our ―power to release those claims as part of a judgment‖ may 
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Moreover, the merits inquiry is particularly 
unwarranted in the settlement context since a district court 
need not ―envision the form that a trial‖ would take, Newton, 
259 F.3d at 167, nor consider ―the available evidence and the 
method or methods by which plaintiffs propose to use the 
evidence to prove‖ the disputed element at trial, Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312.  In fact, the absence of evidentiary 
and trial manageability concerns that initially motivated our 
instruction to conduct a preliminary merits inquiry in the 
predominance context reinforces the ―key‖ distinction 
between certification of a litigation and settlement class.  
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529.  As such, the objectors‘ focus on 
the legal strengths and weaknesses of class members‘ claims 
misconstrues the requirements of Rule 23.
34
  See Newton, 259 
                                                                                                             
―seem anomalous,‖ ―we have endorsed the rule because it 
‗serves the important policy interest of judicial economy by 
permitting parties to enter into comprehensive settlements 
that ‗prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a 
class action.‘‖  Id. (quoting TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western 
Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982)).  As such, the 
unidentified prospective claims could be included in the 
settlement without adjudication of their validity since they 
arose from the identical fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the 
defendant.  
 
34
 The objectors‘ associated argument that the predominance 
inquiry presupposes that every putative class members 
possesses at least a single valid cause of action likewise 
misses the point.  While Rule 23 may presuppose that every 
class member does actually allege a predominantly common 
claim against a defendant, Rule 23 does not mandate that each 
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F.3d at 167-69. 
Even still, the objectors and the dissent urge that the 
absence of one particular element for some class members – 
statutory standing – means that these members cannot state a 
valid claim, and therefore, the class cannot be certified.  
While it may be correct that states abiding by Illinois Brick 
require a plaintiff to be a direct purchaser as one element of 
an antitrust or consumer protection claim, the possibility that 
some of the Indirect Purchasers in the instant class might be 
unable to establish this element at trial is beside the point.  
This element, often confusingly denoted as a statutory 
standing requirement, is not jurisdictional.
35
  Statutory 
standing is distinct from jurisdictional standing in that 
―Article III standing is required to establish a justiciable case 
or controversy within the jurisdiction of the federal courts,‖ 
whereas ―lack of antitrust standing affects a plaintiff‘s ability 
to recover, but does not implicate the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court.‖  Gerlinger v. Amazon.com Inc., 526 
F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see e.g., 
Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) 
                                                                                                             
of these claims must be shown capable of prevailing on the 
merits at the certification stage.   
35
 To further clarify, we use the term ―statutory standing‖ to 
refer to the possession of a viable claim or right to relief, not 
to a jurisdictional requirement.  See generally Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (―It is 
firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as 
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate 
subject-matter jurisdiction,‖ and ―jurisdiction is not defeated 
by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause 
of action‖) (citations and alterations omitted). 
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(noting that ―statutory standing under the antitrust laws is not 
a prerequisite to federal subject matter jurisdiction‖); 
Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 
(7th Cir. 1994) (―[D]espite the suggestive terminology, 
‗antitrust standing‘ is not a jurisdictional requirement and is 
therefore waivable.‖).  Accordingly, statutory standing is 
simply another element of proof for an antitrust claim, rather 
than a predicate for asserting a claim in the first place. 
Here, the supposed lack of one element necessary to 
prove a violation on the merits – statutory standing – does not 
establish a concomitant absence of other predominantly 
common issues.  See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 315 (affirming a 
district court‘s certification of a settlement class despite the 
fact that some objectors challenged the settlement on the 
grounds that some plaintiffs could not establish reliance – a 
necessary element of their state-law fraud claims).   This is 
especially true in the settlement context where no proof on 
the merits need be adduced.  See Linerboard, 305 F.3d at 
162-63 (―‗[T]he mere fact that such concerns [of 
individualized factual and legal determinations] may arise and 
may affect different class members differently does not 
compel a finding that individual issues predominate over 
common ones.‘‖) (quoting Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 296).  
Common questions as to the nature of De Beers‘s ―conduct 
under federal antitrust laws as well as state law‖ and ―the 
causal linkage between [De Beers‘s] conduct and the injury 
suffered by the class members‖ may still be found to 
predominate.  See Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 528; see also Pet 
Food, 629 F.3d at 342 (―[T]he predominance requirement 
was satisfied because the same set of core operative facts and 
theory of proximate cause apply to each member of the 
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class.‖) (internal quotations omitted).36 
v)  The Dissent’s Proposed Framework 
The dissent‘s proposed framework mistakenly places 
the cart before the horse by requiring the District Court to 
establish the validity of the disputed elements of the asserted 
claims – namely, the viability of indirect purchaser actions 
under state substantive laws – prior to certifying the class.  
Under this approach, the dissent seems to require that class 
members show that they can state a valid claim for relief.  But 
the Rule 23 inquiry does not, and should not, involve a Rule 
(12)(b)(6) inquiry.
 37
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 The Panel analyzed the antitrust claims separately from 
the consumer protection and unjust enrichment claims, 
seemingly concluding that plaintiffs could only prevail if each 
putative class member alleged either a ―uniform‖ antitrust 
cause of action, a ―uniform‖ consumer protection cause of 
action, or a ―uniform‖ unjust enrichment claim.  Sullivan, 613 
F.3d 146, 150.  We will not read into Rule 23 this heightened 
threshold requirement that plaintiffs must allege an identical 
cause of action, when all that is required is that common 
issues of law or fact predominate over questions particular to 
individual class members. 
 
37
 The dissent describes this requirement in varied ways:  
under their view, class members who, ―according to the plain 
terms of controlling law have no claim at all‖ (Dissenting Op. 
at 16 n.11), have ―no legal claim‖ (Id. at 1), have ―no cause of 
action,‖ (Id. at 4), have a claim ―clearly lacking a colorable 
basis‖ (Id. at 15), or have a claim ―nonexistent as a matter of 
substantive law‖ (Id. at 13), are barred from partaking in this 
class action settlement.  The problem with this requirement, 
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Were we to require district courts to ensure that ―each 
member of a settlement class has a valid claim‖ in order to 
establish predominance, (Quinn Supp. Br. at 16), or that each 
class member has a ―colorable legal claim,‖ district courts 
would be obligated at the class certification stage to, sua 
sponte, conduct a thorough Rule 12(b)(6) analysis of every 
statutory and common-law claim to ensure that each plaintiff 
– including absent class members – possesses a valid cause of 
action or a ―colorable claim‖ under the applicable federal or 
state substantive law.  Such an inquiry into the merits goes 
beyond the requirements of Rule 23, for Rule 23 does not 
require a district court to determine whether class members 
individually have a colorable claim – one that ―appear[s] to 
be true, valid, or right.  (Dissenting Op. at 10 n.8.)  In 
addition to exceeding the plain requirements of Rule 23, in 
nationwide class settlements, such as the one here, and even if 
limited to a statutory standing inquiry, this analysis would 
necessitate an intensive, fifty-state cataloguing of differences 
in state law at an early stage of the proceedings, and without 
the benefit of a developed record.
38
  Despite the dissent‘s 
                                                                                                             
however, is that in order to separate class members 
possessing an ―existent‖ legal claim from those possessing a 
―nonexistent‖ one, district courts would have to perform a 
Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry into each class member‘s claim. 
38
 At the same time, it is by no means clear that the dissent‘s 
proposed analysis could be cabined to only consider the 
differing statutory standing requirements in the process of 
evaluating the validity of claims.  As discussed supra, 
statutory standing for indirect purchasers is treated as but one 
element of a cause of action, rather than a jurisdictional 
requirement, as the dissent mistakenly suggests.  If a district 
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view, Rule 23 does not require such an intensive cataloguing 
of each class member‘s claim in order to establish 
predominance.  Even more troublesome, this merits analysis 
might not actually answer the salient question of whether 
common issues of fact or law actually predominate over 
individual ones. 
Moreover, district courts undertaking the scrupulous 
review of state laws could not ensure the validity of each 
individual claim without first settling upon the precise state 
law governing each of the putative class members‘ claims.  
This choice-of-law analysis would be particularly difficult in 
a nationwide class action where an array of factors beyond 
the residence of the class members must be considered, 
including, inter alia, the location of the parties and the 
purchased items, and the place of contracting and 
performance.  See generally Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull 
Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 467 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Seventh Circuit 
rightly noted that ―choice-of-law issues in nationwide class 
actions are rarely so uncomplicated that one can delineate 
clear winning and losing arguments at an early stage in the 
litigation‖; ―the legal uncertainty resulting from the 
complicated choice-of-law issues‖ would unduly complicate 
the process for establishing predominance under Rule 23.  
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 
                                                                                                             
court were required to evaluate the statutory standing element 
to assess a claim‘s viability, logic and consistency suggest 
that the court should also consider other aspects of a claim for 
Rule 12(b)(6) and other deficiencies.  This approach would 
delay proceedings in the trial court, as it would require the 
parties to engage in ill-timed, protracted merits litigation at 
the class certification stage. 
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2006).  As a result, many courts find it ―inappropriate to 
decide choice of law issues incident to a motion for class 
certification.‖  See, e.g., In re Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74, 84 (D. Md. 1991); Singer v. AT&T 
Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (―It is well-
established that consideration of choice of law issues at the 
class certification stage is generally premature.‖). 
Even were a district court to properly ascertain the 
applicable law after conducting the choice-of-law inquiry, it 
would likely encounter unsettled legal questions, further 
undermining its ability to assess the viability of some class 
members‘ claims and increasing the costs of administration.  
By way of example, in Warfarin, we remarked on the 
―unsettled question of law as to whether Tennessee‘s antitrust 
statutes . . . cover only violations occurring in intrastate 
commerce or extend to cover violations occurring in interstate 
commerce as well.‖  391 F.3d at 530 n.12.  Relegating the 
issue to a footnote, we did not think it necessary to pry into 
the legal merits of the Tennessee claims in approving the 
class settlement.  In another instance, the Fifth Circuit 
confronted the unresolved question of whether Louisiana 
antitrust law granted standing to indirect purchasers of 
consumer products as part of the class certification process, 
and asked the Louisiana Supreme Court to accept certification 
of the question.  See Free v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 176 F.3d 298, 
298-99 (5th Cir. 1999).  When the state court declined, the 
Fifth Circuit was ―le[ft] to fathom Louisiana‘s unsettled 
antitrust law.‖  Id.  By requiring district courts to assess the 
validity of unsettled state law claims at the certification stage, 
we would needlessly introduce additional legal uncertainty 
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into a certification process that does not demand it.
39
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 Application of the proposed inquiry to the instant matter 
demonstrates the likely obstacles the District Court would 
encounter under this approach.  The objectors present Ohio‘s 
statutory regime as emblematic of the impropriety of the type 
of class settlement certification at issue here.  Citing the Ohio 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 834 
N.E.2d 791 (Ohio 2005), they urge that Ohio law prohibits all 
indirect purchaser claims asserting violations of Ohio antitrust 
law, common law claims for unjust enrichment where a 
purchaser cannot establish that he conferred a benefit upon a 
defendant, and claims alleging violations of the Ohio 
Consumer Sales Practices Act predicated upon monopolistic 
pricing practices.  (Quinn Br. at 60-61.)  As a result, they 
insist that, ―[d]irectly contrary to the district court‘s 
[certification], an Ohio class member does not have a valid 
claim under Ohio law.‖  (Id. at 61.)  The objectors contend 
that a similar problem exists for other Illinois Brick states.   
This inference is flawed for several reasons.  First, the 
objectors fail to engage in the type of choice-of-law exercise 
necessitated by their proposed approach – the evaluation of 
whether an Ohio class member is asserting a claim pursuant 
to Ohio law or pursuant to the law of a repealer state or a state 
affording an alternative basis for recovery.  Undoubtedly, this 
analysis would present significant hurdles and potentially 
alter the presumed outcome.  Second, although Johnson 
provides that an indirect purchaser lacking an antitrust claim 
under Illinois Brick cannot circumvent this limitation by 
relying upon the Ohio consumer protection statute, the Ohio 
Supreme Court did not, nor could it, preclude consumer 
protection claims predicated on fraud or deception.  As the 
plaintiffs point out, the claims settled here include allegations 
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We raise the following questions to further 
demonstrate the error of the proposed framework adopted by 
our dissenting colleagues.  If the dissent‘s ―colorable legal 
claim‖ test is a threshold inquiry for commonality, why 
should the court not consider every potential disqualifier from 
one‘s having a ―colorable legal claim?‖  For example, in any 
class certification case, should the court consider whether all 
potential class members complied with applicable pre-notice 
requirements under the relevant substantive law?  Should the 
court consider whether every potential class member 
exhausted her administrative remedies under the relevant 
substantive law?  Should the court evaluate whether each 
class member‘s claim complies with the applicable statute of 
limitations?  The answers to these questions most certainly 
implicate whether a litigant, in a class action or otherwise, has 
a ―colorable legal claim.‖  These questions, moreover, show 
how flawed, from an administrative, logical, and practical 
                                                                                                             
of fraud and deception separate from the antitrust allegations, 
suggesting that some avenue of recovery arising from the 
same defendant conduct remains available to indirect 
purchasers even in Ohio.  (See Pls.‘ Br. in Response to 
Quinn‘s Response to Class Counsel‘s Mot. for Leave to File 
Record Excerpts 13-14.)  Finally, if the court is to evaluate 
the viability of plaintiffs‘ statutory standing element under 
Ohio law at the class certification stage, the objectors 
presented no sensible reason why the court should not 
likewise inspect the viability of every other aspect of an 
antitrust, consumer protection, or unjust enrichment claim, 
such as statutes of limitation, conditions precedent to suit, and 
the like.  We do not doubt that such an exhaustive analysis 
would produce absurd results and cause undue delay in our 
trial courts. 
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standpoint, the dissent‘s and objectors‘ approach really is.  No 
class would ever be certified because it would be impossible 
to demonstrate that every class member has a ―colorable legal 
claim.‖  (Dissenting Op. at 10.)  More than this, it would gut 
commonality, for, most certainly, individual issues would 
then predominate.  There would simply be no class that could 
meet this commonality and predominance test. 
vi)  Settlements   
Finally, were we to mandate that a class include only 
those alleging ―colorable‖ claims, we would effectively rule 
out the ability of a defendant to achieve ―global peace‖ by 
obtaining releases from all those who might wish to assert 
claims, meritorious or not.  We need not take judicial notice 
of the fact that plaintiffs with non-viable claims do 
nonetheless commence legal action.  Here, in an effort to 
avoid protracted litigation and future relitigation of settled 
questions in federal and state courts across numerous 
jurisdictions, De Beers pursued a global settlement and 
demanded a release of potential damage claims in all fifty 
states.  See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 326 n.82 (noting that 
release of all claims ―serves the important policy interest of 
judicial economy by permitting parties to enter into 
comprehensive settlements that prevent relitigation of settled 
questions at the core of a class action‖) (citation & quotations 
omitted).  Specifically, De Beers sought ―global peace‖ in a 
settlement covering plaintiffs in every federal and state case, 
as well as potential plaintiffs who had not yet filed cases in 
either federal or state court.  See generally Klein v. O’Neal, 
Inc., 2009 WL 1174638, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2009) (―In 
a class action settlement setting, defendants seek and pay for 
global peace-i.e., the resolution of as many claims as 
possible.‖); In re Vioxx Prods. Liability Litig., 574 F. Supp. 
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2d 606, 613 (E.D. La. 2008) (quoting In re Guidant Corp. 
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 
05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *3 (D. Minn. 2008) (noting 
that the parties ―contemplated a global settlement covering 
Plaintiffs from both the MDL and state cases, and included 
Plaintiffs whose cases had been filed or transferred to the 
MDL, Plaintiffs whose cases were filed outside the MDL in 
state court proceedings, and potential Plaintiffs who had not 
yet filed their cases‖)).  The parties entered a mutual 
agreement and sought certification of a settlement class with 
the aim of avoiding countless individual suits in diverse 
jurisdictions.   
Our dissenting colleagues disparage the concept of 
―global peace‖ as if it were an impermissible objective in 
using the class action device.  From a practical standpoint, 
however, achieving global peace is a valid, and valuable, 
incentive to class action settlements.  Settlements avoid future 
litigation with all potential plaintiffs – meritorious or not.  If 
the dissent‘s position were adopted, there would be no 
settlements, collusive or otherwise.  First of all, litigating 
whether a claim is ―colorable‖ and defending who is in and 
who is not in the class would be an endless process, 
preventing the parties from seriously getting to, and engaging 
in, settlement negotiations.  And, as discussed above, the 
―individualized‖ nature of the task would doom the class 
certification process from the outset.  Second, since releases 
would necessarily be limited to the qualifying class members, 
those ultimately excluded would no doubt go right back into 
court to continue to assert their claims.  No defendants would 
consider settling under this framework, for they could never 
be assured that they have extinguished every claim from 
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every potential plaintiff.
40
 
As applied here, the objectors‘ approach would subject 
De Beers to numerous individual suits brought by claimants 
excluded from the class, undermining ―the strong 
presumption in favor of voluntary settlement agreements, 
which we have explicitly recognized with approval.‖  
Ehrheart, 609 F.3d at 594 (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, 
676 F.2d 77, 79-80 (3d Cir. 1982)).  ―This presumption is 
especially strong in class actions and other complex cases . . . 
because they promote the amicable resolution of disputes and 
lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by the federal 
courts.‖  Id. (citations omitted).  By contrast, requiring a class 
to assert uniform or identical questions of law or fact and to 
preemptively demonstrate their legal viability ―would 
seriously undermine the possibility for settling any large, 
multi district class action.‖ Prudential II, 261 F.3d at 367.  
Apart from imposing immense administrative costs, the 
extraordinary requirement that class members individually 
possess a ―colorable legal claim‖ would make it increasingly 
difficult to approve nationwide class settlements entailing 
predominantly common issues but arising under varying state 
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 Of course, some global settlements may nevertheless be 
rejected for failing to meet the requirements of Rule 23.  In 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 528 U.S. 815 (1999), the Supreme 
Court rejected a global settlement in a mandatory class action 
based on a limited fund theory under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).  
There, the plaintiffs seeking class certification failed to 
demonstrate that the fund available to pay claims was limited 
beyond the fund amount agreed to by the parties.  There, the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) were not met; here, the 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met. 
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laws.  The resulting framework would likely siphon the 
various state law claims from federal class actions, and 
defendants seeking to settle ―in such suits would always be 
concerned that a settlement of the federal class action would 
leave them exposed to countless suits in state court despite 
settlement of the federal claims.‖  Id.; see also Pet Food, 629 
F.3d at 342 (―[A]bsent class certification, the Court may be 
faced with litigating over 100 individual lawsuits all of which 
would arise out of the same set of operative facts.‖).   
Rather than ―concentrating the litigation of the claims‖ 
in a superior single action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C), this 
would serve to frustrate ―[t]he core purpose of Rule 
23(b)(3),‖ which ―is to vindicate the claims of consumers and 
other groups of people whose individual claims would be too 
small to warrant litigation,‖ Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617.     
b.  Rules Enabling Act & Federalism Concerns 
 The objectors further contend that the District Court‘s 
certification of the settlement class was flawed because it 
―recognized as valid, for purposes of Rule 23, claims that are 
not recognized as valid under applicable state law.‖  (Quinn 
Supp. Br. at 28.)  Accordingly, they argue, the order ran afoul 
of the Rules Enabling Act, which provides that the rules of 
procedure ―shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.‖  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).41  We cannot agree.   
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 The Panel agreed with this characterization, holding that 
―the order contravenes the Rules Enabling Act‖ because it 
―extends antitrust remedies that, in many instances, have no 
root in state substantive law.‖  Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 149.  The 
Panel rejected the argument that De Beers‘s willingness to 
stipulate to liability obviated this concern, noting that a court 
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In Prudential, we approved a district court‘s 
certification of a proposed settlement despite objections that 
the certification modified or abridged state law rights.  148 
F.3d at 324 (discussing 962 F. Supp. 450, 461-62 (D.N.J. 
1997)).  We agreed with the district court that ―approval of a 
settlement under Rule 23 merely recognizes the parties‘ 
voluntary compromise of their rights and does not itself affect 
their substantive state law rights.‖  Id. (citation & alterations 
omitted).  As a result, we also agreed with the district court‘s 
assessment that the proposed settlement could not violate the 
Rules Enabling Act since a ―court‘s approval of a voluntary 
settlement, by nature a compromise of rights, does not affect 
substantive state rights.‖  Prudential, 962 F. Supp. at 462.   
It is well established that ―settlement agreements are 
creatures of private contract law.‖  See, e.g., Bauer v. Trans. 
Sch. Dist. of City of St. Louis, 255 F.3d 478, 482 (8th Cir. 
2001).  ―A district court is not a party to the settlement, nor 
may it modify the terms of a voluntary settlement agreement 
between parties.‖  Ehrheart, 609 F.3d at 593 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, a district court‘s certification of a settlement 
simply recognizes the parties‘ deliberate decision to bind 
themselves according to mutually agreed-upon terms without 
engaging in any substantive adjudication of the underlying 
causes of action.  In the absence of a finding that plaintiffs are 
actually entitled to relief under substantive state law, we 
reiterate that a court does not ―abridge, enlarge, or modify 
                                                                                                             
was obligated even in the settlement context to ensure that all 
of Rule 23‘s requirements were met and could not 
―effectively grant[ ] relief to individuals to whom De Beers 
had no antitrust liability.‖  Id.  The dissent repeats this 
argument. 
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any substantive right‖ by approving a voluntarily-entered 
class settlement agreement.  § 2072(b). 
 In the same vein, we disagree with the contention that 
the District Court violated principles of federalism by 
extending to the plaintiffs a substantive right that they could 
not have asserted in state court.
42
  As an initial matter, the 
District Court‘s approval of the parties‘ settlement should not 
be considered a recognition or expansion of substantive rights 
unavailable in a particular state.
43
  See supra.  In this regard, 
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 The Panel agreed with this argument, noting that certain 
states‘ ―categorical refus[al] to allow indirect purchasers to 
bring a price-fixing claim‖ was ―not trivial‖ and represented 
―fundamental policy differences among the several states.‖  
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 152, 148.  The Panel concluded that 
these state interests were in effect ―subordinated to De 
Beers‘s desire to resolve all indirect purchaser claims 
simultaneously‖ and ―in a quest to clear the queue in court.‖  
Id. at 152 (citation & quotations omitted). 
 
43
 The dissent concludes that approving class certification 
here endorses the enlargement of substantive rights because 
had some class members brought these claims individually in 
state court, they would ―be immediately shown the exit.‖  
(Dissenting Op. at 30.)  This is incorrect, for the state court 
would not automatically dismiss them without a motion from 
De Beers.  More significantly, nothing would prevent De 
Beers from settling those claims in lieu of moving to dismiss 
them, and doing so in that scenario would not be an 
enlargement of substantive rights.   
In responding to this point, the dissent equates an objection 
to class certification with a motion to dismiss, but such 
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the disputed certification order did not subordinate the states‘ 
interests, as it did not in fact validate any asserted claims 
purportedly rejected by the states.
44
   
Moreover, consideration of the policy imperatives 
underlying Illinois Brick confirms that the District Court‘s 
certification of a settlement class here did not infringe upon 
federalism principles.  Illinois Brick‘s restriction on indirect 
purchaser recovery was motivated by prudential concerns for 
manageability; it does not reflect a categorical policy 
judgment that indirect purchasers do not merit antitrust 
protection.  As we previously highlighted, the Illinois Brick 
                                                                                                             
treatment demonstrates the very flaw in its position.  Class 
certification and motions to dismiss involve two distinct (and 
different) standards, and the former does not permit as 
extensive an inquiry into the merits as the latter does.  (See 
Dissenting Op. at 30 n.21.)   
 
44
 The dissent decries this position, contending that 
including Indirect Purchasers in the class who could not, on 
an individual basis, state a claim for recovery impermissibly 
modifies the rights of those Indirect Purchasers who could 
recover individually.  In so asserting, the dissent assumes that 
the size of the settlement fund would be the same if the 
Indirect Purchasers who cannot recover individually were 
excluded from the class.  Surely this cannot be the case, for 
the settlement amount to which De Beers has agreed must be 
based in large part on the number of potential class members 
and on securing global peace.  Had those Indirect Purchasers 
who could not recover individually been excluded, we 
seriously doubt that the Indirect Purchaser settlement fund 
would still be $272.5 million. 
 
73 
 
Court offered ―three policy reasons for its holding‖: 
(1) a risk of duplicative liability for defendants 
and potentially inconsistent adjudications could 
arise if courts permitted both direct and indirect 
purchasers to sue defendants for the same 
overcharge; (2) the evidentiary complexities 
and uncertainties involved in ascertaining the 
portion of the overcharge that the direct 
purchasers had passed on to the various levels 
of indirect purchasers would place too great a 
burden on the courts; and (3) permitting direct 
and indirect purchasers to sue only for the 
amount of the overcharge they themselves 
absorbed and did not pass on would cause 
inefficient enforcement of the antitrust laws by 
diluting the ultimate recovery and thus 
decreasing the direct purchasers' incentive to 
sue. 
Howard Hess Dental Labs Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 424 
F.3d 363, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Illinois Brick, 431 
U.S. at 730-35, 740-43).
45
  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
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 Other Courts of Appeals have recognized a similar 
functional focus in the Supreme Court‘s decision.  See, e.g., 
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 
991 (7th Cir. 2006) (―An example of the prudential 
limitations on standing is the judge-made ‗indirect purchaser‘ 
doctrine of antitrust law,‖ which is premised on minimizing 
complicated litigation), rev’d on other grounds, Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); 
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d 839, 852 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (―The question of whether a plaintiff has standing 
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acknowledged that its aversion to administering indirect 
purchaser recoveries undoubtedly ―denie[d] recovery to those 
indirect purchasers who may have been actually injured by 
antitrust violations.‖  Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.46 
Here, contrary to the dissent‘s and the objectors‘ 
argument, the District Court‘s certification order did not 
undermine these prudential considerations.  De Beers‘s 
agreement to a specified recovery payment – and the 
interrelated removal of a need to ascertain and prove the 
amount of passed-on overcharges – marginalizes the first two 
Illinois Brick concerns for duplicative liability and 
complexity in ascertaining the passed-on overcharges.  The 
third prudential concern is similarly inapposite since the 
Direct Purchaser Class pursued and approved a separate 
settlement agreement and there is no indication that the 
Indirect Purchaser Settlement undermined ―the direct 
purchasers‘ incentive to sue.‖  Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 370.  
                                                                                                             
to sue under the antitrust laws depends largely on prudential 
considerations.‖). 
46
 States on both sides of the indirect purchaser restriction 
have likewise appreciated the pragmatic origins of and 
purposes served by Illinois Brick.  See, e.g., Lorix v. 
Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 2007) (noting 
that antitrust standing ―has prudential limits based on 
remoteness of injury and complexity of proof‖); Comes v. 
Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Iowa 2002) (―[T]he 
Illinois Brick court was wholly concerned with the 
complexity of litigation and the possibility of multiple 
liability.‖); Abbott Labs, Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 506-
07 (Tex. 1995) (discussing the prudential policy concerns 
underlying Illinois Brick). 
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Indeed, the immediate relief offered by the instant settlement 
appears to offer the most ―[ ]efficient enforcement of the 
antitrust laws,‖ id., when compared to the highly uncertain 
result the plaintiffs would encounter by engaging in 
protracted litigation against a party with a long track record of 
avoiding the jurisdiction of courts in the United States.  See 
generally Comment, The Diamond Cartel, 56 Yale L.J. 1404, 
1411 (1947) (discussing De Beers‘s avoidance of effective 
antitrust prosecution in light of ―the twin difficulties of 
obtaining jurisdiction over the foreign corporations and of 
retaining within the court‘s reach tangible assets sufficient to 
enforce a decree‖). 
Accordingly, we reject the assertion that the District 
Court inappropriately subordinated state sovereignty in 
certifying the class. 
c.  Identification of Class Claims 
Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(B) 
Apart from our disagreement with the objectors‘ 
arguments regarding commonality and predominance, we 
similarly reject the view that the District Court‘s Order in this 
case failed to satisfy all of Rule 23(c)(1)(B)‘s substantive 
requirements.   
As we have explicated, Rule 23(c) provides that a 
certification order ―must include (1) a readily discernible, 
clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the 
class or classes to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, 
clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be 
treated on a class basis.‖  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 
320-21 (citation & quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(c)(1)(B) (―An order that certifies a class action must 
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define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses. . . 
.‖).  The District Court‘s Order ―easily meets the 
requirements of Rule 23(c)(1)(B) with respect to the 
definition of the class itself.‖  Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 188 (3d Cir. 
2006).  The Court properly delineated the parameters of the 
Indirect Purchaser Class, defining class members as any 
purchasers of any diamond product in the United States 
except for those who purchased directly from De Beers or its 
competitors.  (App‘x 270.)   
As to the second prong of the above test, the 
contention is raised that the Court‘s Order did not ―explicitly 
define which claims, issues, or defenses are to be treated on a 
class basis.‖  Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 189.  We disagree with this 
characterization, as the settlement posture of this class action 
makes our decision on this front particularly simple.  As we 
noted in Wachtel, a ―critical‖ purpose of Rule 23(c)(1)‘s 
requirement of a ―full and clear articulation of the litigation‘s 
contours at the time of class certification‖ was the ―need [ ] to 
determine how the case will be tried‖ through presentation of 
―a ‗trial plan‘ that describes the issues likely to be presented 
at trial and tests whether they are susceptible to class-wide 
proof.‖  453 F.3d at 186 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) 
advisory committee‘s note) (quotations omitted).  In the 
settlement context, however, this concern evaporates, ―for the 
proposal is that there be no trial.‖  Comm. Bank II, 622 F.3d 
at 291 (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620).  As such, we agree 
with the Seventh Circuit‘s sentiment that ―[g]iven the 
settlement, no one need draw fine lines among [the various] 
theories of relief.‖  Mexico Money, 267 F.3d at 747. 
The District Court‘s Order identified six common legal 
or factual issues it reasonably found to ―predominate‖ over 
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individual questions and susceptible to class treatment, (see 
App‘x 276); the Court also expressly included in its Opinion 
a background section titled ―Underlying Claims, Cases & 
Parties,‖ which laid out in depth all the claims asserted in 
each individual suit to be resolved by the class settlement, 
(App‘x 263-65).  See also supra note 6.  It is undisputed that 
the Settlement Agreement resolves and releases each and 
every one of these asserted claims and issues, obviating any 
need to ―cobble together‖ some uncertain category of issues 
to be tried as a class.  Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 189.  ―[N]o 
particular format is necessary in order to meet the substantive 
requirement of [Rule 23(c)], and we will not set aside 
substantively conforming certification orders purely over 
matters of form.‖  Id. at 188 n.10.  The District Court‘s 
Opinion ―facilitate[d] meaningful appellate review of [this] 
complex certification decision[ ]‖ by providing us with ample 
guidance as to the ―contours‖ of the settlement.‖  Id. at 186.47 
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 We find additional support for our conclusion from the 
First Circuit‘s recent ruling in In re Pharmaceutical Industry 
Average Wholesale Price Litigation, 588 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 
2009).  There, the Court remarked that ―Rule 23(c)(1)(B) was 
added . . . to help appellate courts reviewing an order better 
understand the district court‘s decision,‖ and to allow 
―appellate courts, attorneys, and parties [to] proceed with 
more information and mutual understanding.‖  Id. at 40 
(citing Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 186-87).  As a result, the Court 
upheld a district court‘s certification order that ―plainly 
defined the class and the class claims, issues, and defenses in 
sufficient detail,‖ ―devoted many pages to the class‘s factual 
allegations against the defendant,‖ ―carefully analyzed the 
proposed class‘s suitability for certification, again explaining 
the issues common to the class,‖ and also ―discussed the state 
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Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did 
not run afoul of the requirements of Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and 
properly certified the two classes of claims. 
2.  Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) 
 In addition to certifying the Direct and Indirect 
Purchaser Classes under Rule 23(b)(3), the District Court 
further certified the purchaser classes pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(2) for the purpose of awarding injunctive relief under § 
16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
48
  (App‘x 285.)  
Plaintiffs alleged that, in the absence of injunctive relief, De 
Beers‘s anticompetitive conduct would continue to cause the 
                                                                                                             
consumer protection statutes underlying the class‘s claims, 
noting differences among them.‖  Id.  Likewise here, the 
District Court clearly defined the class, listed six common 
claims and issues, devoted significant discussion to the 
factual allegations, analyzed the class‘s suitability for 
certification by explaining the predominantly common issues, 
and noted the differences among the various statutes 
implicated in the claims.  As succinctly stated by our fellow 
Court of Appeals, ―[t]hat is enough.‖  Id. at 41.   
48
 15 U.S.C. § 26 reads in pertinent part: 
Any person, firm, corporation, or association 
shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive 
relief, in any court of the United States having 
jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened 
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust 
law . . . when and under the same conditions 
and principles as injunctive relief against 
threatened conduct that will cause loss or 
damage is granted by courts of equity. 
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entire membership of all classes to pay artificially inflated 
prices.  The objectors counter that class members lack 
antitrust standing to seek injunctive relief because they cannot 
demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending 
violation of the antitrust laws.  In support, they point to expert 
reports submitted in 2008 for the targeted purpose of 
identifying a common methodology benchmark for 
calculating damages; these reports suggested that the market 
for rough diamonds became more competitive in the interim 
between mid-2006 and 2008, in concert with De Beers‘s 
weakening position in the market.
49
  In making this argument, 
the objectors reject the District Court‘s conclusion that De 
Beers‘s willful entry into the settlement removed the 
plaintiffs‘ burden to establish the likelihood of future injury.  
(See App‘x 285.)  
In contrast to the damages provision of § 4 of the 
Clayton Act, ―‗Section 16 has been applied more expansively, 
both because its language is less restrictive than that of § 4 . . 
. and because the injunctive remedy is a more flexible and 
adaptable tool for enforcing the antitrust laws than the 
damage remedy. . . .‘‖50  McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 
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 After evaluating the mentioned expert reports, the Panel 
agreed with the objectors that plaintiffs no longer faced ―a 
significant threat of future antitrust harm in the absence of the 
injunction,‖ and, therefore, lacked antitrust standing under § 
16 of the Clayton Act.  Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 157-58. 
50
 Section 16 provides in pertinent part: 
Any person, firm, corporation, or association 
shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive 
relief, in any court of the United States having 
jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened 
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F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Schoenkopf v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 
1980)).  Because actions seeking injunctive relief under § 16 
do ―not present the countervailing considerations – such as 
the risk of duplicative or ruinous recoveries and the spectre of 
a trial burdened with complex and conjectural economic 
analyses,‖ plaintiffs need not ―satisfy the direct purchaser 
requirement as a condition of seeking injunctive relief.‖  In re 
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 
2000) (Warfarin I) (quoting Mid-West Paper Prods Co. v. 
Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 594 (3d Cir. 1979)) 
(quotations omitted).  Instead, to establish the need for 
injunctive relief, plaintiffs must generally demonstrate three 
uncomplicated prerequisites:  ―a threat of loss‖; that the injury 
in question ―is of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent‖; and ―a significant threat of injury from a violation 
of the antitrust laws.‖  Id. at 399 (citations & quotations 
omitted; alterations added). 
Despite this burden, it is well established that ―parties 
to a suit have the right to agree to anything they please in 
reference to the subject matter of their litigation, and the 
court, when applied to, will ordinarily give effect to their 
agreement, if it comes within the general scope of the case 
made by the pleadings.‖  Sansom Comm. by Cook v. Lynn, 
735 F.2d 1535, 1548 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Pac. R.R. v. 
                                                                                                             
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust 
laws, . . . when and under the same conditions 
and principles as injunctive relief against 
threatened conduct that will cause loss or 
damage is granted by courts of equity. 
15 U.S.C. § 26. 
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Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1879) (quotations & alterations 
omitted)).  In turn, ―[a]s the Supreme Court has recognized, a 
district court may ‗provide broader relief in an action that is 
resolved before trial than the court could have awarded after a 
trial.‘‖  In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litig., 818 F.2d 
179, 185 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) 
(alterations omitted).  Accordingly, district courts are 
afforded wide discretion to give effect to joint compromises 
that timely advance the interests of the parties without 
wasteful litigation.
51
  In exercising this discretion, the District 
Court here could reasonably approve a mutually agreed-upon 
stipulation enjoining conduct within the Court‘s jurisdiction 
regardless of whether the plaintiffs could have received 
identical relief in a contested suit by satisfying each of the 
aforementioned requirements at trial. 
Yet because of the class nature of the instant suit, the 
District Court‘s approval of the stipulated injunction borne 
out of a class settlement did need to satisfy an additional test.  
Specifically, Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class certification only 
when ―the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
                                                 
51
 Unsurprisingly, a paucity of case law addresses the issue 
of whether parties to a lawsuit may consent to the issuance of 
an injunction that is agreeable to all parties without a court‘s 
asking whether the prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(2) have been 
satisfied.  This dearth of precedent is to be expected since it 
would be highly illogical for a defendant to dispute an 
injunction to which it in fact agreed, and for a plaintiff 
beneficiary to object to an injunction entered for its benefit.  
Curiously, the latter situation is presented here. 
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on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.‖  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
52
  Important to the analysis ―is that the 
relief sought . . . should benefit the entire class,‖ and ―the 
putative class [must] ‗demonstrate that the interests of the 
class members are so like those of the individual 
representatives that injustice will not result from their being 
bound by such judgment in the subsequent application of 
principles of res judicata.‘‖  Baby Neal for and by Kanter v. 
Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hassine, 846 
F.2d at 179).  ―[I]njunctive actions, seeking to define the 
relationship between the defendant and the ‗world at large,‘ 
will usually satisfy the requirement.‖  Id. 
Here, we have no difficulty concluding that Rule 
23(b)(2)‘s requirement that De Beers‘s alleged conduct be 
―generally applicable to the class‖ was satisfied.  Indeed, 
much of our discussion of ―predominance‖ in the previous 
section of this Opinion specifically emphasized the common 
elements of the complained of conduct that are equally 
applicable to ―the class as a whole.‖  See supra.  As the 
District Court discussed, the plaintiffs alleged that De Beers‘s 
anticompetitive behavior ―caused the entire membership of all 
classes to pay artificially inflated prices,‖ and that, in the 
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 ―This rule applies when the putative class seeks injunctive 
or declaratory relief, and ‗does not extend to cases in which 
the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or 
predominantly to money damages,‘‖ as with a certification 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).  Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 
291, 301 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) 
advisory committee‘s note). 
83 
 
absence of injunctive relief, all classes would continue to pay 
artificial premiums.  (App‘x 285.)  These claims demonstrate 
shared interests between the members of the putative class, 
and, these allegations, if proven, would support injunctive 
relief respecting the class as a whole.  Likewise, the parties‘ 
mutual decision to settle claims ―on grounds generally 
applicable to the class‖ complies with the text of Rule 
23(b)(2) and should be respected. 
In reaching this decision, we also reject the objectors‘ 
request that we engage in fact-finding as to whether all class 
members could show an imminent threat of prospective 
antitrust injury.  Due to the settlement posture of this case, 
which controls, we need not concern ourselves with this issue.  
Moreover, the District Court never addressed the question of 
whether changes in the market negatively affected De Beers‘s 
ability to extract higher rents from diamond sightholders and 
subsequent purchasers.
53
  Without the benefit of the District 
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 The objectors urge, based on the damages methodology 
expert reports, that De Beers‘s market share fell to 
approximately 46% in 2006, and, therefore, posed little 
continuing threat of future antitrust harm.  (Quinn Br. 19.)  
Although the experts mentioned that De Beers lost its 
dominant share of an increasingly competitive market, the 
experts never opined – as the objectors contend – that 
plaintiffs face no significant threat of future antitrust harm.  
Were we to conduct our own independent analysis, we might 
draw a very different conclusion as to De Beers‘s asserted 
ability to inflict future harm: we might decide that De Beers‘s 
ongoing leadership position – considering its purported 46% 
market share in the diamond market – afforded it ample 
opportunity to influence diamond prices, posing an ongoing 
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Court‘s factual findings on the matter in any event, ―[w]e 
deem it inappropriate to treat this question without any 
evidence having been presented on [it] and without the 
benefit of the findings and opinion of the district judge.  
Merola v. Atl. Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                             
and significant threat of antitrust injury.  See generally United 
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 459 (1964) 
(discussing defendant‘s ―dominant position‖ based upon a 
43%-46% market share in a highly concentrated industry).  
The objectors place far too much stock in De Beers‘s 
purported market share, ignoring one of the basic tenets in 
assessing market power:  ―Obviously no magic inheres in 
numbers; the relative effect of percentage command of a 
market varies with the setting in which that factor is placed.‖  
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 
(1953). 
Curiously, the objectors and the Panel also rejected the 
plaintiffs‘ contention that the injunction entered by the 
District Court in 2006 – an injunction directly tailored to 
fostering competition – played any role in the increasingly 
competitive market.  Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 157.  The Panel 
opined that although the mid-2006 competitive increases 
―roughly coincided with the District Court‘s issuance of the 
injunction,‖ this coincidence did not support the reasonable 
deduction that the injunction ―played a meaningful role in 
producing those competitive gains.‖  Id. at 157-58.  An 
equally logical inference would be that increased competition 
approximating the issuance of the injunction evidenced the 
efficacy of the relief.  That said, we will abstain from 
extrapolating broad legal conclusions of market 
competitiveness from data narrowly focused on damages 
methodology. 
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1975).      
At bottom, we hold that the District Court acted within 
its discretion in accepting De Beers‘s stipulation to the 
injunctive relief. 
B.  Fairness of the Class Action Settlement & the Plan of 
Allocation 
 Apart from contesting the certification of the 
settlement class, the objectors raise two other arguments as to 
the fairness and adequacy of the proposed settlement.  First, 
they quarrel with the District Court‘s approval of the 
settlement as a whole under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(e)‘s requirement that the settlement be ―fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.‖  (See Bagolie Br. at 18-28.)  Second, the 
objectors dispute the fairness and adequacy of the 
settlement‘s plan of allocation for a portion of the settlement.  
Specifically, they urge that the proposed Indirect Purchaser 
Settlement distribution is ―patently unfair‖ and presents ―an 
intra-class conflict of interest that renders Class Counsel, as 
well as the class representative, inadequate.‖  (See Murray 
Consol. Br. at 13; Quinn Br. at 63-64; Petrus Br. at 12-13.)  
We address each objection in order. 
 1.  Approval of the Settlement 
 Before approving a class settlement agreement, a 
district court must find that the requirements for class 
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) are met, and must 
separately ―determine that the settlement is fair to the class 
under [Rule] 23(e).‖  Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 257.  Rule 
23(e) provides that a proposed settlement may only be 
approved ―after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, 
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reasonable, and adequate.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).  In this 
process, ―trial judges bear the important responsibility of 
protecting absent class members,‖ and must be ―assur[ed] that 
the settlement represents adequate compensation for the 
release of the class claims.‖  Pet Food, 629 F.3d at 349 
(citation & quotations omitted); see also Ehrheart, 609 F.3d 
at 593 (stressing that ―[t]he purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect 
the unnamed members of the class,‖ and that a ―district court 
acts as a fiduciary‖ for absent class members) (citing 
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 534).  ―[W]here settlement negotiations 
precede class certification, and approval for settlement and 
certification are sought simultaneously, district courts should 
be even ‗more scrupulous than usual‘ when examining the 
fairness of the proposed settlement.‖  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 
534 (quoting GM Truck, 55 F.3d at 805). 
In assessing the fairness of a proposed settlement, we 
have articulated nine well-established primary factors for a 
district court to consider in conducting its inquiry: 
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration 
of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to 
the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings 
and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the 
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of 
establishing damages; (6) the risks of 
maintaining the class action through the trial; 
(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a 
greater judgment; (8) the range of 
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of 
the best possible recovery; [and] (9) the range 
of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a 
possible recovery in light of all the attendant 
risks of litigation. 
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Pet Foods, 629 F.3d at 350 (quoting Girsh v. Jepson, 521 
F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)). (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). 
Furthermore, a district court may consider several 
other factors ―illustrative of additional inquiries that in many 
instances will be useful for a thoroughgoing analysis of a 
settlement‘s terms,‖ id.: 
[T]he maturity of the underlying substantive 
issues, as measured by experience in 
adjudicating individual actions, the 
development of scientific knowledge, the extent 
of discovery on the merits, and other factors 
that bear on the ability to assess the probable 
outcome of a trial on the merits of liability and 
individual damages; the existence and probable 
outcome of claims by other classes and 
subclasses; the comparison between the results 
achieved by the settlement for individual class 
or subclass members and the results achieved—
or likely to be achieved—for other claimants; 
whether class or subclass members are accorded 
the right to opt out of the settlement; whether 
any provisions for attorneys' fees are 
reasonable; and whether the procedure for 
processing individual claims under the 
settlement is fair and reasonable. 
Id. (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 323).  The ―settling 
parties bear the burden of proving that the Girsh factors 
weigh in favor of approval of the settlement‖ throughout this 
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analysis.
54
  Id. (citation omitted).  ―Because of the district 
court‘s proximity to the parties and to the nuances of the 
litigation, we accord great weight to the court‘s factual 
findings‖ in conducting the fairness inquiry.  Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 317. 
 The District Court in this instance engaged in a 
thorough review of the Girsh factors, holding that the relevant 
considerations on balance weighed in favor of a finding of 
fairness under Rule 23(e).  We conclude that the Court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding the settlement to be fair, 
reasonable, and adequate. 
a. Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of 
the Litigation 
 The first Girsh factor ―captures the probable costs, in 
both time and money, of continued litigation.‖  Warfarin, 391 
F.3d at 536 (citation omitted).  The District Court found that 
this litigation ―would have been difficult, as multiple parties, 
multiple claims, extensive jurisdictional problems, and 
complicated discovery would be involved.‖  (App‘x 289.)  
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 We have separately observed that ―an initial presumption 
of fairness‖ may apply when reviewing a proposed settlement 
where: ―(1) the settlement negotiations occurred at arm‘s 
length; (2) there was sufficient discovery; (3) the proponents 
of the settlement are experienced in similar litigation; and (4) 
only a small fraction of the class objected.‖  Warfarin, 391 
F.3d at 535 (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 
201, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (―Cendant‖).  The District Court did 
not consider or rely upon this presumption in assessing 
fairness.  Because we find no error in the Court‘s thorough 
analysis, we will likewise disregard this presumption. 
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The Court further discussed the likelihood of extensive 
motion practice as to jurisdiction, the lifting of default 
judgments, statute of limitations issues, and the concern for 
protecting foreign litigants in United States courts.  (Id. 289-
90.)   
We agree with the District Court‘s conclusion that 
litigation of the numerous legal and factual issues discussed 
would have inevitably contributed to the expense and 
duration of the proceedings.  Faced with the uncertainty 
arising from the existing defaults and De Beers‘s ongoing 
denial of personal jurisdiction, the settlement provided 
substantial and immediate relief to the class without further 
expense.  Moreover, extended motion practice ―would not 
only further prolong the litigation but also reduce the value of 
any recovery to the class.‖  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 536.  
Accordingly, this first factor favors the settlement. 
  b.  The Reaction of the Class to the Settlement 
 The second Girsh factor ―attempts to gauge whether 
members of the class support the settlement,‖ by considering 
the number of objectors and opt-outs and the substance of any 
objections.  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 318.  The District Court 
determined that the reaction of the class was overwhelmingly 
positive,
55
 and noted that all twenty of the objections 
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 The Court noted that, as of March 31, 2008, it had 
received 433,891 claims forms from all classes – nine from 
members of the Direct Purchaser Class and 433,882 from the 
Indirect Purchaser Class, with 431,380 from the Consumer 
Subclass and 2,502 from the Reseller Subclass.  (App‘x 291.)  
The Court also stated that five requests for exclusion had 
been received from the Direct Purchaser Class and 139 from 
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pertained to the Indirect Purchaser Class, with all but four 
objections relating to the consumer subclass, which consists 
of between 67 and 117 million members.  (App‘x 290-91.)  
We agree with the District Court‘s observation that the 
minimal number of objections and requests for exclusion are 
consistent with class settlements we have previously 
approved, and we are satisfied that the District Court acted 
within its discretion in finding this factor to favor settlement. 
c.  The Stage of the Proceedings and the 
Amount of Discovery Completed 
 The third Girsh factor ―captures the degree of case 
development that class counsel had accomplished prior to 
settlement,‖ and allows the court to ―determine whether 
counsel had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case 
before negotiating.‖  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (citation, 
quotations & alterations omitted).  The District Court 
thoroughly discussed the development of this case prior to 
settlement, highlighting the extensive factual discovery of 
industry participants, consumers, and experts in the field; the 
retention of economic experts; the review of publicly 
available information; the experiences of counsel who had 
previously sued De Beers for price-fixing; and the analysis of 
proceedings relating to De Beers‘s other contractual 
entanglements in the field.  (App‘x 292.)  The Court further 
                                                                                                             
the Indirect Purchaser Class (66 from the Reseller Subclass 
and 69 from the Consumer Subclass).  (Id.)  The Court 
received no objections from any direct purchasers and also 
noted that notice was provided to the United States Attorney 
General and the Attorney Generals of all fifty states, with 
none seeking to participate in the proceedings.  (Id. 290-291, 
1449-1450.) 
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observed that several of the individual suits had been in 
litigation for years before negotiation of the settlement, and 
emphasized that classes had been certified in several 
individual suits after significant factual investigation and 
legal development.  (Id.)  The Court committed no error in 
concluding that counsel adequately appreciated the merits of 
the case prior to reaching a settlement, and we agree that this 
factor favors approval of the settlement. 
  d.  The Risks of Establishing Liability 
 The fourth Girsh factor ―examine[s] what the potential 
rewards (or downside) of litigation might have been had class 
counsel decided to litigate the claims rather than settle them.‖   
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 237.  As already highlighted, the 
District Court discussed at length the various difficulties 
plaintiffs would likely encounter in attempting to collect on 
default judgments in foreign jurisdictions, observing that the 
Court‘s monetary judgments would likely be perceived as 
―beyond its authority‖ and ―effectively void.‖  (App‘x 294-
95.)  The objectors‘ misguided contention that no risk of 
establishing liability exists entirely disregards the potential 
drawbacks of litigating and attempting to collect in foreign 
jurisdictions, including the extensive motion practice and 
expense such an uncertain tactic would entail.  We are also 
influenced by De Beers‘s track record of rejecting United 
States jurisdiction over its legal affairs and the fact that De 
Beers has continued to deny any wrongdoing even in reaching 
a settlement agreement in this matter.  Accordingly, we 
discern no error in the District Court‘s conclusion that this 
factor favors settlement. 
  e.  The Risks of Establishing Damages 
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 As with the fourth Girsh factor, ―this inquiry attempts 
to measure the expected value of litigating the action rather 
than settling it at the current time.‖  Cendant, 264 F.3d at 
238-39 (citation & quotations omitted).  The District Court 
found that entry of a default judgment against De Beers 
would prompt the court to ―conduct such hearings or order 
such references as it deems necessary and proper‖ to ascertain 
the amount of damages since the damages had not presently 
been established with certainty.  (App‘x 296 (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 55(b)).)  The expert reports submitted by the various 
parties indicated that these proceedings would likely entail a 
―battle of the experts,‖ with each side presenting its figures 
and defenses to the other side‘s proposals.  (Id. 297.)  
Because of the ―uncertainty attendant to such a battle,‖ the 
District Court determined this factor to weigh in support of 
settlement, (id.), and the objectors do not contest this finding 
on appeal.  Accordingly, we find no flaw in the District 
Court‘s decision that the additional ―risk in establishing 
damages‖ counsels in favor of approval of the settlement.  
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 239. 
f.  The Risks of Maintaining the Class Action 
Through Trial 
 The sixth Girsh factor ―measures the likelihood of 
obtaining and keeping a class certification if the action were 
to proceed to trial‖ in light of the fact that ―the prospects for 
obtaining certification have a great impact on the range of 
recovery one can expect to reap from the class action.‖  
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (internal quotations & citation 
omitted).  Class certification is tenuous, as a ―district court 
retains the authority to decertify or modify a class at any time 
during the litigation if it proves to be unmanageable.‖  Id. 
(citation omitted).  As we have discussed supra, although the 
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size and variety of issues implicated in this nationwide class 
action do not present an obstacle to certification of a 
settlement class, ―there is a significant risk that such a class 
would create intractable management problems if it were to 
become a litigation class, and therefore be decertified.‖  Id.  
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the 
considerable risk of maintaining the class action through trial 
weighed in favor of settlement.
56
 
 g.  Ability of Defendants to Withstand a Greater 
Judgment 
 The seventh Girsh factor considers ―whether the 
defendants could withstand a judgment for an amount 
significantly greater than the settlement.‖  Warfarin, 391 F.3d 
at 537-58 (citation, quotations, & alteration omitted).  The 
District Court observed that ―little fact-finding has been done 
on this issue,‖ and noted that the parties did not dispute De 
Beers‘s ability to withstand a greater judgment.  (App‘x 298-
                                                 
56
 The objectors aver that drawing a distinction between 
settlement and litigation classes ―would create two standards 
for class certification‖ although ―the federal rules do not 
provide for such a difference.‖  (Bagolie Br. at 25.)  This 
argument patently disregards our clear and consistent 
precedent on the subject.   While the standards for class 
certification are the same for both settlement and litigation 
classes, certification in the former context need not consider 
―whether the case, if tried, would present intractable 
management problems, for the proposal is that there be no 
trial.‖  Comm. Bank II, 622 F.3d at 291 (citing Amchem, 521 
U.S. at 620).  This added risk is of utmost significance in 
determining whether a settlement would best serve the 
interests of the class. 
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99.)  Even so, the Court found this factor to neither favor nor 
disfavor the proposed settlement because ―it would be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to collect a judgment 
from De Beers.‖  (Id.)  The objectors contend that the District 
Court made insufficient findings as to De Beers‘s market 
capitalization, which suggested an ability to withstand a much 
higher judgment, and, therefore, should have weighed this 
factor against the settlement.  (Bagolie Br. at 26-27). 
 In comparing the value of settlement versus trial, we 
must be careful to judge the fairness factors ―against the 
realistic, rather than theoretical, potential for recovery after 
trial.‖  In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 
436, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  In this regard, a finding that an 
immediate settlement is preferable to the high unlikelihood of 
collecting a theoretical judgment against De Beers appears 
entirely reasonable.  Moreover, a defendant‘s ability to 
withstand a much higher judgment does not necessarily 
―mean that it is obligated to pay any more than what the 
[class members] are entitled to under the theories of liability 
that existed at the time the settlement was reached.‖  
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538.  That said, ―[t]he proponents of a 
settlement bear the burden of proving that the Girsh factors 
weigh in favor of approval,‖ and we have previously found 
that defendants‘ speculative ability to pay ―substantially more 
than they did under the Settlement‖ cut against approval, 
―albeit only moderately.‖  Cendant, 264 F.3d at 241.    
At bottom, we agree that, ―in any class action against a 
large corporation, the defendant entity is likely to be able to 
withstand a more substantial judgment, and, against the 
weight of the remaining factors, this fact alone does not 
undermine the reasonableness of the instant settlement.‖  
Weber v. Gov’t Empl. Ins. Co., 262 F.R.D. 431, 447 (D.N.J. 
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2009).  As such, we find no error in the District Court‘s 
conclusion that De Beers‘s ability to withstand a greater 
judgment does not necessarily undermine the fairness of the 
settlement.  
h.  The Range of Reasonableness of the 
Settlement in Light of the Best Possible 
Recovery and All Attendant Risks of Litigation 
The final two Girsh factors consider ―whether the 
settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a poor 
value for a strong case.‖  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538.  The 
reasonableness of a proposed settlement is assessed by 
comparing ―the present value of the damages plaintiffs would 
likely recover if successful [at trial], appropriately discounted 
for the risk of not prevailing . . . with the amount of the 
proposed settlement.‖  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322.  Notably, 
in conducting the analysis, the court must ―guard against 
demanding too large a settlement based on its view of the 
merits of the litigation; after all, settlement is a compromise, a 
yielding of the highest hopes in exchange for certainty and 
resolution.‖  GM Truck, 55 F.3d at 806 (citations omitted). 
Applying this framework, the District Court described 
the methodology utilized by the Indirect Purchaser Consumer 
Subclass‘s expert, who theorized that the average overcharge 
for diamond sales was 4.85% and the total worldwide 
overcharge equalled $4.99 billion; the United States 
consumes approximately 50% of the diamonds and diamond 
jewelry worldwide, rendering the overcharge to the U.S. 
market equal to $2.49 billion.  (App‘x 300.)  Accordingly, the 
proposed $272.5 million Indirect Purchaser Settlement Fund 
represented 10.93% of this overcharge.  (Id.)  The expert 
further posited that although the Direct Purchaser Class 
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recovery could not be precisely quantified in the absence of 
data as to the exact amount of non-De Beers sales to Direct 
Purchasers, the value could reasonably be estimated.  Placing 
the total value of United States imports of rough diamonds 
during the Direct Purchaser Class Period at $4.3 billion, the 
expert estimated that at least 46% – or approximately $2 
billion – of the rough diamond sales were excluded sales; 
applying the 4.85 weighted overcharge percentage to that $2 
billion, the expert theorized that the overcharge percentage 
was near $100 million.  (Id.)  As such, the proposed $22.5 
million recovery represented more than 20% of the single 
damages.  (Id.)  The District Court found this estimate 
reasonable and the objectors do not protest this methodology. 
Instead, the objectors contend that the District Court 
abused its discretion in overvaluing the settlement by 
considering only estimated single damages in its ―best 
possible recovery‖ inquiry, rather than comparing the 
settlement amount to the treble damages that are an automatic 
component of antitrust damages recovery in many 
jurisdictions.  (Bagolie Br. 28, 32-43.)  Although the 
objectors correctly note that the District Court compared the 
settlement recovery to single damages in evaluating the 
propriety of the settlement‘s monetary component, (App‘x 
301), we do not agree with the objectors that this 
methodology constituted legal error.   
Some disagreement exists in the case law as to whether 
the reasonableness of a settlement amount should be 
evaluated by comparison to the potential single damages of a 
class or the trebled damages authorized in certain 
jurisdictions.  Compare County of Suffolk v. Long Island 
Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1324 (2d Cir. 1990) (―[T]he 
district judge correctly recognized that it is inappropriate to 
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measure the adequacy of a settlement amount by comparing 
to a trebled base recovery figure.‖), Carnegie v. Household 
Intern., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1035 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(―[N]umerous courts have held that in determining a 
settlement value, the potential for treble damages should not 
be taken into account.‖), and Lorazepam & Clorazepate 
Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 376 (D.D.C. 2002) (―[T]he 
standard for evaluating settlement involves a comparison of 
the settlement amount with the estimated single damages.‖), 
with In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 170792, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) (―[T]here are few perceptible 
justifications of the single damages standard for the 
determination of the fairness of antitrust class actions,‖ which 
―places the settlement court, [acting] as a fiduciary for the 
absent class members, in a position in which it may be forced 
to approve a settlement that no non-representative plaintiffs 
would accept‖), and In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised 
Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D 197, 210 n.30 (D. Me. 2003) 
(―[I]f a settlement reflects a potential damage recovery, it 
should logically reflect the other parts of that recovery 
(trebling and attorneys‘ fees) that the statute awards 
automatically.‖).   
That said, ―we know of no authority that requires a 
district court to assess the fairness of a settlement in light of 
the potential for trebled damages.‖57  Comm. Bank II, 622 
F.3d at 312 (emphasis in original); see also Rodriguez v. West 
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 Peculiarly, the objectors at once argue ―that treble 
damages could be considered in assessing‖ fairness while also 
presuming without cause that a fairness inquiry ―necessarily 
involves consideration of treble damages.‖  (Bagolie Br. 38-
39 (emphasis added).)  
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Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2009) (―We 
have never precluded courts from comparing the settlement 
amount to both single and treble damages.  By the same 
token, we do not require them to do so in all cases.‖).  Rather, 
―courts generally determine fairness of an antitrust class 
action settlement based on how it compensates the class for 
past injuries, without giving much, if any, consideration to 
treble damages.‖58  Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 964; see also City 
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 458-59 (2d Cir. 
1974) (―[T]he vast majority of courts which have approved 
settlements . . . have given their approval . . . based on an 
estimate of single damages only.‖), overruled on other 
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 We agree with our fellow Court of Appeals that, in 
reaching a private consensual settlement, the ―parties, 
counsel, mediators, and district judges naturally arrive at a 
reasonable range for settlement by considering the likelihood 
of a plaintiffs‘ or defense verdict, the potential recovery, and 
the chances of obtaining it, discounted to present value.‖  
Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 965.  Our principal role in this 
engagement ―is to protect the unnamed members of the 
class.‖  Ehrheart, 609 F.3d at 593.  As such, we must remain 
cognizant that our ―‗intrusion upon what is otherwise a 
private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties 
to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a 
reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of 
fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the 
negotiating parties.‘‖  Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 965 (quoting 
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 
1998)); see also GM Truck, 55 F.3d at 805 (same).  No 
assertion of collusion, fraud, or overreaching is advanced or 
evidenced in the settlement at issue here. 
 
99 
 
grounds as recognized by U.S. Football League v. Nat’l 
Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 415-16 (2d Cir. 1989).  
Without delving into the debate over whether single or treble 
damages are the proper variable of comparison, we cannot 
label the District Court‘s adherence to the commonly 
accepted procedure for assessing the fairness, adequacy, and  
reasonableness of a settlement an abuse of discretion.
59
  
Moreover, many of the state law claims asserted would not 
provide for treble damages recovery. 
Finding no abuse in the District Court‘s conclusion 
that the proposed settlement offered a reasonable recovery, 
particularly ―when accounting for the additional relief 
provided by the injunction,‖ (App‘x 301), we are also not 
persuaded that the Court erred in assessing the reasonableness 
of the settlement in light of all of the attendant risks of 
litigation.  Girsh, 521 F.2d at 157.  The District Court found 
                                                 
59
 The objectors also allege legal error in the District 
Court‘s estimate of the ―best possible recovery‖ for the 
Indirect Purchaser Class by reference to the class as a whole, 
rather than by making separate findings as to estimated 
damages for the Consumer and Reseller subclasses.  (Bagolie 
Br. at 27.)  This argument falls short.  The Special Master – 
whose findings were accepted by the District Court – 
thoroughly considered several expert reports and econometric 
models submitted by various counsel discussing the proper 
share of damages within the Indirect Purchaser class.  The 
Special Master established an appropriate distribution of the 
Indirect Purchaser fund based upon estimated damages to 
both the Consumer and Reseller subclasses, and the objectors 
have not demonstrated the inaccuracy of this analysis.  (See 
App‘x 1473-1508.) 
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the ―magnitude of the potential risks in litigation, including 
likely profound difficulties enforcing United States default 
judgments in the relevant foreign countries, establishing 
personal jurisdiction, and establishing liability,‖ to compare 
unfavorably to the recovery offered by the proposed 
settlement.  (App‘x 301-02.)  Based on this assessment, we 
find the District Court‘s conclusion that these final factors 
weigh in favor of the settlement compelling. 
On balance, we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding the Settlement as a whole fair, 
adequate, and reasonable. 
 2.  Plan of Allocation 
The objectors next aver that the previously discussed 
differences in state law mandate a differential allocation in 
the percentage of recovery within the Indirect Purchaser 
Consumer Settlement Fund, which should ―account for the[ ] 
varying strengths and weaknesses‖ of consumer claims as 
informed by the applicable state law treatments of indirect 
purchaser causes of action.  (Murray Br. at 15-18.)  
Accordingly, they contend that the District Court should 
utilize subclasses in accounting for the varied rights to 
recovery caused by Illinois Brick disparities in state laws.  
(Quinn Answer to Pet. for Reh‘g En Banc at 11.) 
 A district court‘s ―principal obligation‖ in approving a 
plan of allocation ―is simply to ensure that the fund 
distribution is fair and reasonable as to all participants in the 
fund.‖  Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 
956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983).  In prior instances where objectors 
challenged the fairness of intra-class allocation of settlement 
funds, we have explained that ―where a class is found to 
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include subclasses divergent in interest,‖ the use of subclasses 
may be appropriate and ―is designed to prevent conflicts of 
interest in class representation.‖  Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 
271.  We have likewise noted the potential drawbacks of 
subclassing, including the potential ―‗Balkanization‘ of the 
class action,‖ and creation of ―a huge obstacle to settlement if 
each subclass has an incentive to hold out for more money.‖  
Id. (quoting In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 
202 (3d Cir. 2005) (―Cendant Sec.‖)).  We accord ―substantial 
deference to district courts with respect to their resolution of 
this issue‖ because such decisions ―require[ ] a balancing of 
costs and benefits that can best be performed by a district 
judge.‖  Ins. Broker., 579 F.3d at 271.  ―Where the district 
court has declined to certify a subclass‖ and treats all class 
members as falling within a single class for purposes of a 
fund allocation, ―we will ordinarily defer to its decision 
unless it constituted an abuse of discretion.‖  Id. (quoting 
Cendant Sec., 404 F.3d at 202) (quotations & alterations 
omitted). 
In Insurance Brokerage, the objectors asserted that the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to require the 
establishment of subclasses where ―the increased recovery of 
one sub-class was achieved at the expense of another 
subclass‘s diminished recovery.‖  Id. at 270.  There, the plan 
of allocation tied reimbursement ―to the extent of damages 
incurred on certain policies of insurance,‖ and was ―allocated 
in such a way that policyholders who likely incurred the most 
damage are entitled to a larger proportion of the recovery than 
those whose injuries were less severe.‖  Id. at 272-73.  
Although we observed that the proposed subclasses ―ha[d] 
some appeal‖ in remedying an unequal division of the 
settlement fund, we deferred to the district court‘s thorough 
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explanation that the objectors had failed to evidence 
―divergent or antagonistic interests between the three 
groups,‖ and had not established that ―these groups have 
claims of varying merit.‖  Id. at 272 (citation & quotations 
omitted).  Indeed, despite the factual disparities in the type of 
insurance at issue, the district court had highlighted that ―all 
of the class members shared a unified interest in establishing [ 
] liability for engaging in anticompetitive conduct which 
increased the cost of premium for all policyholders,‖ 
undermining the showing of divergent interests.  Id. at 273.  
We further noted that the plan of allocation ―was carefully 
devised to ensure a fair distribution of the settlement fund,‖ 
and ―merely created a structure for ensuring that 
reimbursement [was] tied to the extent of damages incurred.‖  
Id. at 272.  Accordingly, we found the settlement allocation 
fair and within the district court‘s discretion.  Id. 
We reached a different conclusion in Pet Food.  629 
F.3d at 353.  There, the district court carefully examined the 
fairness of the total settlement fund, but did not discuss 
whether an allocation of the fund to a sub-segment of claims 
– namely, to consumers who had received refunds outside of 
the settlement – was inadequate and rendered the settlement 
unfair and unreasonable to those who had received nothing on 
account of their claims.  629 F.3d at 353 (noting that although 
―we do not doubt the able District Court properly determined 
that the fund was a fair and adequate settlement of all the 
claims advanced by plaintiffs in this case[,] . . . [w]e are 
unable to determine whether the $250,000 allocation was a 
fair and adequate settlement of the Purchase Claims‖).  There, 
we decided that the district court lacked sufficient 
information to decide whether the allocation to certain 
claimants was fair, and, thus, we remanded for further 
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proceedings.  Id. at 356. 
Like the progressive settlement contemplated in 
Insurance Brokerage, the settlement at issue here provides for 
a pro rata distribution to all class members, and does not 
distinguish based upon any variables, such as the applicable 
state law of claimants‘ states of residence or location of 
purchase.  While the District Court here did not specifically 
evaluate the pro rata allocation through the fairness lens, it 
did consider the differential allocation question in conducting 
the predominance analysis, noting the imprecision inherent in 
weighing class member claims ―based on the relative strength 
of different state law claims.‖  (App‘x 279.)  The District 
Court further noted in its Rule 23(a) analysis that the various 
―individual classes were represented by separate counsel 
during settlement negotiations, allowing for ‗adequate 
structural protections to assure that differently situated 
plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique interests.‘‖  (App‘x 
220 (quoting Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 533).)  Moreover, the 
Court observed that there were no intra-class conflicts since 
all putative members experienced injury caused by De Beers, 
all sought recovery for overpayment caused by allegedly 
anticompetitive behavior, and all shared common interests in 
establishing damages and injunctive relief.  (Id. at 220-21.)   
It may be entirely reasonable to apply the same 
damages calculation to claimants from all states because, as 
the district court in Warfarin observed, ―[i]t is purely 
speculative that claimants from indirect purchaser states could 
anticipate a greater recovery than claimants from other 
states.‖  In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 
231, 260 (D. Del. 2002); see also Cendant, 264 F.3d at 250 
(given the ―speculative‖ nature of such an inquiry, differences 
in the liability standards between § 11 and § 10(b) securities 
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claims did not warrant differential plan of allocation).  And 
only by engaging in the type of fact-intensive merits and 
choice-of-law analyses that we have rejected could a district 
court attempt to assay the ―varying strengths and weaknesses‖ 
of asserted state claims.  (See Murray Br. at 15-18.)  We can 
find no support in our case law for differentiating within a 
class based on the strength or weakness of the theories of 
recovery.  Accordingly, we decline to require such an 
analysis. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that each putative class 
member suffered the same alleged injury as a result of De 
Beers‘s anticompetitive conduct, irrespective of the vagaries 
of applicable state laws.  Recognizing this, the plan of 
allocation here ―adjust[s] diamond purchases to a common 
measure,‖ allowing an ―apples to apples‖ comparison ―of the 
relative amount of damages suffered by various claimants 
within the classes and subclasses and permits distribution pro 
rata based on the relative amounts of damages suffered.‖  
(App‘x 1530.)  Courts ―generally consider plans of allocation 
that reimburse class members based on the type and extent of 
their injuries to be reasonable,‖ In re Corel Corp. Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2003), and we are 
mindful that ―district courts have broad supervisory powers 
over the administration of class action settlements to allocate 
the proceeds among the claiming class members equitably,‖  
McCoy v. Health Net, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 448, 469 (D.N.J. 
2008).  The record here confirms that the District Court 
carefully considered expert advice in accepting the plan of 
allocation, and ―[t]his kind of decision is intensely fact-based, 
falling within the purview of the District Court‘s decision.‖  
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 254.  In light of the foregoing analysis, 
we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its 
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discretion in accepting the carefully negotiated plan of 
allocation.      
Lastly, the objectors contend that the settlement‘s 
minimum claim payment requirement of $10 provides 
inadequate settlement relief, as it will eliminate the rights of 
many class members without providing any compensation.  
(Petrus/Giddings Br. at 12.)  They urge that a minimum 
payment provision contradicts the purpose of the class action 
mechanism to provide recovery even where the amount is 
―paltry.‖  (Id. at 16 (quoting Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 106 
(3d Cir. 2004)).)  We disagree and find no abuse in the 
District Court‘s decision to approve the minimum claim 
payment threshold.   
As other courts have observed, ―de minimis thresholds 
for payable claims are beneficial to the class as a whole since 
they save the settlement fund from being depleted by the 
administrative costs associated with claims unlikely to exceed 
those costs and courts have frequently approved such 
thresholds, often at $10.‖  In re Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd., 
No. CV-02-1510, 2007 WL 1191048, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
19, 2007); see, e.g., In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA 
Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that the 
minimum recovery requirement is a common procedure that 
addresses ―the undeniable fact that claims-processing costs 
money, which comes out of the settlement fund‖); Mehling v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 248 F.R.D. 455, 463 (E.D. Pa. 2008) 
(approving settlement plan with $50 minimum payment).  
The District Court adopted the Special Master‘s considered 
decision that ―administrative costs to make de minimis 
payments are too large to justify the small payments,‖ and the 
objectors have offered only conclusory counter-allegations.  
(App‘x 1531).  Indicative of the disingenuous nature of their 
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responses is the objectors‘ assertion that ―[i]n exchange for 
their release, millions of class members [will] receive no 
money.‖  (Quinn Br. at 63-64.)  This argument fails to 
acknowledge the injunctive relief offered by the settlement, 
however, which is intended to benefit all class members 
regardless of individual monetary recovery.
60
   
Furthermore, the objectors appear to ignore a key 
rationale underlying the class action mechanism.  In addition 
to providing individual class members with payments, ―‗[t]he 
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism‘‖ is to 
provide sufficient incentive to prosecute an action ―‗by 
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into 
something worth someone‘s (usually an attorney‘s) labor,‘‖ 
Yang, 392 F.3d at 106 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617).  In 
this instance, the representative parties and their counsel were 
properly incentivized to bring and prosecute this action 
through settlement, resulting in a net benefit to the class.  As 
a result, based upon the evidence offered before the Special 
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 The objectors‘ related argument that the de minimis 
provision will deprive 57 million consumers of monetary 
recovery even if they file a claim is equally weak.  
(Giddings/Petrus Br. 9.)  This contention unfairly presumes 
that every single putative class member will timely submit 
claims forms, rendering every member‘s pro rata recovery 
below $10.  By contrast, the evidence accepted by the Special 
Master demonstrated that ―consumer claim filing rates rarely 
exceed seven percent, even with the most extensive notice 
campaigns.‖  (App‘x 1550 (citation & quotations omitted).)  
In the absence of any credible evidence subjecting the 
objectors‘ position, we cannot conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in adopting the distribution plan. 
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Master and the arguments alleged herein, we cannot conclude 
that the District Court abused its discretion in approving this 
element of the plan of allocation. 
C.  Objections to the Fee Award 
   The objectors likewise aver that the District Court 
abused its discretion in awarding attorneys‘ fees that they 
urge are excessive.  (Quinn Br. at 65; Hicks Prelim. Op. Br. at 
7; Petrus/Giddings Br. at 12.)  They contend that class 
counsel will receive in excess of $73 million – equal to 
approximately 25% of the $293 million principal settlement 
fund – despite this being a default judgment case, which 
entailed minimal motions practice and discovery.  
Additionally, considering the large number of putative class 
members and the alleged lack of risk undertaken by class 
counsel in prosecuting this case to settlement, the objectors 
urge that the award is unjustified under our jurisprudence.  
We disagree. 
 Our case law makes clear that a ―robust‖ and 
―thorough judicial review of fee applications is required in all 
class action settlements,‖ In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 
537-38 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation & quotations omitted), but 
that ―the amount of a fee award . . . is within the district 
court‘s discretion so long as it employs correct standards and 
procedures and makes findings of fact not clearly erroneous,‖ 
In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 
2005) (citation & quotations omitted).  See also Ursic v. 
Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1983) (―[T]he 
district court has discretion in determining the amount of a 
fee award . . . in view of [its] superior understanding of the 
litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate 
review of what essentially are factual matters.‖) (quoting 
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Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).   
Attorneys‘ fees requests are generally assessed under 
one of two methods:  the percentage-of-recovery (―POR‖) 
approach or the lodestar scheme.  ―The former applies a 
certain percentage to the settlement fund,‖ while ―[t]he latter 
multiplies the number of hours class counsel worked on a 
case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services.‖  
Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 540 (citation, quotations, & 
alterations omitted).  The POR method ―is generally favored 
in common fund cases because it allows courts to award fees 
from the fund ‗in a manner that rewards counsel for success 
and penalizes it for failure.‘‖  Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 300 
(citation & quotations omitted).  The lodestar method, which 
is more commonly utilized in statutory fee-shifting cases and 
―where the expected relief has a small enough monetary value 
that a percentage-of-recovery method would provide 
inadequate compensation,‖ Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 540-41, is 
then used ―to cross-check the reasonableness of a percentage-
of-recovery fee award,‖ AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d at 164.61  
Because the case at issue entailed a common fund, the District 
Court applied the POR method and utilized a lodestar cross-
check.  (App‘x 310.).  The objectors do not dispute the 
                                                 
61
 The lodestar crosscheck ―is performed by dividing the 
proposed fee award by the lodestar calculation, resulting in a 
lodestar multiplier.‖  AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d at 164.  The 
multiplier endeavors ―to account for the contingent nature or 
risk involved in a particular case,‖ and may be adjusted ―to 
account for particular circumstances, such as the quality of 
representation, the benefit obtained for the class, [and] the 
complexity and novelty of the issues presented.‖  Id. at 164 
n.4 (citations & quotations omitted). 
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propriety of this approach, and we find no fault with this 
decision. 
 In determining the appropriate percentage fee award, 
the District Court then devoted detailed consideration to each 
of the ten factors that we identified in Gunter v. Ridgewood 
Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000),
62
 and Prudential, 
148 F.3d 283,
63
 finding, inter alia, that the complexity and 
duration of the litigation, the time and skill committed to the 
                                                 
62
 The Gunter factors are as follows: 
(1) the size of the fund created and the number 
of persons benefitted; (2) the presence or 
absence of substantial objections by members of 
the class to the settlement terms and/or fees 
requested by counsel; (3) the skill and 
efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the 
complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the 
risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time 
devoted to the case by plaintiffs‘ counsel; and 
(7) the awards in similar cases. 
223 F.3d at 195 n.1. 
63
 The Prudential factors are: 
(8) the value of benefits attributable to the 
efforts of class counsel relative to the efforts of 
other groups, such as government agencies 
conducting investigations, (9) the percentage 
fee that would have been negotiated had the 
case been subject to a private contingent fee 
arrangement at the time counsel was retained, 
and (10) any innovative terms of settlement. 
Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 541 (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 
338-40). 
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litigation, the ever-present risk of nonpayment from De 
Beers‘s tenuous status in the United States, the absence of 
substantial objections, and the achievement of both monetary 
and injunctive relief without any governmental investigation 
or assistance all weighed in favor of approving the Special 
Master‘s recommended 25% attorneys‘ fee award.  (App‘x 
311-21.)  The objectors do not contend that the District Court 
applied incorrect legal standards or procedures or that the 
Court improperly ―brushed over our required analysis.‖  In re 
Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 735 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Rather, they disagree with the Court‘s factual findings 
as to two of the factors; they contend that we should find an 
abuse of discretion because this case is ―‗neither legally nor 
factually complex and did not require significant motion 
practice or discovery‘ by class counsel.‖  (Quinn Br. at 65 
(quoting Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 743).)   
Because of the objectors‘ narrow focus before us and 
the District Court‘s thorough analysis of each of the Gunter 
and Prudential factors, we will only address the specific 
objections raised herein.  As an initial matter, the objectors 
neglect to mention the primary reason for our finding of error 
in Cendant PRIDES – the principal case advanced in support 
of their position.  There, we criticized the district court‘s 
failure to ―explicitly consider any of [the Gunter] factors,‖ 
and its neglect to ―‗make its reasoning and application of the 
fee-awards jurisprudence clear.‘‖  Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d 
at 734-35 (quoting Gunter, 223 F.3d at 196).  We engaged in 
our own analysis of the propriety of the fee award only 
because the district court failed to consider the fee award 
factors that we had deemed ―essential to a proper exercise of 
discretion.‖  Id. at 735; see also Ne. Women’s Ctr. v. 
McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1989) (―[A]n 
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appellate court, which relies on a cold record, is even more 
poorly positioned to assess the nature and quality of the legal 
services performed at the trial court level.‖).  We have no 
such concern here, as the District Court clearly set forth its 
reasoning for the fee award.  Indeed, the objectors never 
explain exactly where in its lengthy analysis the District 
Court misapplied the Gunter factors; the objectors simply 
dislike the conclusion reached by the Court.  See generally 
McMonagle, 889 F.2d at 475 (―[T]he appellate court may not 
upset a trial court‘s exercise of discretion on the basis of a 
visceral disagreement with the lower court‘s decision.‖) 
(citation & quotations omitted). 
Moreover, the District Court‘s factual findings as to 
the complexity and demands of this case further distinguish 
the instant circumstances from Cendant PRIDES and do not 
suggest an abuse of discretion.  As we discussed in Rite Aid, 
the Cendant PRIDES counsel ―only spent approximately 
5,600 hours on the action,‖ ―Cendant had conceded liability 
and no risks pertaining to liability or collection were 
pertinent.‖  396 F.3d at 304 (discussing Cendant PRIDES, 
243 F.3d at 735).  These factors are absent in this case.  
Contrary to the objectors‘ contention, the Special Master and 
District Court both observed that counsel devoted nearly 
39,000 hours to litigating this matter in the various federal 
and state courts and to the subsequent negotiations and 
disputes pertaining to the settlement itself.  The Court noted 
that, apart from addressing complicated legal questions and 
the secrecy surrounding the diamond industry, plaintiffs‘ 
counsel was forced to litigate against opposition from 
intervenors and amicus curiae, engaged in protracted 
settlement negotiations lasting approximately one year, and 
ultimately confronted the difficult settlement, distribution, 
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and injunctive issues addressed in this appeal.  (App‘x 317-
18.)  Given the complexity of the legal and factual issues 
implicated and the difficult questions raised in the post-
settlement process, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court‘s conclusion that the complexity and duration 
of the litigation supported the requested fee.
64
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 The objectors‘ further contention that the size of the 
percentage fee award should decrease in light of the large size 
of the overall settlement, (Quinn Br. at 66), is premised on 
several of our opinions in which we stated that ―the 
percentage of a recovery devoted to attorneys‘ fees should 
decrease as the size of the overall settlement or recovery 
increases.‖  Cendant, 264 F.3d at 284 n.55 (citations & 
quotations omitted).  We so ruled because ―in many instances 
the increase in recovery is merely a factor of the size of the 
class and has no direct relationship to the efforts of counsel.‖  
Id.  In particular, we have vacated large fee awards ―‗when 
much of the settlement apparently resulted from the work of 
state regulators and a multi-state insurance task force.‘‖  Ride 
Aid, 396 F.3d at 303 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 338-
342).  But ―there is no rule that a district court must apply a 
declining percentage reduction in every settlement involving 
a sizable fund,‖ and we have approved large settlements 
where ―class counsel‘s efforts played a significant role in 
augmenting and obtaining an immense fund.‖  Id.  Ultimately, 
―the fact-intensive Prudential/Gunter analysis‖ must trump 
all other considerations.  Id. 
 Here, plaintiffs‘ counsel prosecuted this matter through 
settlement with no certainty as to their ability to enforce any 
judgment against De Beers.  The District Court‘s fact-
intensive Gunter analysis found that plaintiffs‘ counsel deftly 
and efficiently handled this complex matter and played a 
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Furthermore, unlike in Cendant PRIDES, the risk of 
nonpayment here remained ever-present throughout the 
litigation and settlement proceedings.  The objectors dispute 
that counsel faced such risk after agreeing to settle and the 
depositing of the settlement amount into an escrow account.  
It is unclear, however, whether an agreement to settle after 
inception and prosecution of a matter should play a role in a 
court‘s evaluation of the risk of nonpayment; indeed, our case 
law has ―never addressed whether courts must reconsider the 
risk of nonpayment as the action evolves.‖  Diet Drugs, 582 
F.3d at 543.  Although we previously approved a district 
court‘s evaluation of risk ―as of ‗the inception of the action 
and not through the rosy lens of hindsight,‘‖ we emphasized 
that our endorsement took into consideration the district 
court‘s ―more comprehensive‖ reevaluation of the risk over 
the course of the proceedings.  Id. (quoting In re Diet Drugs, 
553 F. Supp. 2d 442, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2008)).  There, we did not 
directly resolve whether a district court should reassess risk 
throughout a litigation, but found the risk of nonpayment to 
be ongoing, noting that while a settlement agreement and ―the 
escrow funds undoubtedly reduced the risk of nonpayment, 
those funds were but one part of an intricate agreement‖ and 
the efforts of counsel could still ―have been for naught.‖  Id. 
Here, we are similarly satisfied that counsel faced a 
legitimate risk of nonpayment throughout the litigation.  The 
District Court found that De Beers possessed few assets in the 
United States against which a judgment could be enforced 
                                                                                                             
significant role in the outcome.  Accordingly, we disagree 
that the size of the overall settlement bears no relationship to 
the efforts of counsel and will defer to the District Court‘s 
considered judgment. 
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and effectively dodged jurisdiction in the United States for 
over fifty years, evidencing a cognizable risk of nonpayment 
at the inception stage.  (App‘x 319.)  Although the District 
Court‘s order did not address the prospects for nonpayment 
post-settlement, it is evident that De Beers never conceded 
liability or admitted any wrongdoing, and that the escrow 
funds ―were but one part of an intricate agreement‖ that – as 
demonstrated by the Panel‘s original decision to reject 
settlement class certification – continued to pose a genuine 
risk of nonpayment to counsel.  As such, the objectors‘ ―view 
of the risk of nonpayment is more myopic than the Court‘s,‖ 
Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 543, and we are not persuaded that 
the District Court abused its discretion in finding this factor to 
favor the requested fee. 
Finally, the objectors‘ assertion that the award 
improperly exceeds the awards in similar cases is equally 
unavailing.  In Cendant PRIDES, we discussed fee awards in 
class actions in which the settlement fund exceeded $100 
million and which relied upon the POR method, finding that 
―the attorneys‘ fee awards ranged from 2.8% to 36% of the 
total settlement fund.‖  243 F.3d at 737.  Similarly, in Rite 
Aid, we found no abuse of discretion in a district court‘s 
reliance on three studies that demonstrated an average 
percentage fee recovery in large class action settlements of 
31%, 27-30%, and 25-30%.  396 F.3d at 303.  Here, the 
District Court determined that the 25% fee requested by 
counsel fell within this range.  (App‘x 320.)   
We are cognizant that a comparison of this award to 
fees ordered in other cases is a complex analytical task, in 
light of variations in the efforts exerted by attorneys and the 
presence of complex legal and factual issues.  That said, we 
have emphasized ―that a district court may not rely on a 
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formulaic application of the appropriate range in awarding 
fees but must consider the relevant circumstances of the 
particular case.‖  Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 736.  
Although this case may have lacked some of the contested 
motion practice and extensive discovery elicited in some of 
the other cases receiving similar percentage awards, see id. at 
740-41, the case presented other challenges, including ―De 
Beers‘[s] denial of jurisdiction [and liability], the secrecy of 
the diamond industry, and unavailability of ordinary 
discovery methods, the substantial risk of non-collection of a 
U.S. judgment in foreign countries and the historic injunction 
obtained.‖  (February 15, 2008 Report and Recommendation 
of Special Master on Incentive Awards, Cost Reimbursement 
& Attorneys‘ Fee Awards at 31.)  The District Court here 
properly considered the relevant Gunter and Prudential 
factors, and determined that the case presented all of the 
factors we had recognized as supporting a higher award:  
―complex and/or novel legal issues, extensive discovery, 
acrimonious litigation, and tens of thousands of hours spent 
on the case by class counsel.‖  (App‘x 320 (quoting Cendant 
PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 741).)   
Because the District Court employed the ―correct 
standards and procedures‖ and its findings of fact are not 
clearly erroneous, we do not find an abuse of discretion in its 
calculation of the attorneys‘ fee award.  Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 
299.
65
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 We also reject the sole objection pertaining to the District 
Court‘s decision to grant incentive awards to class 
representatives.  ―Incentive awards are not uncommon in 
class action litigation and particularly where . . . a common 
fund has been created for the benefit of the entire class.‖  
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IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‘s Order. 
                                                                                                             
Lorazepam, 205 F.R.D. at 400 (internal quotations omitted).  
―The purpose of these payments is to compensate named 
plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks they 
incurred during the course of class action litigation,‖ and to 
―reward the public service of contributing to the enforcement 
of mandatory laws.‖  Bredbenner v. Liberty Travel, Inc., No. 
09-905, 2011 WL 1344745, at *22 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2011) 
(citations & quotations omitted).  Contrary to the objectors‘ 
contention, the District Court – relying upon the Special 
Master‘s more detailed findings – discussed the role played 
by the several class representatives and the risks taken by 
these parties in prosecuting this matter.  (App‘x 326-27; R&R 
on Awards at 42-46.)  We find no error in the District Court‘s 
decision. 
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Sullivan v. DB Investments, et al., 
Nos. 08-2784/2785/2798/2799/2818/2819/2831/2881 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I fully concur in the Court’s opinion.  I write 
separately to address this case in the wider context of the 
evolving law on settlement classes. 
Ever since the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in 
Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) and 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), one of the 
most vexing questions in modern class action practice has 
been the proper treatment of settlement classes, especially in 
cases national in scope that may also implicate state law.  
Grounded in equitable concepts of structural and procedural 
fairness for absent plaintiffs—competent and conflict-free 
representation, fair allocation of settlement, absence of 
collusion—Amchem and Ortiz set down important standards 
and guidelines for settlement classes.
1
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 The class action device has a venerable pedigree in equity 
practice.  As early as the seventeenth century, English 
chancery courts employed bills of peace to facilitate 
representative suits analogous to “common question” suits 
under Rule 23(b)(3).  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An 
Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1861-65 (1998).  Inchoate class actions 
continued in the American legal system until codified under 
Rule 23 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.  Id. at 
 2 
 
Despite initial uncertainty the opinions might pose 
formidable obstacles for settling massive, complex cases, this 
has not, for the most part, proved to be the case.  Nonetheless, 
class settlement in mass tort cases (especially personal injury 
claims) remains problematic, leading some practitioners to 
avoid the class action device—most prominently in the recent 
$4.85 billion mass settlement of 50,000 claims arising out of 
use of the drug Vioxx.  In fact, some observers believe there 
has been a shift in mass personal injury claims to aggregate 
non-class settlements.  “The Zyprexa and Ephedra 
settlements, as well as the more recent Guidant and Vioxx 
settlements, suggest that the MDL process has supplemented 
and perhaps displaced the class action device as a procedural 
mechanism for large settlements.”  Thomas E. Willging & 
Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations:  Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz, 
58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 775, 801 (2010); see also Thomas E. 
Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of 
Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It 
Make?, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 591, 636 tbl. 12 (2006) 
(presenting evidence that, in sample, 41% of cases denied 
                                                                                                     
1878-1942.  The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 substantially 
modified earlier practice and ushered in a class action 
“revolution” by introducing most of the current aspects of 
class action litigation, particularly the broad provisions of 
23(b)(3) and the concomitant procedural safeguards requiring 
predominance and notice.  Stephen B. Burbank, The Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1484-89 (2008).   
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class certification ended in non-class settlement).  This is 
significant, for outside the federal rules governing class 
actions,
2
 there is no prescribed independent review of the 
structural and substantive fairness of a settlement including 
evaluation of attorneys’ fees, potential conflicts of interest, 
and counsel’s allocation of settlement funds among class 
members.
3
 
Because of the pivotal role and ensuing consequences 
of the class certification decision, trial courts must conduct a 
“rigorous analysis” of Rule 23’s prerequisites.  Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, --- U.S.---, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 
(2011); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 
305, 315-21 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. 
Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 31-42 (2d Cir. 2006).
4
  The same 
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 Bankruptcy may also provide a vehicle for some measure of 
compensation to mass claimants (creditors) and for resolution 
of liability. 
3
 Nevertheless, some MDL transferee judges have treated the 
MDL proceedings as quasi class actions and restricted 
contingent fee agreements in non-class aggregate settlements 
under their equitable and supervisory powers.  See In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558-62 (E.D. La. 
2009); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 
682174 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
4
 For a litigation class, the key decision is whether or not to 
certify the class.  Once a class is certified, the dynamics of the 
case change dramatically.  For many plaintiffs, denial of 
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analytical rigor is required for litigation and settlement 
certification, but some inquiries essential to litigation class 
certification are no longer problematic in the settlement 
context.  A key question in a litigation class action is 
manageability—how the case will or can be tried, and 
whether there are questions of fact or law that are capable of 
common proof.  But the settlement class presents no 
management problems because the case will not be tried.  
Conversely, other inquiries assume heightened importance 
and heightened scrutiny because of the danger of conflicts of 
interest, collusion, and unfair allocation.  See Amchem, 521 
U.S. at 620 (“[O]ther specifications of the Rule [23]—those 
designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or 
overbroad class definitions—demand undiluted, even 
heightened, attention in the settlement context.”).   
In conducting a “rigorous analysis” under Rule 23, 
lower courts have applied the strictures laid down in Amchem 
and Ortiz, and added some of their own.  So far, the 
developing jurisprudence appears to have justified the 
judgment of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure and Advisory Committee on Civil 
                                                                                                     
certification may sound the death knell of the action because 
the claims are too small to be prosecuted individually.  For 
many defendants, class certification may create hydraulic 
pressure to settle, even for claims defendants deem non-
meritorious.  For these reasons, the Supreme Court adopted 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) to permit a 
discretionary interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of 
class certification. 
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Rules to defer consideration of a variant rule for settlement 
class actions. 
Rule 23(a) sensibly provides that every certified class 
must share common questions of law or fact.  For (b)(3) 
classes, common questions must predominate over individual 
questions, claims must be typical, and the class action device 
must be superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.  Naturally, there is 
some overlap in the requirements for commonality, typicality, 
and predominance—all of which must be shown.   
Commonality for a settlement class should be satisfied 
under the standard for supplemental jurisdiction first set forth 
in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 
725 (1966), allowing joinder of claims deriving from a 
common nucleus of operative fact.  See also Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., --- U.S. ---, 130 
S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (“A 
class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a 
species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims 
of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits.”).  
Variation in state law should not necessarily bar class 
certification.   The focus in the settlement context should be 
on the conduct (or misconduct) of the defendant and the 
injury suffered as a consequence.  The claim or claims must 
be related and cohesive and should all arise out of the same 
nucleus of operative fact.  The “common contention, 
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of 
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its 
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
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validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”  Dukes, 131 
S.Ct. at 2551.  The interests of the class members should be 
aligned. 
The nature of the predominance analysis reflects the 
purpose of the inquiry, which is to determine whether “a class 
action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, 
and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to persons 
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or 
bringing about other undesirable results.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. 
at 615 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note).  
This is important even though, in the settlement context, a 
court need not worry about the challenge of litigating the 
claims to a verdict in a single proceeding.  If the class 
presented a grab-bag of unrelated claims, a trial court would 
be unable to ensure that absent class members’ interests were 
protected.  The question, then, is what kind of common issues 
a settlement class must share to satisfy commonality and 
predominance.   
In certain areas, such as antitrust, common issues tend 
to predominate because a major focus is the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct of the defendant and its downstream 
effects on plaintiffs.  See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 
579 F.3d 241, 268 (3d Cir. 2009).   Commonality and 
predominance are usually met in the antitrust settlement 
context when all class members’ claims present common 
issues including (1) whether the defendant’s conduct was 
actionably anticompetitive under antitrust standards; and (2) 
whether that conduct produced anticompetitive effects within 
the relevant product and geographic markets.  See id. at 267.   
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Even when a settlement class satisfies the 
predominance requirement, the inclusion of members who 
have a questionable chance of a favorable adjudication may 
present fairness concerns that demand the district court’s 
attention.  Trial courts must enforce the Rule 23(a) and (b) 
requirements in order to obtain a “structural assurance of fair 
and adequate representation for the diverse groups and 
individuals affected.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627.  In 
discharging this responsibility, district courts have a number 
of ways to address fairness concerns.
5
  Due to the context-
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 Trial courts can certify subclasses in situations where 
divergent interests implicate fair allocation—a situation not 
presented here, as all indirect class members have aligned 
interests.  Certifying subclasses may be proper “[w]here a 
class is found to include subclasses divergent in interest.”  In 
re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig, 579 F.3d at 271 (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) advisory committee note).  Even the 
conflicts in Amchem were amenable to resolution through 
sub-classes.  See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856 (explaining that 
Amchem requires “a class divided between holders of present 
and future claims” to be “divi[ded] into homogeneous 
subclasses . . . with separate representation to eliminate 
conflicting interests of counsel”).  Objector Quinn, in her 
answer to the petition for rehearing, states that subclasses 
would adequately address the Illinois Brick-based disparities 
in this case; she does not argue that it would be categorically 
improper to afford class treatment to indirect purchasers 
governed by Illinois Brick.  See Quinn Answer at 11.   The 
District Court here examined whether indirect purchasers’ 
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specific nature of these judgments, district courts should be 
afforded a broad ambit of discretion.   
For viable settlement classes, Amchem and Ortiz made 
clear that expediency could not negate the requirements of 
Rule 23, which serve to protect absent class members.  See 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (“Subdivisions (a) and (b) [of Rule 
23] focus court attention on whether a proposed class has 
sufficient unity so that absent members can be fairly bound 
by decisions of class representatives.  That dominant concern 
persists when settlement, rather than trial, is proposed.”).  The 
principal danger of collusion lies in the prospect that class 
counsel, induced by defendants’ offer of attorneys’ fees, will 
“trade away” the claims of some or all class members for 
inadequate compensation.  There is also the possibility that a 
settlement will not serve the interests of all of the class 
members, which may be in tension.  In Amchem, for instance, 
the Court concluded the settlement was not demonstrably 
fair—there was insufficient allocation to asbestos claimants 
who were seriously injured (e.g. mesothelioma) and 
insufficient protection of non-impaired plaintiffs.  521 U.S. at 
625-28.  The Court worried that the claims of the exposure-
only class members were being released without adequate 
protection.  Id.; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“Prudential”) (identifying and distinguishing Amchem’s 
                                                                                                     
interests diverged depending on the law applied to their 
claims, and found such differences to be irrelevant in the 
context of this settlement.  I find no abuse of discretion in 
such a conclusion. 
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concerns); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Prods. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-86 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(providing summary of the debate regarding propriety of 
mass tort settlements prior to Amchem).   
These observations elucidate the issues of 
predominance and fairness present in this case.  Here, the 
objectors contend certain claims (claims under state-law 
following Illinois Brick) are not viable--that is, they fail to 
state a cause of action.
6
  For this reason, objectors believe that 
defendants are barred from settling these claims in a 
settlement class action because of the predominance 
requirement.  Under objectors’ view of Rule 23, trial courts 
would be obligated at the settlement class certification stage 
to decide which state’s law would govern for that particular 
plaintiff, and whether a plaintiff has stated a valid cause of 
action, even if no defendant has raised a Rule 12(b)(6) 
objection—the usual way to contest the validity of a claim.  
Objectors contend they seek to protect absent class members, 
but fail to explain how absent class members—all of whom 
claim injury—are harmed by the defendants’ willingness to 
settle all potential claims. 
This interpretation also presents significant 
administrative problems.  Objectors view the indirect 
purchaser class as composed of members who either have 
valid claims under the laws of states with Illinois Brick 
                                              
6
 Objectors also claim that variance on state claims (based on 
consumer protection and unjust enrichment laws) defeats 
predominance as well. 
 10 
 
repealers or members who have invalid claims under the laws 
of non-repealer states.  But a claim cannot be declared invalid 
without proper analysis, which would require a choice-of-law 
examination for each class member’s claim.  Such analyses 
may pose difficulties in cases where the residence of the class 
member is not the sole consideration; modern choice-of-law 
standards often consider an array of factors particular to 
individual plaintiffs.  Consequently, individual 12(b)(6) 
inquiries for settlement class certification could present 
serious difficulties in administration and greatly increase 
costs and fees, and may deplete rather than increase the 
recovery of even successful plaintiffs.
7
 
                                              
7
 The purported “overbreadth” of the putative class at issue 
here is qualitatively different from the Supreme Court’s 
concerns in Amchem.  Under Amchem the significance of 
variations in state laws is properly assessed in terms of the 
interests of absent class members.  The proposed Amchem 
settlement, extinguishing claims for different injuries with 
different onsets incurred at different times due to conduct of 
different defendants, undercompensated exposure-only claims 
and those with mesothelioma.  Here, objectors contend some 
class members do not have a valid cause of action, but these 
class members with non-repealer state law claims have lost 
nothing through inclusion in the class.  Objectors speculate 
inclusion of non-repealer state law claims necessarily 
diminishes the settlement accrued to class members whom 
they contend have undisputedly valid claims.  But they 
provided no support for their assertion.  In Amchem the 
objectors provided evidence of intraclass conflicts detrimental 
 11 
 
 Issues of predominance and fairness do not undermine 
this settlement.  All plaintiffs here claim injury that by reason 
of defendants’ conduct—market manipulation and fraud—has 
caused a common and measurable form of economic damage.  
They seek redress under federal antitrust laws and state 
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment laws.  
All claims arise out of the same course of defendants’ 
conduct; all share a common nucleus of operative fact, 
supplying the necessary cohesion.  Class members’ interests 
                                                                                                     
to class members.  For example, 15% of the proposed 
Amchem settlement’s mesothelioma claims arose in 
California, where the average recovery for a mesothelioma 
claim was more than double their maximum recovery in the 
settlement.  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 610 n.14. 
The objectors have not shown that plaintiffs suffering 
identical economic injuries due to a single course of conduct 
on the part of the defendant have conflicting interests solely 
because some class members may have stronger claims 
depending upon variation in state law.  Objectors assume that 
the non-repealer state claims have zero settlement value and 
that defendants would contribute the same amount to the 
common settlement fund regardless of how many claims the 
settlement may extinguish.  But the settlement of the 
considerable bulk of claims against the defendants for a prior 
course of conduct may be of substantially greater value to 
defendants than a settlement of only the strongest claims 
against them.  And, unlike in Amchem, objectors have not 
shown the inclusion of more claims was achieved by grossly 
underpaying some class members. 
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are aligned. The entire DeBeers settlement class consists of 
members with some pleaded claim (but not necessarily the 
exact same one) arising out of the same course of allegedly 
wrongful conduct such that shared issues of fact or law 
outweigh issues not common to the class and individual 
issues do not predominate.  As the class structure and 
settlement assure fairness to all class members, there appears 
to be nothing in Rule 23 that would prohibit certification and 
settlement approval. 
Moreover, the focus on the alleged insufficiency of 
some members’ claims is misplaced.  Settlement of a class 
action is not an adjudication of the merits of the members’ 
claims.  It is a contract between the parties governed by the 
requirements of Rule 23(a), (b), and particularly (e),
8
 and 
                                              
8
 Rule 23(e) is especially relevant in this context because it 
governs the settlement, dismissal, or compromise of a class 
action.  It requires court approval of any agreement, and 
establishes five procedural requirements that must be 
satisfied: 
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable 
manner to all class members who would be 
bound by the proposal.  
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, 
the court may approve it only after a hearing 
and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.  
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a 
statement identifying any agreement made in 
connection with the proposal.  
 13 
 
establishes a contractual obligation as well as a contractual 
defense against future claims.  Here, class members and 
DeBeers want to settle all state and federal claims arising out 
of defendant’s alleged misconduct.  Amchem recognized the 
legitimacy of such a settlement under Rule 23, setting forth 
applicable parameters.  The court’s responsibility is to 
supervise and assume control over a responsible and fair 
settlement.  Those requirements have been met here.   
  A responsible and fair settlement serves the interests 
of both plaintiffs and defendants and furthers the aims of the 
class action device.  Plaintiffs receive redress of their claimed 
injuries without the burden of litigating individually.  
Defendants receive finality.  Having released their claims for 
consideration, class members are precluded from continuing 
to press their claims.  Collateral attack of settlements and 
parallel proceedings in multiple fora are common realities in 
modern class actions—features that can imperil the feasibility 
of settlements if defendants lack an effective way to protect 
                                                                                                     
(4) If the class action was previously certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to 
approve a settlement unless it affords a new 
opportunity to request exclusion to individual 
class members who had an earlier opportunity 
to request exclusion but did not do so.  
(5) Any class member may object to the 
proposal if it requires court approval under this 
subdivision (e); the objection may be 
withdrawn only with the court's approval. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 
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bargained-for rights.  See Prudential, 314 F.3d at 104-05.  If 
the indirect-purchaser claims at issue here were excluded, 
nothing would bar the plaintiffs from bringing them as 
separate class actions or as aggregate individual actions, 
leaving defendants “exposed to countless suits in state court” 
despite the settlement.  In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 367 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Prudential 
II”).  (Here, prior to removal and MDL consolidation, it 
appears an Illinois state court certified a nationwide litigation 
class asserting indirect-purchaser claims under the laws of all 
50 states.)  Perhaps a defendant will be willing and able to 
defend or settle all of these actions separately, or perhaps it 
won’t.  Either way, the costs (direct and indirect) and risks of 
continuing litigation will be greater.  A defendant, therefore, 
may be motivated to pay class members a premium and 
achieve a global settlement in order to avoid additional 
lawsuits, even ones where it might be able to file a 
straightforward motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
9
    
Finally, new limitations such as those proposed by 
objectors would, I believe, undercut the policy goals of the 
                                              
9
 Facing liability for alleged misconduct, a defendant may 
desire global settlement for several possible reasons:  (1) 
redressing plaintiffs’ injuries; (2) the possibility of liability; 
(3) the direct costs of defending suits, often in multiple fora; 
(4) the risk of financially unmanageable jury verdicts which 
may threaten bankruptcy; (5) the effects of pending or 
impending mass litigation on its stock price or access to 
capital markets; (6) the stigma of brand-damaging litigation; 
and (7) maintaining financial stability.  
 15 
 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 
109-2, 119 Stat. 4, and the Multidistrict Litigation Statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1407, both of which are designed to encourage the 
consolidation of mass claims national in scope—and in the 
case of CAFA, with particular reference to class actions based 
on state law claims.  Of course, district courts must fully 
enforce the requirements of Rule 23.  But the limitations 
objectors propose here “would seriously undermine the 
possibility for settling any large, multi district class action.” 
Prudential II, 261 F.3d at 367.
10
 
                                              
10
 In Prudential II, we affirmed the grant of an injunction 
enjoining a state-court action brought by policyholders who 
were members of the Prudential class to the extent the state-
law claims were based on or related to claims released in the 
class action.  We agreed with the district court that allowing 
the policyholders to prosecute their civil actions in state court 
“would allow an end run around the Class settlement by 
affording them (and other class members who might later 
attempt the same strategy) an opportunity for relitigation of 
the released claims.”  261 F.3d at 367 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  We noted that the position urged by the 
policyholders “would seriously undermine the possibility for 
settling any large, multi district class action.  Defendants in 
such suits would always be concerned that a settlement of the 
federal class action would leave them exposed to countless 
suits in state court despite settlement of the federal claims. . . . 
[S]uch state suits could number in the millions.”  Id.  It is for 
this reason that releases of all claims—whether state or 
federal—have been held valid, “provided they are based on 
 16 
 
The class action device and the concept of the private 
attorney general are  powerful instruments of social and 
economic policy.  Despite inherent tensions, they have proven 
efficacious in resolving mass claims when courts have 
insisted on structural, procedural, and substantive fairness.  
Among the goals are redress of injuries, procedural due 
process, efficiency, horizontal equity among injured 
claimants, and finality.  Arguably a legal system that permits 
robust litigation of mass claims should also provide ways to 
fairly and effectively resolve those claims.  Otherwise, mass 
claims will likely be resolved without independent review and 
court supervision.
11
 
                                                                                                     
the same factual predicate.”  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 326 n.82.  
So long as a sufficient factual predicate exists, a release can 
even bar later claims which could not have been brought in 
the court rendering the settlement judgment.  Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 377 (1996). 
11
 The final draft of the American Law Institute’s Principles 
of the Law of Aggregate Litigation points out the current lack 
of judicial oversight over non-class aggregate settlement.  § 
3.15 cmt. a (2010).  It notes that, unlike class settlements, 
“[n]on-class aggregate settlements are governed primarily by 
ethical rules and are rarely subject to court review or approval 
for fairness” and so advocates “a fresh look . . . at how non-
class aggregate settlements should be regulated.”  Id.  In 
particular, it proposes a rule to provide each plaintiff a 
nonwaivable right to challenge in court a settlement that is 
allegedly “not procedurally and substantively fair and 
reasonable.”  § 3.18(a).  The ALI Principles analogizes these 
 17 
 
                                                                                                     
proposed requirements to those applied to class settlements.  
§ 3.17 cmt. e.  
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Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., (Nos. 08-2784/2785/2798/ 
2799/2818/2819/2831/2881) 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, joined by SMITH, Circuit Judge, 
 dissenting  
 
 This is the Majority’s considered view of the law: in 
certifying a class action, it makes no difference whether the 
class is defined to include members who lack any claim at all.  
As my colleagues in the Majority see it, “were we to mandate 
that a class include only those alleging ‘colorable’ claims, we 
would effectively rule out the ability of a defendant to 
achieve ‘global peace’ by obtaining releases from all those 
who might wish to assert claims, meritorious or not.”  (Slip 
Op. at 66.)  So, “come one, come all,” regardless of 
substantive legal rights.  That remarkable declaration sets the 
class action ship in our Circuit badly adrift.  
 
 To be clear, the problem with the enormous, 
nationwide class most particularly at  issue in this case is not 
that it may include people with marginal or dubious claims.  
The class of indirect purchasers of De Beers diamonds 
actually presents a far more troubling problem than that.  It 
includes people who have no legal claim whatsoever.  That is 
clear on the face of the statutory and decisional law of several 
states whose laws are invoked as the basis for this class 
action,1
                                              
1 More precisely, we are dealing here with a set of 
class actions, since the settlement involves the resolution of 
several cases, as the Majority opinion notes.  For ease of 
reference, however, I will often refer to these matters in the 
singular. 
 and no one has been able to mount a cogent argument 
2 
 
to the contrary.  Despite the Majority’s elaborate construction 
and dismantling of straw man arguments about commonality 
and predominance, those state laws ought to stand as an 
insurmountable barrier to any proper certification of a 
nationwide indirect purchaser class.  By treating the dictates 
of state law as irrelevant, to be passed over in the name of 
“global peace,” the Majority has endorsed the fabrication of 
substantive rights where none before existed.  This is, in 
short, a bad day for Rule 23, for federalism, and for those 
who thought the Rules Enabling Act was a restraint on 
judicial legislating.  I therefore dissent. 
 
I.   Where We Agree 
 
The Majority devotes much attention to the question of 
whether “commonality and predominance are defeated 
merely because available rights and remedies differ under the 
several laws that form the basis for the class claims.”  (Slip 
Op. at 45-46.)  In addressing that question, the Majority 
inaccurately characterizes the now-vacated panel opinion as 
having required “that everyone in a class must allege 
precisely identical or ‘uniform’ causes of action.”2
                                              
2 The Majority is oddly persistent in this confusion.  
Despite the clear language in the panel opinion and repeated 
assurance in this dissent that class members need not all share 
a “uniform cause of action” to satisfy the requirements of 
Rule 23, the Majority continues to say by implication and 
assertion that the panel opinion suggested that all members of 
the class must assert a “uniform” cause of action or “identical 
… issues or claims.”  See Slip Op. at 46 (“We have never 
required the presentation of identical or uniform issues or 
claims as a prerequisite to certification of a class.”); id. at 48 
  (Slip Op. 
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at 48 (citing Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 613 F.3d 134, 
149 (3d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted and vacated by 
Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 619 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 
2010)).  But the panel opinion made no such statement, nor 
have the objectors claimed that all class members must share 
a “uniform cause of action.”  The only “uniformity” required 
by the panel opinion, or argued for by the objectors, is that at 
least some “question of law or fact regarding [class 
members’] legal rights [be] uniform throughout the class.”  
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 149.  Insisting that there be a uniform 
question of law or fact is nothing more than an application of 
the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement that there be “questions of law 
or fact common to the class.”   The Majority’s assertion that 
the panel demanded there be uniform causes of action – a 
requirement far different than requiring uniform questions – 
is unfounded and should not detain us any longer. 
 
On this much we can agree: that, as the Majority says, 
“where a defendant’s singular conduct gives rise to one cause 
of action in one state, while providing for a different cause of 
action in another jurisdiction, the courts may group both 
claims in a single class action.”  (Slip Op. at 48.)  If that were 
                                                                                                     
(“Nothing in our case law or the language of Rule 23 
commands that everyone in a class must allege precisely 
identical or ‘uniform’ causes of action … and statutory 
variations do not defeat predominance in the presence of 
other exceedingly common issues.” (internal citations 
omitted)); id. at 60 n.36 (“The Panel … seemingly 
conclude[ed] that plaintiffs could only prevail if each putative 
class member alleged either a ‘uniform’ antitrust cause of 
action, a ‘uniform’ consumer protection cause of action, or a 
‘uniform’ unjust enrichment claim.”).   
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the case before us, we would have unanimity.  The problem, 
though, is that the defendants’ singular conduct here gives 
rise to causes of action in some states while providing for no 
cause of action at all in others.  Under these circumstances, 
there can be no grouping of claims into a single class action, 
because, by definition, some would-be class members have 
no claim.  As a result, and as discussed in the following 
section, there can be no common questions of law or fact with 
respect to that subset of would-be class members and, 
therefore, neither the commonality requirement of Rule 
23(a)(2) nor the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) 
can be satisfied. 
 
II.   Commonality And Predominance Under Rule 23 
 
The objectors3
                                              
3 Both before the panel and the en banc court, objector 
Susan M. Quinn has taken the lead on the issues of 
commonality and predominance, and my references to the 
arguments of the objectors come from her briefs.  
 have challenged the commonality of the 
indirect purchaser class, stating that “putative class members 
who do not even have an arguable cause of action under 
applicable law do not qualify for inclusion in a class action 
for failure to satisfy [the] Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of 
‘questions of law or fact common to the class.’”  
(Supplemental Brief of Appellant Susan M. Quinn on 
Rehearing En Banc at 11-12 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a)(2).)  While they initially couched their arguments about 
commonality in terms of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), 
the objectors’ position has always been that common 
questions of law or fact do not predominate because there 
simply are no questions of law or fact common to the entire 
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class of indirect purchasers.  (See, e.g., Brief for Appellant 
Susan M. Quinn at 32 (“The evidence supporting a lack of 
commonality is abundant.”); id. at 38 (“[T]he question of 
antitrust conspiracy is not common to the class.”); id. at 44 
(“The district court did not even determine that there was a 
common question involving unjust enrichment.”); id. at 45 
(“The district court did not find a common question regarding 
[the consumer protection/deceptive trade practice] claims.”).)   
The panel opinion thus addressed the objectors’ arguments in 
that light, holding that there was no predominance because 
there were no questions of law or fact common to the entire 
class.  Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 148 (“[T]here can be no 
certification of a nationwide class of state indirect purchaser 
plaintiffs because there is no common question of law or 
material fact.”). 
 
 Ultimately, though, whether the objectors’ argument is 
framed as a Rule 23(a)(2) commonality challenge or a Rule 
23(b)(3) predominance challenge is immaterial.4
                                              
4 Although the parties do not particularly press the 
issue in their briefs, an argument can be made that the 
proposed class might also fail to meet the requirements of 
Rule 23(a)(4), which provides that a court may certify a class 
only if “the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).  
By proposing a class that consists of individuals who have no 
cause of action under state or federal law, the class 
representatives have diluted the recovery for those who 
actually have claims.  Moreover, the class representatives also 
unnecessarily incur the cost of giving notice under Rule 23 to 
individuals who have no right to relief, as well as the cost of 
compensating class counsel for undertaking unnecessary tasks 
  As noted by 
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the Majority, we have said before that “‘we consider the Rule 
23(a) commonality requirement to be incorporated into the 
more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, and 
therefore deem it appropriate to analyze the two factors 
together.’”  (Slip Op. at 37 (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 266 (3d Cir. 2009)).)  
Whatever label we hang on the objectors’ argument, it always 
has been clear that their basic contention is that there are no 
questions of law or fact common to all class members, which 
necessarily means that common questions do not 
predominate.  Whether coined as a Rule 23(a)(2) problem or 
as a Rule 23(b)(3) problem, the determinative question of 
commonality is the same. 
 
The Majority spends little time explaining what makes 
questions “common,” but the principle they seem to espouse 
                                                                                                     
associated with such notice.  Cf. In the Matter of Aqua Dots 
Prods. Liability Litig., No. 10-3847, 2011 WL 3629723, at *3 
(7th Cir. 2011) (“A representative who proposes that high 
transaction costs (notice and attorneys’ fees) be incurred at 
the class members’ expense to obtain a refund that is already 
on offer is not adequately protecting the class members’ 
interests.” (citing Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627 
F.3d 289, 293-94 (7th Cir. 2010))).  Those costs reduce the 
total amount of recovery available to the appropriate 
members of the proposed class (i.e., individuals who may 
assert an antitrust claim under federal or state law).  In other 
words, a class representative who unnecessarily increases the 
cost of litigating a class action by including improper 
plaintiffs in the class definition is at risk of being found to not 
“adequately protect the interests of the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a)(4). 
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is that questions are common when the “defendant’s conduct 
was common as to all of the class members” and when “all of 
the class members were harmed by the defendant’s conduct.”  
(Slip Op. at 38.)  Based on that, the Majority asserts that, as to 
the indirect purchaser class, “each class member shares a 
similar legal question arising from whether De Beers engaged 
in a broad conspiracy that was aimed to and did affect 
diamond prices in the United States” (Slip Op. at 43 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)) and shares “common factual 
questions as to whether De Beers ‘acted in concert to 
artificially fix, maintain, and stabilize prices and to 
monopolize trade and commerce in the market for polished 
diamonds.’”  (Slip Op. at 43 (quoting App. 278-79).)  Those 
questions are common to the class, according to the Majority, 
because the “allegations are unaffected by the particularized 
conduct of individual class members, as proof of liability and 
liability itself would depend entirely upon De Beers’s 
allegedly anticompetitive activities.”  (Slip Op. at 43.)   
 
In seeking to justify its “welcome all comers” 
approach to class certification, the Majority has produced an 
internally inconsistent definition of commonality.  On the one 
hand, as just noted, the Majority emphasizes that “proof of 
liability and liability itself would depend entirely upon De 
Beers’s allegedly anticompetitive activities” (Slip Op. at 43), 
as if no reference need be made to the status of individual 
class members.  Indeed, if one examines what the Majority 
identifies as “common factual questions” and “similar legal 
question[s,]” it is apparent that no reference to anyone but De 
Beers is called for, which means that the class is entirely 
unbounded.  Everyone in the world could share in a class 
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defined on those lines.5
 
  On the other hand, evidently 
recognizing the problem with a commonality definition that 
looks only at De Beers’s activities, the Majority adds as 
something of an afterthought that, well yes, there must be 
some limiting feature of the class and that feature is injury; 
class members must have been injured by De Beers’s 
unlawful conduct.  (Slip Op. at 38.)   
Of course, as soon as one acknowledges that 
commonality requires a consideration of whether class 
members have sustained injury, one ought also have to 
acknowledge, by logic grounded in hornbook law, that 
“injury” is not an abstraction but rather refers to a concrete 
and legally cognizable injury.  A definition of commonality 
that says, in effect, “if you feel wronged, you have a claim” is 
a giant step away from precedent and the underlying premise 
of Rule 23, which is designed to efficiently handle claims 
recognized by law, not to create new claims.  Cf. Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1442 (2010) (“Congress authorized ... promulgat[ion] 
[of] rules of procedure subject to its review, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(a), but with the limitation that those rules ‘shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ 
§ 2072(b).”).  Never before has any court, to my knowledge, 
tried to take the position effectively adopted by the Majority 
here, namely that, in deciding commonality, one need not be 
                                              
5 If one were actually to accept a test that looked solely 
at the behavior of the alleged wrongdoer, it would make no 
difference who was in the class.  Thus, in this case, it would 
be appropriate to certify a class consisting of everyone on 
earth, regardless of diamond purchases, since the supposedly 
common questions would stay the same.  
9 
 
concerned with whether the alleged injuries of class members 
are legally cognizable.6
 
 
In stark contrast to the Majority’s practically limitless 
definition of commonality is the measured definition provided 
by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  The Court 
there clarified the meaning of “commonality” under Rule 23, 
saying that the concept is “easy to misread.”  Id. at 2551.  In a 
passage particularly apropos of the Majority’s new rule, the 
Supreme Court said: 
 
[A]ny competently crafted class complaint 
literally raises common ‘questions,’  For 
example: Do all of us plaintiffs indeed work for 
Wal-Mart?  Do our managers have discretion 
over pay?  Is that an unlawful employment 
practice?  What remedies should we get?  
                                              
6 While trying to distance itself from the consequences 
of its own ruling today, the Majority asserts that the “[indirect 
purchaser] class members … possess a legally cognizable 
injury acknowledged in hornbook law, as their injuries are 
real, and stem not from simply feeling ‘wronged,’ as the 
dissent suggests …, but from De Beers’s alleged anti-
competitive conduct, conduct which antitrust laws forbid.”  
(Slip Op. at 44-45.)  If only my colleagues in the Majority 
actually applied that assertion, this dissent would be 
unnecessary, since the assertion concedes that (1) recovery 
should be preconditioned on the existence of an injury that is 
legally cognizable, and (2) whether an injury is legally 
cognizable depends on the operative substantive law. 
10 
 
Reciting those questions is not sufficient to 
obtain class certification. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Emphasizing a point that the Majority ignores, the Court 
explained that “‘[w]hat matters to class certification … is not 
the raising of common ‘questions’ – even in droves – but, 
rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate 
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’”  Id. 
(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age 
of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).  In 
other words, common questions must have answers that “will 
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of 
the claims in one stroke.”  Id.  Thus, as defined by Dukes, 
“common questions” are those that, because they have 
answers that will affect the validity of all class members’ 
claims, can be said to be legally relevant.7
 
   
A necessary corollary of that definition is that, for 
there to be any common questions, all class members must 
have at least some colorable legal claim.8
                                              
7 Similarly, if predominance means anything, it must 
mean that the resolution of something will actually affect 
somehow the claims of all class members.  The claims might 
vary among the class members, but, at a minimum, some 
legal right to recover has to be held by everyone in the class. 
  Otherwise, it is 
8 A colorable claim is one that at least “appear[s] to be 
true, valid, or right.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 301(9th ed. 
2009).  Requiring a district court to consider whether a claim 
appears to be valid before certifying class, when the court is 
expressly apprised of good reasons to doubt the same, does 
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nonsense to speak of “resolv[ing] an issue that is central to 
the validity of each one of the claims ….”  Id.  It cannot be 
sufficient, as the Concurring Opinion in this case suggests, 
simply for each class member to have “some pleaded claim.”  
(Concurrence Slip Op. at 12.)  Merely pleading a claim is not 
enough, because “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading 
standard.  A party seeking class certification must … prove 
that there are in fact … common questions of law or fact. … 
[S]ometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe 
behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification 
question.”  Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 
552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he requirements set out 
in Rule 23 are not mere pleading rules.  The court may delve 
beyond the pleadings to determine whether the requirements 
for class certification are satisfied.” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)).  As the panel opinion explained it, “to 
obtain certification of an indirect purchaser class, plaintiffs 
would have to show that all class members share a right to 
recover for antitrust harms, such that one or more common 
issues affect all members’ claims.”9
                                                                                                     
not transform the Rule 23 inquiry into one under Rule 
12(b)(6), as I discuss infra.   
  Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 
154. 
9 To the extent that the quoted statement, read in 
isolation, might suggest a rule that all class members had to 
share an antitrust claim, the context of the statement – coming 
after a discussion of other types of statutory or common law 
claims that might give rise to common questions – makes it 
clear that the panel was requiring only that all class members’ 
right to recover arise from the same harm or injury – 
something unambiguously required under Supreme Court 
12 
 
Dukes’s instruction that, for questions to be “common” 
in the sense contemplated by Rule 23, their answers must 
affect the validity of claims, does not set forth a new 
principle.10
                                                                                                     
precedent.  See, e.g., Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 1551 
(“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
class members have suffered the same injury.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
  In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the 
10 The following passage in the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 
articulates this basic principle: 
The legal and factual issues involved in any 
individual civil claim are a function of 
applicable substantive law. … Factual issues 
concern disputes about whether the evidence at 
trial demonstrates, under the applicable standard 
of proof, the existence of a given element. … A 
factual issue may rise to the level of a common 
issue if … a common body of evidence to be 
presented on behalf of multiple claimants at 
trial is capable of proving the existence of a 
material fact as to all such claimants. 
ALI, Principles of Law: Aggregate Litigation 
§ 2.01(b)(2010).  Thus, the treatise supports the proposition 
that in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s commonality 
requirement, there must be some “material” issue.  
Materiality is a “function of applicable substantive law.”  See 
id.; In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 659 F.3d 282, 290 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“A material fact is ‘[a] fact[] that might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” (quoting 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))).  
13 
 
Supreme Court, in a discussion of predominance, said that the 
common questions that matter are those “that qualify each 
class member’s case as a genuine controversy.”  521 U.S. 
591, 623 (1997).  It seems self-evident that there can be no 
“genuine controversy” with respect to plaintiffs whose claims 
are nonexistent as a matter of substantive law.  Likewise, in 
Hydrogen Peroxide, we noted that Rule 23 requires plaintiffs 
to show that the elements of their claim are “capable of proof 
at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather 
than individual to its members.”  552 F.3d at 311-12.  Again, 
for plaintiffs who lack any claim, there are certainly no 
elements of a claim that are “capable of proof,” either 
common or individual.  Accordingly, in assessing 
commonality or predominance, an inherent step is deciding 
that class members possess at least some legal basis for 
asserting a claim.   
 
By misconstruing Supreme Court precedent, the 
Majority denies that district courts have either the need or the 
power to take that essential step.  My colleagues declare that 
“[a] court may inquire [at the class certification stage] 
whether the elements of asserted claims are capable of proof 
through common evidence, but lacks authority to adjudge the 
legal validity or soundness of the substantive elements of 
asserted claims.”  (Slip Op. at 55 (emphasis added).)  
However, the Majority’s position is contrary to what the 
Supreme Court has just said in Dukes: 
 
                                                                                                     
By necessary implication, if certain members of the proposed 
class cannot assert a claim under either federal or state law, 
then there can be no common questions of law or fact that are 
“material.”   
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A statement in one of our prior cases, Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974), 
is sometimes mistakenly cited … :  “We find 
nothing in either the language or history of Rule 
23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in 
order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action.”  But in that case, 
the judge had conducted a preliminary inquiry 
into the merits of a suit, not in order to 
determine the propriety of certification under 
Rules 23(a) and (b) (he had already done that, 
see id. at 165), but in order to shift the cost of 
notice required by Rule 23(c)(2) from the 
plaintiff to the defendants.  To the extent the 
quoted statement goes beyond the permissibility 
of a merits inquiry for any other pretrial 
purpose, it is the purest dictum and is 
contradicted by our other cases. 
 
131 S. Ct. at 2552.  Thus, any suggestion that a district court 
is prevented from “adjudging the legal validity or soundness 
of the substantive elements of asserted claims” at the class 
certification stage is clearly mistaken after Dukes.  That 
should already have been clear, however, from our statement 
in Hydrogen Peroxide that “[a] concern for merits-avoidance 
should not be talismanically invoked to artificially limit a trial 
court’s examination of the factors necessary to a reasoned 
determination of whether a plaintiff has met her burden of 
establishing each of the Rule 23 class action requirements.”  
552 F.3d at 318 n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 The Majority repeatedly suggests that requiring 
adherence to substantive law would “introduce a Rule 
12(b)(6) inquiry as to every claim in the class.”  (Slip Op. at 
54.)  More specifically, my colleagues in the Majority say 
that, if my approach were followed, “district courts would be 
obligated at the class certification stage to, sua sponte, 
conduct a thorough Rule 12(b)(6) analysis of every … claim 
to ensure that each plaintiff … possesses a valid cause of 
action … .”  (Slip Op. at 61.)  That characterization is 
incorrect.  Rather, I advocate a procedure essentially identical 
to the one that occurred here:  A district court is approached 
with a class complaint requesting relief under a variety of 
state statutes.  Because of differences among those statutes, it 
is clear that some class members are entirely without a 
cognizable claim.  Objectors bring those issues to the district 
court’s attention.  Because “such variances … are so 
significant as to defeat commonality and predominance even 
in a settlement class certification,” In re Warfarin Sodium 
Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 529-30 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(hereinafter “Warfarin Sodium II”), the district court should 
deny certification.  Assuming the parties revise the class to 
eliminate claims clearly lacking a colorable legal basis, and 
assuming the class otherwise satisfies Rule 23, the district 
court could then certify the class.11
                                              
11 There are at least two other problems with the 
Majority’s assertion that “[t]o adopt the position of the dissent 
and the objectors is to introduce a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry as to 
every claim in the class before a class may be certified.”  
(Slip Op. at 59.)  First, it ducks the difficulty at the center of 
this case, which is not and never has been about merely 
dubious claims.  Claims that are of doubtful quality still have, 
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 Note that the court in this hypothetical has neither 
performed a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry, nor conducted an 
                                                                                                     
as the adjective indicates, some doubt about them, which 
means they still retain at least some superficial possibility of 
being valid.  Such claims, because they cling to that 
possibility, will typically not need to cause a district judge 
any agita in addressing the certification of a class for 
settlement purposes.  The central problem in this case, 
however, goes beyond factual disputes or debatable points of 
law.  The problem here is that there are class members who, 
according to the plain terms of controlling law, have no claim 
at all, not even a dubious one.  We are not rightfully at liberty 
to ignore that, nor was the District Court.  The second 
problem with the Majority’s parade-of-horribles rhetoric in 
response to the suggestion that class members should actually 
have claims (see Slip Op. at 60-66) is that objectors have 
always been entitled to raise a legal challenge to claims being 
included in a class, even a settlement class.  Cf. Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320  (“[A] district court exercising 
proper discretion in deciding whether to certify a class will ... 
make findings that each Rule 23 requirement is met or not 
met, having considered all relevant evidence and arguments 
presented by the parties.”).  In other words, district courts 
have always been required to ensure that the requisites of 
Rule 23 have been met, and that includes an obligation to 
address the non-frivolous arguments and objections that are 
put to them.  A court does not need to assess sua sponte every 
potential problem, nor need it engage in “an intensive 
cataloguing of each class member’s claim” (Slip Op. at 62), 
but it must give objections their due. 
17 
 
individualized assessment of claims. 12
                                              
12 The Majority’s recoiling at the individualized 
assessment of claims also reflects a failure to appreciate that 
some such assessment does typically take place at some point 
during the settlement process.  The parties share a common 
interest in ensuring that individuals falling outside the class 
do not share the benefits of the settlement.  For that reason, a 
class member here must submit a proof of claim 
demonstrating his or her purchase of a diamond within the 
relevant time period.  As is often the case, parties to an 
antitrust settlement want to ensure that individuals seeking a 
share of the settlement actually bought a product with an 
allegedly inflated price, demonstrating their membership in 
the class.  See Warfarin Sodium II, 391 F.3d at 525.  Some 
settlements create elaborate systems for evaluating not only 
the validity but the severity of each class member’s injury.  
See In re Prudential Sales Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent 
Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 295-96 (3d Cir. 1998).  These proofs 
of claim are rarely evaluated by the court.  “Although the 
court has general supervisory powers over settlements, it 
usually does not handle the actual administration.  As a rule, 
the administration is delegated either to a special master or to 
the plaintiff’s counsel or a committee of counsel.”  4 Alba 
Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions 
§ 11:33 at 68-69 (4th ed. 2002).  It is universally recognized 
that the special master, committee, or other body created to 
administer the settlement agreement is responsible for 
evaluating the validity of claims and calculating the 
individualized recovery of a particular class member.  See 
David F. Herr, Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.661 (4th 
ed. 2011) (“The administrator or special master may be 
  It has simply engaged 
in a straightforward analysis of the applicable law.  This is by 
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no means unusual in considering the certification of a 
settlement class.  In Prudential, the plaintiffs “compiled a 
series of charts setting forth comprehensive analyses of the 
various states’ laws potentially applicable to their common 
law claims.”  148 F.3d at 315 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  There, we concurred with the district court’s 
conclusion that “the elements of the[] common law claims are 
substantially similar and any differences fall into a limited 
number of predictable patterns.”  Id.   
 
In short, I have proposed only what the law has 
heretofore always required:  one must actually have a legal 
claim before getting in line for a legal recovery.  When 
objections are raised that persuasively demonstrate that a 
portion of a proposed class does not have any such claim, 
courts of law are obliged to follow the law.  That is the 
circumstance we face, as was detailed at length in the panel 
opinion and is again described briefly herein.  
 
III.   Some Class Members Lack A Claim 
 
 As noted by the Majority, the indirect purchasers in the 
consolidated actions “sought damages pursuant only to state 
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment statutes 
and common law.”  (Slip Op. at 16.)  Unlike the direct 
purchasers, the indirect purchasers did not seek damages 
under federal law, because, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), 
                                                                                                     
charged with reviewing the claims and deciding whether to 
allow claims that are late, deficient in documentation, or 
questionable for other reasons.”). 
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only direct purchasers may bring an antitrust claim under 
federal law. 
 
Although most states have traditionally followed 
federal law in interpreting their own state antitrust laws, some 
have enacted “Illinois Brick Repealers,” rejecting the rule that 
only direct purchasers may recover for an antitrust violation.  
See, e.g., CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a).  By contrast, 
others have expressly followed Illinois Brick and declared 
unequivocally that, in their states, indirect purchasers lack 
standing to bring a claim.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Microsoft 
Corp., 834 N.E.2d 791, 798 (Ohio 2005).  Several states have 
been even more precise, explaining that indirect purchasers 
lack standing to bring what is effectively an antitrust claim, 
regardless of how the claim is labeled, so that recovery is 
precluded even if, for example, it is sought under a consumer 
protection act (“CPA”) or the common law.  See, e.g., Abbott 
Labs., Inc. (Ross Labs. Div.) v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 507 
(Tex. 1995) (“We will not interpret the [Texas CPA] in a 
manner that rewards creative pleading at the expense of 
consistent application of legal principles. …  Our holding 
today only forecloses the recovery of damages for seeking a 
prohibited antitrust recovery under the masquerade of our 
[CPA].”); Johnson, 834 N.E.2d at 801 (holding that Ohio 
antitrust statute “provides the exclusive remedy for” claims 
predicated upon “monopolistic pricing practices,” and thus 
dismissing claims under Ohio’s CPA and common law).  In at 
least some states, then, indirect purchasers are absolutely 
precluded from bringing an antitrust claim, no matter how 
they dress it up.13
                                              
13 For a more detailed discussion of which states 
preclude claims entirely, see Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 147-48 & 
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n.10-11, 150-51.  According to the Majority, the panel 
opinion “undertook a wide-ranging fact-finding review of 
state antitrust statutes … .”  (Slip Op. at 29.)  That description 
is puzzling, however, because there was no fact-finding 
involved.  The review of state law was just that: a review of 
law.  The panel opinion took the very ordinary approach of 
examining the laws on which the plaintiffs purported to base 
their claims, including state antitrust laws.  The opinion also 
stated:  
We are certainly not saying that nuanced 
differences among state laws will prevent the 
certification of a class, nor are we suggesting 
that a state-by-state cataloguing of differences 
in state law is necessary every time a multi-
jurisdiction class is certified.  We are saying 
that the difference between having an antitrust 
claim under state law and having none is no 
mere nuance and cannot be solved by any 
reconfiguration of the nationwide class short of 
changing it from a nationwide class to one or 
more classes that exclude those who have no 
claim.  
Sullivan,  613 F.3d at 148 n.12.  Both the Majority and the 
Concurring Opinions claim that it is wrong for us to pay 
attention to the differences in state law because, as the 
Concurrence puts it, “trial courts would be obligated at the 
settlement class certification stage to decide which state’s law 
would govern … .”  (Concurrence Slip Op. at 9.)  It bears 
repeating, then, that nothing said by the panel opinion or in 
this dissent would entail the cataloguing of differences in 
state law in the mine run of cases.  However, when, as in this 
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Nevertheless, the Majority declares that those class 
members whose claims purportedly arise in states that 
preclude indirect purchaser recovery can still be part of the 
indirect purchaser class.  The Majority offers two arguments 
in support of that conclusion.  First, noting that indirect 
purchasers lack only statutory standing under Illinois Brick, 
rather than Article III standing, the Majority asserts that 
“statutory standing is simply another element of proof for an 
antitrust claim, rather than a predicate for asserting a claim in 
the first place.”  (Slip Op. at 59.)  The Majority does not cite 
any authority to support that assertion, and there is reason to 
doubt it.14
                                                                                                     
case, an objection has been raised pointing out that there is a 
body of claims that are undeniably impermissible under the 
law of the state which governs them, we are not free to shirk 
the responsibility of separating those unfounded claims from 
the class. 
   But, in any event, it misses the point.  Even if the 
14 It is not clear, to begin with, that the Majority’s 
“statutory standing” label accurately describes the substantive 
law of the several states denying a claim to indirect 
purchasers.  That aside, and although a dismissal for lack of 
statutory standing may be viewed as akin to a dismissal under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Baldwin v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(noting that “[a] dismissal for lack of statutory standing is 
effectively the same as a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim”), compelling authority teaches that the absence of 
statutory standing can also implicate the court’s power to 
adjudicate a dispute under Article III, see Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“Dismissal 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the 
adequacy of the federal claim is proper … when the claim is 
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so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of 
this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to 
involve a federal controversy.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  We have suggested this ourselves, see Malaysia 
Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd., 436 F.3d 349, 
359 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that “non-Article III jurisdictional 
issues like statutory standing” fit within a category of cases 
somewhere between cases that have “jurisdictional issues that 
cannot be bypassed because Article III of our Constitution 
requires that they be addressed” and cases “with merits-
related issues, which cannot be reached without first verifying 
jurisdiction” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), 
rev'd on other grounds, 549 U.S. 422 (2007), and other 
circuits have held the same, see Crawford v. Lamantia, 34 
F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1994) (statutory standing under ERISA) 
(“[W]e note that the basis for ‘[s]tanding, since it goes to the 
very power of the court to act, must exist at all stages of the 
proceeding, and not merely when the action is initiated or 
during an initial appeal.’”);  Alexander v. Anheuser Busch 
Co., 990 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1993) (statutory standing 
under ERISA) (“In reviewing Alexander’s ERISA claims, we 
raise, sua sponte, the question whether he has standing to 
bring such claims.  The issue of standing is jurisdictional in 
nature.”);  Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit 
Sharing Trust v. Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(statutory standing under ERISA) (“We have recognized, 
however, that standing is essential to the exercise of 
jurisdiction, and that lack of standing can be raised at any 
time by a party or by the court.”); cf. Mainstreet Org. of 
Realtors v. Calumet City, 505 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Posner, J.) (describing lack of statutory standing under 
Illinois Brick as “not jurisdictional, at least in the 
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Majority’s ipse dixit were true as to antitrust claims under 
federal law, there is no basis for saying it is so with respect to 
claims under the laws of the several states that have adopted 
the ultimate holding of Illinois Brick.  Indeed, in several of 
those states, courts have indicated that indirect purchasers are 
barred from asserting a claim because they lack standing.15
                                                                                                     
conventional sense[,]” but nonetheless “belong[ing] to an 
intermediate class of cases in which a court can notice an 
error and reverse on the basis of it even though no party has 
noticed it”). 
  
For instance, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “an 
indirect purchaser of goods may not assert a Valentine Act [, 
i.e., a state antitrust act] claim for alleged violations of Ohio 
antitrust law.”  Johnson, 834 N.E.2d at 798.  Likewise, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “indirect 
15 Whether a party has standing under Article III is a 
distinct inquiry from whether the party may assert a cause of 
action under state or federal law.  In Bond v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 2355, 2362 (2011), the Supreme Court made clear 
that a party may have standing under Article III, but fail to 
assert a cause of action under state law.  See id. at 2362 
(“Still, the question whether a plaintiff states a claim for relief 
‘goes to the merits’ in the typical case, not the justiciability of 
a dispute, and conflation of the two concepts can cause 
confusion.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).  
However, even assuming indirect purchasers have standing 
under Article III, they have no claim under federal law and 
many of them lack standing to assert any claim under relevant 
state law.  Because the proposed class includes such 
individuals, it cannot satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s commonality 
requirement. 
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purchasers … have no standing to assert a private right of 
action under the New Jersey Antitrust Act.”  Wilson v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 921 A.2d 414, 416 (N.J. 2007).  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court has said the same, explaining that 
Connecticut law allows “only those consumers who purchase 
directly from the antitrust defendant to bring suit under our 
state antitrust law.”  Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 
1048, 1058 (Conn. 2002).  Thus, it is clear that there are 
states that decidedly do treat statutory standing16
 
 as “a 
predicate for asserting a claim in the first place.”  (Slip Op. at 
59.)   
Second, the Majority asserts, using the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s Johnson case as an example, that “although Johnson 
provides that an indirect purchaser lacking an antitrust claim 
under Illinois Brick cannot circumvent this limitation by 
relying upon the Ohio consumer protection statute, the Ohio 
Supreme Court did not, nor could it, preclude consumer 
protection claims predicated on fraud or deception.”  (Id. at 
64 n.39.)  The Majority then says that “claims settled here 
include allegations of fraud and deception separate from the 
antitrust allegations.”  (Id. at 64 n.39.)  While the Majority is 
correct that Ohio does not “preclude consumer protection 
claims predicated on fraud or deception,” it is not correct that 
such claims were brought in this case under the Ohio CPA – 
or under the CPA of any state following Illinois Brick.  Of the 
seven complaints covered by the proposed class action 
settlement, only two made allegations referencing violations 
of the Ohio CPA, Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., No. 04-cv-
                                              
16 Again, assuming that “statutory standing” is the 
appropriate description of the principle under state law.  See 
supra n.13. 
25 
 
02819 (D.N.J.) and Null v. DB Investments, Inc., No. 05-L-
209 (S.D. Ill.), and both of those complaints predicated their 
Ohio CPA claims on monopolistic pricing practices.  In 
Sullivan, the only allegation with respect to the Ohio CPA is 
that “Defendants’ contract, combination and conspiracy in 
unreasonable restraint of trade and to monopolize and 
defendants’ monopolization constitute a violation of various 
state antitrust and/or consumer protection and deceptive and 
unfair business practices acts and laws.”  (App. at 652 ¶ 47.)  
Likewise, the allegations in Null are that the CPA “laws of 
the various states” were violated “through one or more of the 
following unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or practices:  
illegally and artificially restraining trade and increasing the 
price of diamonds by controlling inventory, limiting supply, 
restricting purchase and falsely advertising the scarceness of 
diamonds.”  (App. at 629 ¶ 61, 626 ¶ 45.)  Thus, the only 
claims brought under the Ohio CPA in any of the class 
actions now at issue were “predicated upon monopolistic 
pricing practices,” and, therefore, according to the highest 
court in Ohio, those claims are precluded.  Johnson, 834 
N.E.2d at 801.  
 
Moreover, even if any of the complaints could be 
construed as raising claims for fraud under some state 
CPAs,17
                                              
17 The Majority uses Ohio’s CPA as an example and 
does not discuss whether fraud claims were brought under the 
CPAs of other states following Illinois Brick.  Nonetheless, 
the pleading deficiency is the same for allegations involving 
the laws of other states.  The Sullivan and Null complaints are 
the only complaints to invoke the CPAs of the states 
following Illinois Brick and, as discussed above, neither of 
 those claims were, it appears, never brought to the 
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attention of, or considered by, the District Court, nor were 
they raised before the Panel.  As a result, the District Court 
made no findings with respect to fraud claims under state 
CPAs, including whether the elements of those claims could 
be proven by “evidence common to the class,” as required by 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 325.  Of the five common 
questions identified by the District Court, none pertain to 
fraud.18
                                                                                                     
those complaints allege fraud; they merely pin the “fraud” 
label on the price-fixing behavior at issue.  Consequently, 
there is no claim for fraud under the laws of any state 
adhering to Illinois Brick. 
  Thus, even if there were fraud claims for all class 
18 Those questions are:  
 
(a)  Whether [D]efendants combined or 
conspired with others to fix, raise, 
stabilize and maintain the prices of 
polished diamonds; 
(b)  Whether [D]efendants monopolized or 
combined or conspired with others to 
monopolize the supply of polished 
diamonds; 
(c)  Whether [D]efendants’ conduct caused 
the prices of polished diamonds to be 
maintained at higher levels than would 
exist in a competitive market; 
(d)  Whether [P]laintiffs and the Class[es] are 
entitled to injunctive relief; and 
(e)  Whether [D]efendants’ conduct caused 
injury to the business or property of 
[P]laintiffs and the other [Class and] 
Subclass Members and, if so, the 
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members – which, for the reasons I have identified, there are 
not – there has been no finding of commonality and 
predominance with respect to those claims and, therefore, the 
District Court’s class certification cannot rightly be affirmed 
on that basis.   
 
The bottom line is that, as to those class members who 
purport to bring claims under the laws of states following 
Illinois Brick, the status of being an indirect purchaser is not 
only the gateway to membership in the class, it is what 
entirely disqualifies them from asserting any claim based on 
De Beers’s price-fixing conduct.  That is a straightforward 
application of state law.19
                                                                                                     
appropriate class-wide measure of 
damages. 
  The class thus includes members 
 
(App. at 276.) 
 
19 In its effort to diminish the significance of the state 
laws denying a cause of action to indirect purchasers, the 
Majority likens those laws to pre-suit notice requirements or 
other issues of form that may vary from state to state.  (Slip 
Op. at 65.)  But we are not talking here about the niceties of 
notice.  In a class action invoking the laws of multiple 
jurisdictions, there will often be variations in the law 
pertaining to how a particular claim is to be presented.  Those 
variations may at times be framed as prerequisites to the 
bringing of a cause of action or restrictions on the manner in 
which the action is brought.  Were the aggregated claims to 
be brought individually, those prerequisites would in all 
likelihood be met on a claim-by-claim basis, but, since the 
claims are aggregated, those prerequisites are appropriately 
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who are barred from asserting a claim in the first place.  And, 
because those class members lack any claim, there are no 
questions common to all class members for which the 
answers “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of 
each one of the claims.”  Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551.  
Consequently, pursuant to long-standing principles of 
aggregate litigation, most recently reaffirmed in Dukes, there 
is neither commonality nor predominance under Rule 23.20
 
  
                                                                                                     
bypassed.  They amount to nothing more than variations in 
form, not in kind, and neither the panel opinion in this case 
nor the objectors nor this dissent have advocated the elevation 
of form over substance.  Differences in form are not at issue 
here; it is the very existence of any cause of action at all that 
is at stake.  The distinction is crucial. 
20 I am not suggesting that no class of indirect 
purchasers could have been certified here.  On the contrary, 
as the panel opinion noted,  
It may be that the antitrust and consumer 
protection statutes in a more limited number of 
states are sufficiently similar that common 
issues of law or fact would predominate with 
respect to plaintiffs in those jurisdictions.   
However, it was improper for the District Court 
to certify a nationwide class of plaintiffs based 
on state law when many states withhold 
antitrust standing from indirect purchasers and 
where the variability in consumer protection 
and unjust enrichment law in a context like this 
is extreme. 
Sullivan, 613 F.3d at 153-54. 
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IV.   The Rules Enabling Act and Federalism 
 
In addition to violating the terms of Rule 23, certifying 
this class violates the Rules Enabling Act and basic principles 
of federalism.  The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the 
creation of “rules of practice and procedure,” but states that 
“[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any 
substantive right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (b).  In Dukes, the 
Supreme Court highlighted the role of the Rules Enabling Act 
in class certification decisions, holding that, “[b]ecause the 
Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right,’” the proposed class 
could not be certified because it would have abridged 
Wal-Mart’s statutory right to litigate certain defenses.  131 
S.Ct. at 2561 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).  That point is 
consistent with the Court’s past cautionary statements that an 
overly expansive reading of Rule 23 will violate the Rules 
Enabling Act.  See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 
845 (1999) (“The Rules Enabling Act underscores the need 
for caution.  As we said in Amchem, no reading of the rule 
can ignore the Act’s mandate that rules of procedure shall not 
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613 (“We 
therefore follow the path taken by the Court of Appeals, 
mindful that Rule 23’s requirements must be interpreted in 
keeping with Article III’s constraints, and with the Rules 
Enabling Act, which instructs that rules of procedure ‘shall 
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.’” 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))). 
 
In this case, by approving certification of the indirect 
purchaser class, the Majority proceeds heedless of that advice 
and endorses the enlarging of substantive rights.  Using the 
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Majority’s example of a member of the indirect purchaser 
class asserting under Ohio law a claim based on De Beers’s 
price-fixing, it is indisputable that the same member would, if 
he tried to bring his claim individually in an Ohio court, be 
immediately shown the exit.21
                                              
21 The Majority tries to deny this, saying that a state 
court would only dismiss the invalid claim upon a motion by 
the defendant.  (Slip Op. at 71 n.43.)  But the procedural 
mechanism that prompts application of substantive law is 
irrelevant.  Whether or not a motion brings to light a claim’s 
fatal flaw, the flaw is there.  To continue with the Ohio law 
example, there is clearly no colorable claim for an indirect 
purchaser, and that is true whether or not a defendant chooses 
to file a motion to dismiss.  Ohio law does not depend on the 
whim of De Beers or any other defendant.  It is telling that the 
Majority’s rejoinder on this point is, in effect, “yes, the 
claimant could be tossed out of state court, but only if there 
were a motion.”  That seems a concession that the differing 
results that now obtain in this Circuit and in Ohio state courts 
reflect an expansion of substantive rights.  As to the “there 
must be a motion” comment, irrelevant and of questionable 
accuracy though it may be, it prompts re-emphasis of this 
fact: there was a motion in this case, in the form of the 
objections to the nationwide settlement of the indirect 
purchaser class.  Thus, the legal problem was squarely before 
the District Court, as it is now before us.  It does not matter 
that the motion came from someone other than De Beers.  
The issue has been raised and cannot be dodged by saying no 
one brought it up.  Nor can it be avoided by saying that De 
Beers could have settled an individual suit in Ohio.  We are 
obviously not dealing with the settlement of a dispute 
between private parties in Ohio state court; we are dealing 
  Controlling law allows no 
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result but dismissal of such a claim.  But, under the 
Majority’s class action certification theory, that individual 
now has a right to share in the settlement fund based on a 
claim he is otherwise forbidden to bring.  If that is not an 
enlargement or modification of substantive rights, it is hard to 
know what would be.  Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
130 S. Ct. at 1442 (stating that, for purposes of the Rules 
Enabling Act, a rule is substantive in nature if it alters the 
rules of decision by which courts adjudicate rights).  The 
Majority seems to have a “no harm, no foul” feeling about 
dispensing new rights, but legitimate class members are 
harmed.  If we enforced substantive law as we ought to, those 
who actually have claims would not be required to share the 
proceeds of a proper settlement with those who do not.22
                                                                                                     
with a class action settlement binding on absent parties and 
sanctioned by a federal court purporting to apply Ohio law. 
 
22 Herein lies a fundamental flaw in the Concurring 
Opinion as well, which takes the view that “[u]nder Amchem 
the significance of variations in state law is properly assessed 
in terms of the interests of absent class members[,]” and that 
here class members from states adhering to Illinois Brick 
“have lost nothing through inclusion in the class.”  
(Concurrence Slip Op. at 10 n.7.)  Very true.  The problem 
here is not that some absent class members who deserve 
compensation are left out by the settlement.  The problem is 
that some class members who deserve nothing are included in 
the settlement and hence are diluting the recovery of those 
who are entitled to make claims.  That harm is real, and the 
cause of it, the overbreadth of the class, is akin to the problem 
in Amchem.  See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 (“But other 
specifications of [Rule 23] – those designed to protect 
absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class 
32 
 
 Certifying the indirect purchaser class is, for the same 
reasons, contrary to principles of federalism.  The policy 
decisions of the constituent states of our country are 
“fundamental aspect[s] of our federal republic and must not 
be overridden in a quest to clear the queue in court.”  In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 
2002).  When one of those states says to its citizens “you have 
no claim” – and the law covering many of the class members 
here is just that clear – but those under that edict nevertheless 
are joined in a class with people who do have a claim, by 
what logical process consistent with federalism can 
aggregating the “haves” and the “have-nots” imbue those 
“have-nots” with the very claim that the state has said is 
foreclosed to them?  There is no sound answer to that 
question.  There is only the Majority’s and the Concurrence’s 
policy preference, in derogation of controlling state law, for 
“global peace” through unfettered access to class action 
settlements.23
                                                                                                     
definitions – demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in 
the settlement context.”). 
 
23 The Majority cites Warfarin Sodium II in an effort to 
justify its decision today, but we were careful to say in that 
case that “there may be situations where variations in state 
law are so significant so as to defeat commonality and 
predominance even in a settlement class.”  391 F.3d at 529.  
That observation seems obvious and unassailable, and we are 
presented here with exactly that kind of situation.  If we 
cannot bring ourselves to say plainly that the certification 
here was improper, one is forced to wonder what limit is left 
on the reach of Rule 23. 
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 My colleagues in the Majority of course dispute that 
certifying this class implicates either the Rules Enabling Act 
or federalism.  With respect to the Rules Enabling Act, they 
say that there has been a “voluntary settlement agreement 
between parties” (Slip Op. at 70 (quoting Ehrheart v. Verizon 
Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010)), and “a district 
court’s certification of a settlement simply recognizes the 
parties’ deliberate decision to bind themselves according to 
mutually agreed-upon terms without engaging in any 
substantive adjudication of the underlying causes of action” 
(id.).  That may be so when a settlement involves only private 
parties who all participate in the settlement process, but it is 
not true in a class action settlement.  In that latter context, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require district courts to be 
intimately involved, because the approval of a class action 
settlement gives the government’s imprimatur to the terms of 
the settlement and binds absent parties.24
                                              
24 The Majority also writes that, in Prudential, “we 
agreed with the district court that ‘approval of a settlement 
under Rule 23 merely recognizes the parties’ voluntary 
compromise of their rights and does not itself affect their 
substantive state law rights,” and, therefore, held that “the 
proposed settlement could not violate the Rules Enabling 
Act.”  (Slip Op. at 70 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 324).)  
However, we also held in Prudential that the proposed 
settlement was not contrary to the cited state law, and, 
therefore, the Rules Enabling Act could not possibly have 
been implicated.  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 324 & n.77. 
  As already 
discussed, a court is not supposed to certify a class without 
determining that there is a “genuine controversy” or, in other 
words, that there is at least some legal basis for class 
members to claim relief.  If a district court credits potential 
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class members with having a valid claim when the underlying 
state law says there is none, the court has, by definition, 
enlarged and modified those class members’ rights.   
 
Moreover, while De Beers is now pleased to stipulate 
to liability in all fifty states, and, for its own purposes, is 
willing to forego legal arguments that it could have raised 
about the substantive rights of class members, a defendant’s 
willingness to waive an argument is not a reason to ignore it.  
It is rather the very reason that collusive settlements are a 
problem.  No matter how much De Beers wants to bind 
everyone in America, and no matter how much the attorneys 
involved stand to gain from their percentage of the settlement, 
and no matter how laudatory the “global” resolution of a 
price-fixing case may be as policy matter, there are limits on 
the power of federal courts to facilitate settlements and bind 
absent class members and objectors.  Amchem admonishes 
courts approving settlement classes to pay “undiluted, even 
heightened, attention” to issues of predominance as well as to 
the other requirements of Rule 23 to ensure that a certified 
class is not overbroad.  521 U.S. at 620.  Approving a class 
certification that groups together plaintiffs who have claims 
with those who plainly do not results in such a class. 
 
Furthermore, while the Majority speculates that the 
approach I suggest will seriously impede class action 
settlements, it is far from clear that limiting class certification 
to people who have legal claims would actually undermine 
the goal of global peace.  Indeed, as the Concurrence 
acknowledges, similar concerns in other cases have proved 
largely unfounded.  (Concurrence Slip Op. at 2.)  But even if 
one assumes that the Majority’s concerns about “global 
peace” have some merit, Rule 23 remains the sole benchmark 
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for determining whether a settlement class can be certified.  
In Amchem, the Supreme Court reiterated that point over 
Justice Breyer’s criticism that the Court had given insufficient 
weight to the value of settlement.  See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
629 (“Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the 
Rules Enabling Act and applied with the interests of absent 
class members in close view, cannot carry the large load 
CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it.”); 
id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the need for 
settlement of this mass tort case, with hundreds and thousands 
of lawsuits, is greater than the Court’s opinion suggests.”).  In 
Ortiz, the Court rejected a settlement expressly designed for 
“total peace,” 527 U.S. at 864-65, even as several justices 
acknowledged the need for a resolution to the “elephantine 
mass of asbestos cases,” id. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring).  We are not free to rewrite the requirements of 
Rule 23 simply because it would allegedly advance the goal 
of global peace. 
 
 The Majority also dismisses any federalism concern, 
reasoning that the policy concerns behind Illinois Brick do not 
apply.  As the Majority sees it, “Illinois Brick’s restriction on 
indirect purchaser recovery was motivated by prudential 
concerns for manageability; it does not reflect a categorical 
policy judgment that indirect purchasers do not merit antitrust 
protection.”  (Slip Op. at 72.)  Thus, says the Majority, 
because the “District Court’s certification order did not 
undermine these prudential concerns,” the District Court did 
not “inappropriately subordinate[] state sovereignty in 
certifying the class.”  (Slip Op. at 74-75.)  But regardless of 
the Majority’s novel views about the policy judgments 
underlying Illinois Brick and whether “indirect purchasers … 
merit antitrust protection,” the states which have chosen to 
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follow Illinois Brick have decided – and plainly stated – that 
indirect purchasers have no substantive right to recovery 
under their laws.  Principles of federalism do not permit us to 
write our own exceptions into unambiguous state laws simply 
because we think that the states would see things differently if 
only they had our policy insights.25
 
  Somehow, though, the 
Majority thinks that “the class settlement posture of this case 
largely marginalizes the objectors’ concern that state law 
variations undermine a finding of predominance.”  (Slip Op. 
at 49.)  Once again, the promise of settlement trumps 
everything else, even variations in state laws as wide as “you 
have a claim” versus “you have none.” 
V.   Conclusion  
 
I cannot voice strongly enough my disagreement with 
this elevation of settlement to the status of ultimate and 
overriding good.  (See Slip Op. at 66 (“[W]ere we to mandate 
that a class include only those alleging ‘colorable’ claims, we 
                                              
25 The Concurring Opinion’s assertion that the 
settlement of a class action is merely “a contract between the 
parties” (Concurrence Slip Op. at 12) misses this point, 
though the opinion adds a reference to Rule 23 (id. at 12-13 
n.8).  The states have an interest in not having their laws 
strained beyond recognition or ignored entirely.  A class 
action settlement, whether it involves a settlement or a 
litigation class, is not simply a private contract.  If it were, it 
would not need court approval, and federal courts called upon 
to supervise class actions, including resulting settlements, are 
obligated to see that Rule 23 does not become a tool for 
modifying state law. 
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would effectively rule out the ability of a defendant to 
achieve ‘global peace’ by obtaining releases from all those 
who might wish to assert claims, meritorious or not.”).  It has 
been aptly observed that “[s]ocial peace is not the Article III 
mission.”  Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The 
Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: the Illegitimacy 
of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 475 (1997).  Rather, we are to “decide 
cases or controversies.”  Id.  Social peace becomes a natural 
and very welcome byproduct of focusing on that specific 
mission, “because for every carefully wrought judicial 
decision, there may be hundreds or thousands of matters that 
are privately resolved ‘in the shadow’ of the law.”  Id.   
 
On its own terms, then, the Majority’s decision is 
short-sighted and counterproductive.  In the interest of short-
term peace, it sacrifices long-term legitimacy and, with that, a 
more stable, lasting peace.  By failing to enforce the limits of 
Rule 23, today’s decision will encourage frivolous class 
action claims and have the predictable consequence of 
weakening the incentives – the sheltering shadow – under 
which non-frivolous disputes would otherwise be properly 
resolved. 
 
 In sum, when a federal court issues an order certifying 
that there are questions of fact or law common to all class 
members, it necessarily concludes, whether explicitly stated 
or not, that all class members have at least some colorable 
legal claim.  When there are members of a putative class who 
do not, under the operative substantive law in a case, have a 
colorable claim, certification of the class enlarges the 
substantive rights of those members.  Any such order is thus a 
violation of the Rules Enabling Act, and, when it occurs in a 
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class whose only claims are based in state law, it also violates 
core principles of federalism.  The damage done by that 
judicial usurpation is not made better by invoking the benefits 
of social peace through litigation settlement.  Private parties 
have a free hand in settling their own disputes, but class 
action settlements require federal courts to determine the 
rights and obligations of people who are not there to speak for 
themselves – hence the Supreme Court’s insistence that class 
action settlements “demand undiluted, even heightened, 
attention … ,” especially when there is a risk of “unwarranted 
or overbroad class definitions,”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.  
That risk has been realized here. 
 
